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Abstract
July 1, 2013 marked Croatia's official induction into the European Union. For Croatia this
was the culmination of a long negotiation process filled with concessions and challenges. This
situation inspired the question of how Croatia's alliance with the EU has affected the state? In
order to analyze this relationship the aspects of Croatian identity and sovereignty were explored,
in addition to the EU's principles and problems regarding member and candidate states. The
evidence found within this investigation came from a number of literary sources ranging from
the academic to official government documents. Furthermore, nine interviews were conducted
within Croatia, which explored how the EU's influence has affected the Croatian state. Through
this research it was conclusively found that Croatia's alliance with the EU creates problems and
exasperates existing issues within the country. Furthermore, this situation showcases a pattern of
discrimination within the EU that benefits Western European EU states at the expense of its
Central and Eastern counterparts. As a result, the recommendations would be to promote
awareness of the double standards and discriminations occurring within the EU, which victimize
Central and Eastern European states, so that these countries may be able to preserve their identity
and sovereignty.
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Introduction
Background of the European Union
In recent years the European Union (EU) has become one of the most recognized and
powerful institutions within the world. Following the aftermath of WWII, the EU began as an
idea built around the concept of economic cooperation. The founding members which included
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg came together in order to
achieve the potential benefits and stability this unification could bring. The success of this
venture only encouraged these countries to become more interdependent with the hopes that
further prosperity would reveal itself in the future. This meant that the original partnership based
upon coal and steel and the European Common Market transitioned into the elimination of
custom codes held between the states, the development of common agricultural policies, and
ultimately the successful proposal of obtaining a common currency. The visible gains of the EU
establishment encouraged other countries within Europe to attempt to join the organization as
well. Ultimately, this desire led to the EU's expansion into Denmark, Ireland, the United
Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The enlargement not only meant the EU had acquired
strength in the added numbers, but it also meant that the organization had become one that was
largely comprised and led by Western European countries. Together with its expanded economic
policies the EU was quickly becoming an emerging contender within the modern world.1

1

"The History of the European Union 1945-1969," European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/19451959/index_en.htm.(September 20,2013).
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The EU's early triumphs also emboldened the institution to make a variety of changes.
One of the most noteworthy came in the form of politics. As the EU began to delve deeper into
economic interdependency, it likewise began to reflect on the idea of incorporating political laws
and bodies within the organization. Over time committees such as the European Commission
became an influential factor within the EU. The members of these EU bodies not only dealt with
the economic issues that were affecting the organization but political ones as well. As result,
these committees began to pass both economic and political laws that reflected the EU's goals
and principles.2 This meant that the EU had expanded from being a strong economic partnership
to a powerful political institution. In addition, the larger impact of these changes indicated that
the EU would be an influential and deciding factor not only economically, but politically within
each of its member states. As the EU has grown it has added policies relating to foreign relations,
culture, and the governments of its member states. The diverse expansion of EU power begs the
question of where the role of state's rights ends and the EU's begins. Essentially, the EU as a
joint economic and political entity leaves it an impressive force to be reckoned with, but one that
relies on the balance of control the supranational organization has with its member states.
The Issue of the EU's Expansion Eastward
The other major development affecting the EU and its growth was the demise of
communism. As the Soviet Union collapsed, it left many states that had formerly comprised the
Soviet Bloc a chance to regain their sovereignty and self determination. From the perspective of
the EU, this large transition within Europe provided an opportunity for the institution to gain
additional power in the form of new members. Thus the EU began to actively pursue the

2

"A Growing Community, European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1970-1979/index_en.htm
(September 20,2013).
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countries that had once been considered part of the Soviet Bloc. Although the EU desired to add
these new members and many of the states were willing to do so, the EU made it clear it would
only accept membership once all of the organization's conditions and requirements had been met.
As a result, Eastern European countries such as Poland, and Romania rushed to meet these
standards and eventually became part of the EU. In many ways, this expansion was a dramatic
change for both the new member states and the EU as an institution. For the states this was a
chance to supposedly reap the economic benefits that EU membership offered and they so
desperately needed. As for the EU, this was not only a new founded opportunity, but the first
time the organization expanded eastward to a part of Europe that was distinctively different. In
comparison to the West, Eastern Europe has its own unique history, culture, and political values.
While this expansion was seemingly a success, tensions and problematic issues that have arisen
over the last few years have proven that this was not as smooth of a transition as originally
thought. Questions regarding the fairness of the EU membership process, as well as concerns
regarding sovereignty and culture have become significant topics of contention when analyzing
the EU's relationship with these countries. In addition to these problems, the stark differences
between Eastern and Western Europe combined with the fact that the EU is primarily led by
Western states has prompted a discussion about potential discrimination and double standards
occurring within the organization. Overall, while the EU has benefitted from eastward
expansion, it seems that these new member states have paid more for EU membership than they
have gained.
As the EU continued to deal with its advancement into Eastern Europe, a new market
emerged when the state of Yugoslavia disintegrated in the early 1990's. Like the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia was a communist state comprised of many different members. Once the collapse
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occurred each member was granted an opportunity to assert its independence. For the EU, this
was yet again another chance for the organization to expand its base to a new clientele. At the
same time, however, the EU was commencing relations with states that were equally if not more
unique than Eastern Europe in terms of history, culture, and politics. Since tensions and
disagreements had already begun to arise between the EU and its Eastern European constituents,
this left the question of whether the institution's relations with these newly independent
countries would be any different. This has been especially true as the EU has only recently
accepted Croatia, one of the former republics of Yugoslavia, as its newest member after a long
accession process. Since the beginning of its discussions with the EU, Croatia has made a long
list of compromises and changes in order to be considered and eventually accepted as an EU
member. These necessary concessions have elicited concerns and discussions of whether EU
membership is beneficial or even harmful for the Croatian state. The interactions between the
EU and Croatia, and the doubts about what is ultimately gained and lost can be seen as strong
indicators of what the country and the region can expect by allowing EU expansion into its
territory. While it seems the EU has used the collapse of communism to its advantage, countries,
like Croatia, continue to follow a pattern of Central and Eastern European states that pay a far
higher price for membership than the benefits they receive.
Background of Croatia
In order to understand the EU's impact on Croatia, it is important to gain knowledge
regarding the state's past. From multiple perspectives the history of Croatia can be characterized
as a perpetual fight for independence. Most sources note that the Croatian region, which was
historically tied to the Roman Empire, was first settled by the Croats during the 6th century. The
first Croats, also known as White Croats, are thought to have originated from an area that
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presently constitutes parts of Poland and Ukraine. Upon their arrival, the Croats instead of
conquering the land settled and mixed with the existing Illyrian tribes that had been living in the
territory, primarily along the Dalmatian coast.3 While working to establish an independent
kingdom, the Croats became early converters to Christianity, having been baptized in the 7th
century. Despite countless attempts at invasion by rivals, such as the Bulgarians, the Croatian
people were able to defend their domain. This early success lasted until 1102, when the Croatian
kingdom formed a partnership with Hungary.4 Throughout its connection with Hungary, Croatia
maintained virtual autonomy as their kingdom continued to function under the rule of their own
ban (viceroy) and Sabor(parliament). At the same time, however, this union arguably sets the
foundation for Croatia's later loss of sovereignty. Due to its association with Hungary, Croatia
naturally became absorbed by the Austrians, thus becoming part of the Austro-Hungarian
empire. Unlike its previous association with Hungary, the Croatians could no longer retain their
freedom and ability to self-rule. As a result, this led to Croats suffering at the hands of Habsburg
oppression for many years. Essentially, Croatia's early history reveals that the Croatians were a
distinct people with an independent kingdom, whose failed partnerships and loss of sovereignty
began a negative pattern that would continue to define the rest of Croatian history.
The loss of Croatia's independence became a driving force for the Croatian people, who
fervently searched for ways to regain the sovereignty and stability their country once had.
Despite their desire for self determination, being part of the Austro-Hungarian empire meant that
the Croatians had no choice but to be subservient to the Habsburg Crown. While Croatian
nationalism continued to thrive under Austro-Hungarian rule, it never resulted in the Croats
being able to separate themselves from the empire. This status quo continued until the onset of
3
4

John Prcela, Stanko Guldescu, Operation Slaughterhouse, (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 1970), 4.
Prcela, Guldescu, Operation Slaughterhouse, 7.
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WWI. By 1918 WWI had resulted in the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire, leaving a gateway
for Croatia to re-assert itself within Europe as an independent country. This opportunity was
short lived, however, as the kingdom of Yugoslavia emerged from merely an idea into reality.
Following the demise of the Austro-Hungarian empire the Croats searched for stability that
would benefit the state. This led to Croatia signing a pact with the Slovenes, and Serbs to
become part of a joint federation. In many ways, it seemed the Croats were looking to for an
association that still allowed Croatia to have virtual autonomy. Yet, this plan abruptly went
wrong with the signing of the Yugoslavian constitution in 1921,which gave Serbs more power
within the kingdom. This did not sit well with the majority of Croats and Slovenes, and it created
numerous tensions between all parties involved. While many Croats protested against the
changes, solving these internal issues became complicated as everyone had to contend with
WWII. While this war sent the kingdom of Yugoslavia towards its destruction, it unfortunately
did not grant the Croats a second chance at freedom the previous war had done. In fact, it opened
the window for an even harsher reality that the Croats had to contend with. Basically, this period
reveals a pattern in which Croatia's search for stability leads to a loss of sovereignty that they
must continually struggle to restore.
As the Croats grappled with the deterioration of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, a much
formidable foe in the form of communism became Croatia's next obstacle in the journey towards
independence. The embodiment of all that stood between Croatia and sovereignty was Josip Broz
Tito. A citizen of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, Tito was a member of the communist party. As the
kingdom was falling apart, he took advantage of this period and began his rise to power. By 1945
Tito was recognized as the leader of Yugoslavia. During his leadership Tito expanded
Yugoslavia to many territories which in the present are known as: Croatia, Slovenia, Vojvodina,
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Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia. While Tito was known
for his charm and public relations with foreign countries, his outward demeanor disguised the
cruelty and oppressive nature of his leadership within Yugoslavia. Although Tito was a staunch
communist, he was known to act only in what he thought was his best interests. As a result, he
severed ties with Stalin and the Soviet Union in favor of running communist Yugoslavia under
his own terms. This resulted in the persecution of any person, group, or institution Tito thought
challenged his leadership. He began by ensuring that theology would never work against him by
censuring multiple religions including the Croatian Roman Catholic Church, which had and
continues to play an important role within Croatian culture and identity.
In addition to religion, Tito condemned any form of nationalism. Even though favoring
and fighting for Croatian sovereignty under the Habsburg crown and the kingdom of Yugoslavia
was dangerous, in relation to Tito it was a death sentence for many. During his long reign Tito
was responsible for ordering the deaths of anyone he suspected of supporting nationalist aims.
As Tito ruled Yugoslavia with an iron fist, his tactics also influenced how the outside world
viewed the country and the people in it. Since Tito's reign was long and his oppression of
nationalism so successful, many outsiders believed that Yugoslavian was one ethnicity.
Furthermore, due to the fact that Yugoslavia covered so much territory and was ruled by a
unique form of communism, it became known to outsiders as "the Balkans," which came
attached with certain stereotypes about both the country and its citizens. It would be these
foreign perspectives along with Tito's dictatorship that would haunt Croatia when an opportunity
for independence would reveal itself again. Overall, the reign of Tito and Yugoslavian
communism not only prevented Croats from attaining self-determination, but it was a regime that
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successfully oppressed the Croatian people and influenced the outside world in a way that would
only harm Croatia's attempt to achieve independence.
Despite Croatian nationalism surviving the state's long and complicated history,
another chance to regain sovereignty only revealed itself through the demise of communist
Yugoslavia. After a long reign of more than thirty years Tito died in 1980. Following his death
the various republics attempted to continue Yugoslavia as a federation of equal parties. This idea
was short lived, however, as Serbia swiftly revealed its desire to be the ruling power over the
other republics. As in the case of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, the other states within this
partnership condemned Serbia's goals. Tensions continued to rise until 1991 when both Slovenia
and Croatia openly declared independence and an end to their roles within Yugoslavia. Not only
did the Serbs refuse to accept this affirmation, but openly resorted to aggressive tactics in order
to ensure that the Slovenes and Croats would not leave. While Slovenia had to defend its right to
self rule, in terms of physical warfare with Serbia it was left virtually unscathed. Unfortunately,
for the Croats they were not so lucky. In an effort to regain sovereignty once and for all the
Croatians had to wage a long and bloody battle with the Serbs. By the time Croatia had declared
independence Serbia had gained absolute control over the Yugoslav army and weapons, forcing
the Croatians to defend themselves with anything they could obtain. To make matters worse, not
only were the Croats battling the Serbs but parts of the European community as well. The years
of Yugoslavian communism under Tito had left its mark as many European countries as well the
commission of the European Union couldn't understand why the Slovenes and Croats would
want to leave. Some like the EU commission even went as far as to openly suggest that Serbia
should be aided in regaining control of the seceded states. Although Croatia was practically
abandoned during the early part of its war for independence, Croatians continued to defend and
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persevere. The Croat endurance later earned allies and assisted the Croatian people in winning
the war and finally regaining back the autonomy and freedom it had been missing for so many
years. Essentially, Croatia's past is vital to understanding the country's relationship with the EU,
as it reveals the crucial components of Croatian identity as well how its historical past continues
to define the current state.
Statement of Croatia's Issues Regarding the EU
As Croatia had finally tasted freedom, they had come to the next critical phase for their
state, which was securing the prosperity and stability of their country. While the war ended
successfully, it left both physical and psychological scars on Croatia and its people. The road to
rebuilding the country has and continues to be a slow and painstaking journey. As Croatia began
to progress the EU extended an offer of membership to the country. By this time, the former
republic of Slovenia had already accepted the offer and would eventually be accepted as an EU
member quite quickly. For the Croats this was a lucrative offer for a state that was looking to
stabilize further. Yet, EU membership was not free nor unconditional. In order to be considered,
the country was told to make numerous changes, which the Croatian government has fully
abided with. The fulfillment of the EU requirements took years for Croatia to complete, and
eventually on July 1st 2013 they were inducted as a full member of the EU. Yet, even during the
membership process questions began to arise regarding the benefits and consequences such a
venture would have on the country. Was Croatia's search for additional stability within the EU
merely a re-enactment of the state's historical past and failures? Additionally, what would such a
membership mean for the future of the Croatian people? Basically, Croatia's decision to enter the
EU is a transformative change that seems to have brought more questions than answers about the
country's future survival.
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It is Croatia's entrance into the EU that has inspired the following research. Intrigued by
Croatia's past and its new partnership the goal of my investigation was to analyze the effects
such a change would have on the country. As my quest continued my focus began to revolve
around the idea of what forms EU opposition within Croatia? My interests regarding this
question slowly became centered around the topics of geopolitics, internal stability, as well as the
types of rights within Croatia that would be affected by EU membership. In particular my
research kept referring back to the overarching themes of identity and sovereignty and how these
critical aspects of the Croatian state would be represented within its relationship with the EU.
While conducting this research multiple academic, literary, and official sources were referenced
within this piece. They ranged on topics regarding the EU and its expansion, Croatia, and
Croatian-EU relations. In addition, I embarked on primary research within Croatia and
completed nine interviews with Croatian citizens. The respondents within my research retain
different jobs and positions within Croatian society, but all hold specific opinions regarding the
EU and its future within Croatia. Therefore, this investigation and my argument are built upon
both secondary as well primary sources I have uncovered throughout my study of this topic.
Following the completion of my research I have concluded that the EU has negatively
impacted Croatia by creating issues and exasperating existing tensions, which the country will
have to contend with in the future. My examination and analysis have proven that Croatia's bid
for the EU is not merely economic, but based around the principles of identity as well. Yet, the
irony is while Croatian identity has been a driving force for EU membership, it is actually one of
the components of Croatian society that is greatly harmed by the state's association with the EU.
In addition, the EU's influence and demands on Croatia have also adversely impacted many
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aspects the state's sovereignty as well. My study will address these overarching themes as well as
specific issues regarding Croatia's partnership with the EU.
Theoretical Framework
This research covers two themes regarding Croatia's accession to the EU. The first part of
this work addresses the concept of identity. This section is largely inspired by Tariq Modood's
theories regarding multiculturalism and its manifestation or lack thereof within the EU.
Modood's theories surrounding multiculturalism help explain the relations between different
cultures that come into contact. In addition, it helps asses the connection between multiple
cultures and larger institutions such as the state, or supranational organizations like the EU. In
specific regards to Croatia's identity within the EU, Edward Said's theory of Orientalism has also
influenced the research. Said's Orientalism focuses on how the West's relationship with the East
is defined by stereotypes that pervade multiple subjects whether it be politics or culture. While
this theory deals with the East, many of the characteristics associated with this concept have
come to apply to the perceived view of Croatia within the EU. In addition, the related theory of
Balkanism put forth by Maria Todorova has formed the conceptualization of multiple chapters
within this work as well. Todorova asserts that Balkanism is a term that encapsulates the
negative stereotypes and perceptions of states considered to be part of the Balkans. This is
directly related to Croatia, as it is consistently referred to as a Balkan country. Essentially, these
three theories work in conjunction to help analyze the journey of Croatian identity within the EU.
The second part of this research is dedicated to addressing the aspect of Croatian
sovereignty within the EU. This section of research is inspired by Antonio Gramsci and his
theory regarding cultural hegemony, which discusses how the domination of society by the
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ruling class is achieved through social constructs and the belief in consented coercion. While
Gramsci's ideas are intended to assess the relationship between society and state, it has
influenced this analysis regarding the relationship between states and the supranational
institution of the EU. It has provided a perspective in which Croatia's membership within the EU
can be explored. In addition, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty forms the core of the
following analysis regarding Croatia. Within the Westphalian theory is the right of selfdetermination and equality between states, and the belief in the non-intervention of other states
in the domestic affairs of another. These ideas are especially relevant when discussing the
challenges Croatia has faced and continues to deal with as an EU member. Overall, these
concepts play a pivotal role when discussing Croatia's accession to the European Union.
Terms
Identity-Within this work, my definition of identity includes the beliefs, values, characteristics,
and lifestyles that formulate nation states.
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Literature Review
The European Union's new role as not only an economic, but a political institution has
elicited strong reactions from both its members and potential EU candidates. While some have
applauded these changes, negative responses towards the EU have been gaining strength within
Eastern Europe. Many of these countries contest the instilled EU conditionality requirements
within their respective states. The discontent surrounding the EU has made many question the
institution's intentions in the areas of member equality, and its respect for the unique histories
and cultures of its members. As for Croatia, it is not excluded from this discussion. Many
individuals and groups within and outside the country have voiced concerns about the small
nation state's relationship with the EU. Explaining these issues, and how they affect Croatia,
requires addressing the multiple dimensions of this conflict. The literature reviewed will provide
support and analysis in relation to the theoretical origins of these challenges, the fissures of EU
policy in regards to Eastern Europe, and exactly how Croatia is affected by this institution. The
specific types of literature used for my research will deal with topics of identity both as a
theoretical concept as well as specific studies on how this concept relates to EU relationships,
especially with Croatia. To supplement the analysis regarding the role of identity, research
concerning multiculturalism and sovereignty will be addressed as well. In addition, literature
analyzing the specific issues that Croatia faces as a result of EU integration will be part of my
study.
Identity & Inequality
As the EU has been accused of inequality in terms of the organization's treatment of its
members, the allegations can be seen as an example of "othering." In his work regarding how the
Orient was portrayed, Edward Said theorized that those located within this part of the world were
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seen and treated differently. He argued that this was the result of "Orientalism," the way in which
the West depicted the East as the continual outsider. As a result, this allowed for a certain power
dynamic to develop between the East and the West. The power relations between the two could
be characterized as one of domination and subordination, with the West being in control (Said
1978). Said's theory is related to the EU in that the organization is no longer a homogenous
institution made up of Western states. The fact that eastern members are now included, brings up
the question of whether Said's theory of orientalism is being carried out within the EU. If a form
of orientalism is taking place, it would explain how power is distributed within the organization.
While Said's theory offers insight, it has limitations in that it only directly discusses the Orient.
The reason being that Said's theory is focused solely on the perceptions and relations with
countries within the far East. Even though aspects of Said's theory can be applied to the EU
situation, it does not provide specific evidence of an inner European form of othering.
Essentially, in order for Said's theory to be fully applied the unique cultural and epistemic
differences of Europe must be taken into account.
While not engaging Said's concept of the other directly, there are numerous authors who
have focused their research on the apparent inequalities within the EU. These theorists tend to
emphasize that the ideals of EU integration are far different than the realities Eastern European
members are facing (Medvec 2009, Carroll 2010). Stephen E. Medvec argues that despite the EU
welcoming Eastern European countries on the basis that they would prosper, there continues to
be a disparity of benefits between east and west. This is important because it provides physical
evidence that eastern EU members are facing real issues as a result of their integration. As for
Dean Carroll, he points out that the expansion of the EU is difficult for the institution as well as
the country seeking membership.
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Like Medvec, Carroll acknowledges that the joining state may risk its economic stability
by accepting EU membership. While the prevailing notion is that the EU will only bring
economic benefits, theorist like Carroll point out that there actually may be economic risks
involved as a result of integration. He cites waiting periods and economic conditionality
requirements may actually hinder the internal market of these countries. The noted inequalities
bring up the question of whether these are a result of some form of internal and geographical
discrimination. It is important to note these physical issues because they can be regarded as
surface indicators of a deeper rooted problem concerning inner EU relations. Said often noted
that the treatment of those hailing from the Orient were outward expressions of the othering
taking place and perpetuated within Western society. Specifically, in how the West perceived,
taught, and depicted individuals and groups coming from that part of the world. As a result, by
citing the risks faced by Eastern European EU members and potential candidates, it is
acknowledging that there are legitimate concerns in regards to the subject of EU integration
within this geographical region. Yet, purely addressing the economic side of EU integration fails
to take into account identity politics and how it effects both the EU and its members.
One of the ways to explore identity within the EU is to analyze the institution's policy
towards expansion within Eastern Europe. Multiple researchers have studied how the EU relates
to its new members (Hursoy 2010, Jura 2012, Xuereb 2011). Siret Hursoy, argues that the EU
lacks a defined institutional identity and that its foreign policy does not function in the same way
as nation states (Hursoy, 93). This statement is important as it recognizes the organization's
failure to address its multiple members with varying cultural values and historical backgrounds.
In addition, since the organization does not have a specific approach in member relations, this
creates a setting where discrimination can occur.
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Operating along the same lines Karsten Xuereb notes how internal EU migrants are
affected by the institution not having a comprehensive cultural policy. Xuereb discusses how the
lack of an EU standardized cultural policy does not consider the place of migrants of different
cultures, especially non-Europeans (Xuereb, 30-31). Again, this proves an absence of a cultural
approach has perpetuated a series of negative effects. Cristian Jura takes these assessments a step
further by arguing that the EU refuses to acknowledge the importance of learning how to operate
within multiculturalism. He also says that the leading EU countries of Germany, France, and the
U.K. have failed to address the problem properly. Jura's analysis implies that the EU does not
view multiculturalism as a valid issue that should be part of the EU's platform or goals. This is
important because it reveals that the denial of this problem works into the issues faced by Eastern
European EU members and candidates. It also goes back to the topic of identity. Since identity is
not part of EU discourse and that the organization is led by Western European nations, it allows
the institution to be driven by western ideals and perceptions that may or may not be in
contention with those of Eastern Europe. While these authors provide a detailed perspective on
the EU's official cultural policy, it does not address how the Western EU members view their
eastern counterparts, and how it affects the institution's policy on these countries. Basically, this
research reveals the fissures within the EU concerning its official relation to multiculturalism,
but it does not discuss the specifics of Eastern European portrayal and treatment.
In order to fully analyze internal dynamics within the EU, literature regarding
multiculturalism was addressed as well. Many of the authors assert that the concept of
multiculturalism plays a large role in the policies and the successes or lack thereof within the EU
(Modood & Meer 2012, Brljavac 2012, Aggestam & Hill 2008, Sprague-Jones 2011). In their
work, Modood and Meer explore what David Cameron calls a "failure" of the EU in terms of
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multiculturalism. He goes on to analyze the fact that this concept has received a backlash from
those rediscovering their national identity, or minority groups who feel violated by the
institution. Aggestam and Hill explicate on the idea of multiculturalism and issues further by
highlighting the fact that this concept is consistently politicized. In addition, it is also a point of
tension in regards to certain groups, in this case Muslims, which were used as a case study.
While Sprague-Jones, chooses to focus more on the political aspect of multiculturalism that
Modood and Meer mentioned within their piece. She argues that awareness of one's personal
heritage or ethnicity, and the election of right wing parties influences the way multiculturalism is
perceived and functions within the EU. As for Brljavac, he explains these arguments using
Bosnia & Herzegovina as a case study. Brljavac asserts that the reason why the EU has not made
much progress with the state is because its failure of having a successful standardization of
multiculturalism.
The literature concerning multiculturalism provides much needed information, but also
has limitations as well. On a positive note, the theorists provide a contextual background that can
be used when analyzing the EU's relationship with Croatia. It shows that multiculturalism is an
important factor that both drives and works against EU policy. This is an aspect to keep in mind
when exploring the conditionality requirements as well as the reaction against the EU. At the
same time, the literature on how EU multiculturalism effects Eastern Europe, and specifically
Croatia and the Balkans is very scarce. The goal is for my study to fill in these gaps and provide
more evidence for this area of research. Basically, the concept of multiculturalism is an
important factor, but needs more expansion in my area of research.
Another important factor related to this discussion is how the western led EU perceives
and treats Eastern European countries. Theorists have studied how the characterization of
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Eastern Europe has affected its relations with the EU (Pusca 2008, Carroll 2010). Researcher
Anca Pusca argues that as the EU has expanded eastward, it has proven that every country has a
specific view of what an imagined Europe should be like. At times these views come into
conflict with one another. Pusca highlights this argument by providing the example of the
"Polish Plumber." When Poland had become integrated within the EU, France experienced a
rampant and public expression of xenophobia against the Poles. The argument behind their
action was that the Poles were migrating to take jobs away from French citizens. In the end
France moved to extend the transition period before Poles were allowed to migrate. While Pusca
uses this example to analyze EU visibility, it can also be argued that this is an example of
discrimination. French feelings and perceptions of the Poles not only dictated their treatment in
the public forum of media, but it also resulted in Poland being dealt an extra conditionality. This
shows how western values came at the expense of an Eastern European country, and further
illustrates how Western and Eastern European relations influence EU policy.
Dean Carroll also discusses how identity politics factored into the perceptions of Eastern
Europe and its place within the EU. He argues that the EU should not veto states on the basis of
their religious or cultural values. In addition, Carroll states that the EU should refrain from
implementing widespread western values and attempting to create a homogenous Europe. These
are imperative assertions as they point out that the EU organization is doubtful of accepting any
state that does not fit in with what is considered the norm. It also depicts an EU that will only
support new members if they conform to EU standards. This implies that the EU is functioning
as an institution that is not only in favor of economic and political integration, but in molding
these new members into what Pusca calls the EU's own imagined Europe. Both of these authors
show that the western response towards Eastern Europe has dictated much of the EU's treatment
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of these states. Although these works provide insight into the relations the EU has with Eastern
Europe it is not specific enough, as this thesis directly deals with the impacts the EU will have on
Croatia. The state of Croatia is part of what is considered the Balkans, a Central European region
that shares characteristics with Eastern Europe, but has its own distinct attributes as well.
Overall, these works engage in the idea of how identity affects EU relations, but fails to take into
account the specificity of the Balkans.
As Croatia is finishing its final procedural stages before becoming part of the EU, in
order to understand the EU's impacts, it is important to note how the Balkan identity is received
by the western led EU. Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990's a number of
theorists have analyzed the progression these newly independent states and their relations with
the EU (Todorova 2009, Belloni 2009, Krajina 2009). In her study of the Balkans, Maria
Todorova acknowledges the work of Edward Said and argues that a similar but different concept
known as Balkanism was in existence. Todorova defines Balkanism which, "information about
the Balkans is placed, most notably in journalistic, political, and literary output" (Todorova,
192). She points out that like the Orient, the Balkans found itself as the victim of long standing
perceptions. Unlike the Orient, however, it was the ambiguity of the Balkans that committed the
west to retaining certain unwavering views of the region that existed from World War I to the
present. She goes on to note the EU is an experiment of the supranational, and that in order to be
welcomed into an organization, there has to be a sense of similarity or cohesion within the state
that relates to others. These are all vastly crucial assertions. To begin with, by acknowledging
that a theory similar to Orientalism exists for the Balkans, may work to indicate that states that
are located within the west and part of the EU are predisposed to view and treat Balkan countries
in a certain way. This relates to the case of Croatia as its treatment and conditionality

B i l a n d z i c h | - 20 -

requirements may be traced back to Todorova's concept. In addition, her discussion about these
states and cohesion indicates that the existence of Balkanism makes it far more possible for the
EU to have an ultimatum for these countries in terms of changing its culture, values, etc. in order
to be accepted by the institution.
Roberto Belloni makes similar assertions about the Balkans when discussing potential
EU integration within the region. He too argues that there is a form of Orientalism, which is
influencing the EU's relations with the Balkans. Belloni argues that the EU should shed the focus
on European elitism and emphasize stable EU integration within the region. In order to do this,
Belloni argues that the Balkans should be dealt with sensitively if its integration is to be
sustained. The analysis that Belloni provides points out the potential weaknesses and risks if the
EU is to rely on its preconceived notions of the region. From the perspective of the EU and its
stability, using assumptions rather than researched facts could hinder the well-being of the
institution if one of the Balkan states would react adversely to the EU and its role within the
region. In terms of the countries themselves, if the EU does not recognize and respect the
histories and cultures of each of the countries, than the institution may not be working in its
benefit and in the long run may actually cause harm. This is an especially important concept to
keep in mind when analyzing the EU as a powerful actor within the Croatian state. If the EU
relies on the idea of Balkanism to guide its relations with the state, it may exasperate old
problems and provide new challenges the country may not be prepared to deal with.
Zlatan Krajina expands on both Todorova and Belloni's assertions by specifically
analyzing how Croatia's bid for the EU was represented within the media. Krajina argued that
Todorova's concept of Balkanism was visible within the media's treatment of Croatia and its
relations to the EU. He noted that Croatia was depicted as Europe's other and that the country as
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well as the Balkan region was depicted as negative, socially backward, and violent. Krajina also
notes that when the state of Croatia disagreed with the International Criminal Tribunal of
Yugoslavia, it was portrayed as inferior and socially immobile. In relation to his findings,
Krajina cites Said's Orientalism as guiding the way the state was viewed and treated. This is
important as it reveals that Croatia's negative depiction could have influenced how the EU has
treated the state in terms of conditionality requirements, and whether the state will be viewed as
an equal member within the organization. Essentially, the prevailing idea of Balkanism has
proven that the EU may be inclined to treat Croatia and other Balkan countries on the basis of
their perceptions and assumptions, rather than reality.
In connection to the concept of Balkanism, there is also a prevailing idea regarding the
EU and Europeanism. Many authors have found themselves interested in researching the belief
that the EU is seeking to instill a Western European lifestyle on its Eastern European
counterparts (Krajina 2009, Miosic-Lisjak 2006, Serbos 2008, Ashbrook 2010). While Zlatan
Krajina focused his work on Croatia's EU accession and the media, he also focused on the
concept of European. He argues that in the world of today to be considered European, one must
be an integrated member within the EU. Krajina goes on to say that in regards to Croatia's bid for
the EU, the state was constantly referred to as having a "choice" to be part of the European arena
or not. In many ways this proves to be a vital analysis of Croatia's situation. It seems as if the
state was put in a position where it had no rights to contest what the EU desired in return for
membership. If Croatia openly rejected the institution's terms, which ranged from issues
concerning territory, minority rights, economic interdependence, etc., it would not be considered
as part of the European identity. Krajina's assessments of the situation depict a scene in which
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the EU uses its power as an organization associated with the European identity as leverage on
Croatia to accept all of its terms in order to be considered a European nation.
Nives Miosic-Lisjak expands on this idea in her analysis of Croatia's integration within
the EU. In her work, Miosic-Lisjak discusses the reforms and reservations the Croatian state has
undergone since it had begun to actively work towards EU integration. She argues that part of
the incentives driving Croatia towards the EU is this idea of being European. As a result,
revealing a push pull situation occurring in Croatia in regards to the EU. Miosic-Lisjak argues
that being considered part of Europe was seen as increasingly important for the state. Her
analysis seems to indicate that Croatia held a form of desperation when contemplating a chance
to enter the EU. As a result, this may have led the state to accept conditionality requirements that
it either did not agree with or have proved to be potentially damaging for the county. This
argument continues to show how the concept of identity proves highly influential when
discussing EU relations with Central and Eastern Europe, especially Croatia.
Sotiris Serbos continues this pattern by discussing the concept of European and power
relations in regards to the EU and the Balkans. For Serbos he argues that the war within the
Balkans puts the states belonging to the region in a non-advantageous position when attempting a
bid for EU integration. He goes on to point out that the violence that the region had experienced
has prompted the EU to look towards the Balkans as a project where the EU could "Europeanize"
it. In many ways this sets up a power dynamic in which the EU views itself as the norm and
controlling entity, while the Balkans would have to allow itself to be molded by the organization.
The analysis of Serbos continues to add to the idea that the concept of European is used as both
an incentive and leverage tool within the EU when it is looking to expand to another country. It
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also proves that the states located within Central and Eastern Europe are not only seeking
economic benefits, but a certain identity in their bid for integration.
John E. Ashbrook also chooses to expand on Croatia's relate to the European concept in
his study of the country's future membership within the EU. Ashbrook notes that within the
Croatian state there is a yearning to be part of a greater cosmopolitan Europe. He argues that this
is driven by the state elite who view this as a chance to gain an added sense of legitimacy. At the
same time, he also says that Croatia gravitates towards this idea because it is unhappy that the
Balkans is consistently associated with Eastern Europe. The country and others in the region
want the distinction to be recognized and the feeling is that joining the EU might change that.
This shows that this interest in being European directly connects back the concepts of Balkanism
as well as identity. In addition, it reveals that the EU holds a powerful position in regards to
countries like Croatia. Overall, the concept of European explains an added dimension to not only
how countries like Croatia are depicted, but treated as well.
Sovereignty & Croatia's Integration Challenges
Another vital topic that needs to be considered, is the idea of sovereignty. Numerous
theorists contend that sovereignty is a significant factor when discussing the relationship between
states and the EU (Bailes 2006, Mamudu & Studley 2009, Adler-Nissen 2011). Bailes asserts
that part of the problem with the EU is that it actually lacks the power that it needs because of
sovereignty. She claims that grassroots movements resolved to maintain whatever national
autonomy is left has hindered the EU from reaching its full potential. As for Adler-Nissen the
main aspect is that EU created treaties signed with member states encourages deeper integration,
which takes away sovereignty. While Mamudu and Studley, using tobacco policy as a case
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study, theorize that there is an idea of "shared sovereignty" taking place within the EU. They
argue that shared sovereignty allows for negotiations to take place between the EU and member
states.
The concept of sovereignty is an important aspect to consider when exploring how
Croatia has negotiated with EU conditionality and integration. As the theorists pointed out there
seems to be a desire for the EU to gain more power, but there are still groups willing to do
anything to maintain sovereignty. This directly connects to my own topic as Croatia's ties to its
own sovereignty has become one of the focal points of the EU opposition platform within
Croatia. In addition, the idea put forth regarding shared sovereignty and negotiations is also
representative of the issues Croatia is facing. Croatia's attempts to arbitrate its integration with
what the EU desires also plays a part when discussing the problems that have seemingly arisen as
a result of EU integration. At the same time, literature regarding Croatia's sovereignty and the
EU is virtually non-existent. My research will be a step in readdressing this issue since Croatia
achieved independence in the 1990's. Basically, sovereignty is an imperative component of EU
relations.
In order to analyze the potential challenges the EU's presence within Croatia it is
important to acknowledge the state's issues. As far as the EU is concerned Croatia and the
Balkan region poses numerous risks for the institution itself due to the prevailing beliefs the
organization has concerning the area. Theorists have touched upon how the perceived issues
affects the conditionality requirements the EU has on the Balkans (Hardy 2010, Hursoy 2010).
Angelique Hardy argues that one of the EU's vital concerns for Croatia is its problem with
government corruption and that as a result the EU has implemented harsh conditionality
requirements. At the same time, Hardy questions the long term benefits of the approach as he
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cites the backsliding of Romania and Bulgaria in the same area following their achievement of
official membership within the EU. Hardy asserts that strict conditionality requirements is not
always equivalent to sustainability. This is important in terms of Croatia as it also provides an
added layer to the explanation as to why the EU implements such harsh conditionality
requirements on the state. In addition, it begs the question of whether the EU's demands creates a
setting where the government would rather hide or improperly deal with issues, such as
corruption, in order to obtain membership quicker.
Working along the same lines as Harding, Siret Hursoy also focuses on the reasons
behind EU conditionality within the Balkans. Hursoy's argument that the EU's extensive
presence within the region is the result of its failure to intervene during the wars that had taken
place during the 1990's. He claims that the intense requirements are due to the fact that the EU
fears that there will be repeat security challenges that will threaten the institution, such as state
disintegration and organized crime. Again, it seems that the EU desires the advantages of adding
the Balkan region to its list of members, however it also wants a quick fix of the perceived
issues. In addition, it is implied that these obstacles are to be solved according to EU terms. The
strict requirements and the push for quick integration, may potentially create problems for not
only the Balkan countries, like Croatia, but the EU itself.
The EU's conditionality demands has evoked negative reactions from various parts of the
Croatian nation. Some of these researchers argue that many Croatian feels that certain
conditionality requirements should be debated due to the part Western Europeans played within
the state's war during the 1990's (Caratan 2009, Jovic 2011, Stojic 2006). Branko Caratan
characterized that for many Croatians Western Europe is viewed as having been characterized by
numerous misjudgments and belated responses during the state's fight for independence. In many
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ways, Croatians feel that Western Europe had abandoned the country when it needed help the
most. As a result, Croatian citizens find it hard to accept harsh conditionality requirements from
a part of Europe that arguably refused to provide assistance. This reveals that there is already
unresolved tensions between Croatia and the EU even at the beginning of the bidding process.
Yet, the country continues to deal with the desire to be recognized as part of the European
community. It also presents a potential problem that could reveal itself in the future since Croatia
considers Western Europe's role in the wars an unresolved issue.
Dejan Jovic further explores the issue of Western Europe, the EU, and the wars of the
1990's in regards to Croatia. Jovic argues that since many Western European countries refused to
come to Croatia's aid the issue was not only left unresolved, but created feelings of doubt and
suspicion amongst the Croatian public. Since many of the Western European countries are also
the leaders within the EU, the intentions of the organization have been brought up as well. The
implication is that if the Western European countries had refused to aid Croatia in the past, how
can the state trust that the EU has its best interests at heart. This analysis also brings up
legitimate concerns regarding Croatia's future stability. Adding the dimension of distrust into the
relationship further intensifies the risks of Croatia entering the EU.
Marko Stojic expands upon the same ideas as Caratan and Jovic, as he also analyzes the
impact of the EU on Croatia. Stojic also questions the motivations of the EU in regards to
Croatia, citing the war as one of the causations of doubt amongst Croatian society. He argues that
the beliefs in the doubts concerning EU membership may put Croatia's sovereignty into question.
The nation of Croatia underwent a war for independence in which there continues to be not only
physical but emotional scars as a reminder of what occurred. Even remotely thinking about
Croatia' future as an independent country being threatened adds an immense amount of tension
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to the state's relationship with the EU. Basically, the position Western European nations had in
response to Croatia's plight in the war has affected how the country views the EU and its
conditionality requirements.
Another source of discontent is the fact that EU conditionality demands are aggravating
and creating geopolitical problems for Croatia. Many authors have argued that the EU's demands
are adding to Croatia's list of issues rather than benefits (Pridham 2008, Caratan 2009, Ashbrook
2010, Roter and Bojinovic 2005, Jovic 2011, Miosic-Lisjak 2006). Geoffrey Pridham argues that
since the war there are still territories that still need to be resolved with other members of the
former Yugoslavia such as Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a very intense process for
Croatia, and Pridham argues that the EU is not helping the issue by getting involved. The EU's
desire to have an opinion on the matter doesn't sit well with many Croatians. It relates back to the
claims that since Western Europe did not intervene, it also means that it does not adequately
understand or respect the process of partitioning territory. In addition, the EU's role concerning
this situation can create more tension rather than ease it.
Both Branko Caratan and Dejan Jovic address the issue of Slovenia as evidence of a new
geopolitical problem as the result of EU intrusion. The location known as Piran Bay, a seaport
within the Adriatic Sea, had been under Croatian jurisdiction for many years. As Croatia began
its bidding process for EU accession, Slovenia contested Croatia's rights to the bay. After Croatia
refused to surrender the bay to Slovenia, the Slovenes threatened to veto Croatia's application
into the EU. In order to maintain Croatia's integration process, Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor
agreed to arbitrage, which effectively increased the probability that Croatians could lose the bay
to Slovenia. Caratan and Jovic cite this as a negative impact of the EU's effects on Croatia. In
addition, it brings for the idea of conflict of interest in that Slovenia used its position as an EU
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member to gain leverage against Croatia. Also this example points out that this incident created
tensions between Croatia and Slovenia that had previously not existed before.
Petra Roter, Ana Bojinovic, and Nives Miosic-Lisjak also address a similar situation in
which Croatia lost rights at the hands of the EU. Since Croatia has territorial rights to part of the
Adriatic Sea, the country wanted to install ecological laws and preserves that would maintain the
health of the sea. These laws were soon contested, however, as they would affect the fishing
habits of both Italy and Slovenia. While Croatian parliament announced that the laws would be
better restructured to address Italy and Slovenia, the EU indicated that it would rather Croatia
forget the entire thing. Again, it seems that the EU used its power to work in the benefit of other
countries at the expense of Croatia's sovereignty. This also leads to not only further strained
relations with Slovenia, but Italy and the EU itself.
John E. Ashbrook also emphasizes the geopolitical pitfalls that have occurred within
Croatia as a result of the state's relationship with the EU. Ashbrook argues that the EU's
Stabilization and Association Policy (SAP) as well as the EU's Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has
resulted in strong tensions within Croatia and its relationships to other countries as well as the
EU. His point is that these policies are pushing Croatia to have more relations and dependencies
on states that it had been part of Yugoslavia with. Since independence is still very new for
Croatia, it does not want to risk its sovereignty for anything close to what the Yugoslavia had
been. Although the state found itself consistently making concessions. In addition, issues of
territory, and other consequences of war have not been fully resolved, which means that
increased interdependencies between these countries only creates more stress and issues. Also
Ashbrook notes that these policies call for an extended waiting period before Croatians can
migrate to other countries as EU citizens, however, the time taken before outside citizens can
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buy Croatian land is noticeably shorter. All of this indicates that Croatia is dealing with a variety
of drawbacks as a result of EU conditionality. As a result, this works to prove that the EU has
increased and created a variety of geopolitical problems for Croatia.
Another important issue that the EU has caused more tension with is the issue of minority
rights within Croatia. Many authors note that the EU's push for quick inclusion and rights for
minorities is actually creating more problems for Croatia and these groups (Caratan 2009, Roter
& Bojinovic 2005). For Branko Caratan, Petra Roter and Ana Bojinovic the EU's push for
minority rights within Croatia is conjuring up the past and creating challenges. Relating back to
the fact that Croatia's war was recent, the country has been slowly stabilizing and progressing in
all areas including minority rights. The quick push from the EU, however, is directing Croatia
towards a position that it may not be ready for and is also allowing for negative memories to take
precedence over progress. Again, it seems the EU disregards Croatia's past in order to achieve
ideal integration from the state, but in the process the institution may have caused more issues.
A final concern from many Croatians is how the EU will impact the state's culture and
values. Some theorists argue that the EU's goal may be to attempt Croatia's culture and values
with that of their own (Stojic 2006, Ashbrook 2010). In terms of John E. Ashbrook he argues that
the Eurocritics within Croatia feel that EU integrations will come at the cost of the nation's
identity and values. They cite issues of geopolitics, and the war as reasons to believe that the EU
intends to change the country. This plays upon the fears of those who fought or supported the
war for an independent Croatia. In addition, this relates back to how Croatia and the rest of the
Balkans may always be viewed as the other that must be molded and changed.
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Marko Stojic analyzes the same fears in his research into the effects of Croatia becoming
an EU member. Stojic asserts that if Croatia were to lose its culture and economic independence,
it would also mean a loss of sovereignty. In addition, he notes the multiple organizations and
groups who have vocally spoken against EU integration as an effort to preserve Croatian culture.
Again this shows another added dimension to not only the tensions and the problems Croatia
faces as a result of EU integration, but the very concept of identity as well.
Overall, these various works provide patterns that address the multiple dimensions of this
conflict. The very heart of the matter is identity politics, and many of the works rely on this
concept to not only discuss the EU's relation with Croatia but Central and Eastern Europe as a
whole. They also work to show the similar lines of thinking in regards to the perceptions of
Croatia., as well as sovereignty in regards to the potential effects the EU will have on the
country. The goal of my research will be to add significant information to the subject of Croatia's
accession with the EU, which will bridge the previously mentioned literature and will provide a
new outlook in relation to this topic.
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Methodology
In order to asses and analyze my research question regarding Croatia's accession into the
European Union (EU) , I employed a variety of strategies. The first step taken was to obtain
information regarding the European Union, particularly dealing with the area of EU expansion.
This was achieved by using multiple online databases including JSTOR, and EBSCO as well the
official site of the EU. Also a number of books pertaining to this subject were found within the
University of San Francisco library and used as part of my research. This information helped
provide the factual components needed to understand the foundation and the goals that the EU
was built upon. In addition, it assisted in presenting perspectives concerning how the EU's
principles have grown and or changed throughout its existence. The evidence also helped in
revealing how these changes have far greater impacts than its intended effects. In addition, the
information gave insight into the EU's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe and how this
has affected the EU as an organization, as well as the new member countries.
Following my research into the EU, I began to focus on collecting information regarding
the specific relationship between the institution and Croatia. This involved gathering facts,
perspectives, and statistics regarding not only Croatia's bid for EU membership, but its history as
a country. This meant performing another exploration of the university library and the databases
JSTOR and EBSCO. Also an investigation into the information provided by the CIA and the
Clinton Library on Croatia added to my understanding and research as well. All of these
documents provided insight into Croatia's journey to independence and the necessary steps the
country was required to take in order to become eligible for EU membership. They also
highlighted the potential issues this process could have for Croatia and other EU members. In
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addition, the information produced knowledge in relation to the EU's strategy regarding Croatia
and the potential pitfalls of this relationship.
The next stage of my investigation required me to travel abroad to Croatia in an effort to
secure more research related to my topic. In order to acquire better knowledge regarding the
relationship between the EU and Croatia, I visited the official EU office located in Zagreb,
Croatia's capital city. At the office I gained access to the EU's library, which held literature
regarding EU policy and its dealings with Croatia. The information I obtained revealed the EU's
position in regards to their policies, especially those concerning culture and politics, which was
helpful in understanding EU strategy in its preparation of Croatia becoming its newest member.
Also other literature within the library presented pro-EU views from Croatians reacting to the
accession process. This allowed me to understand some of the thought processes that went
behind choices the country has made in order to become eligible for the EU. Basically, the EU
library provided an additional dimension to understanding relations between the institution and
Croatia.
While at the EU office I was directed by the personnel to explore the official website
dedicated to Croatia and its pathway towards membership. Acting on this advice I investigated
the site and uncovered various pieces of information that proved helpful for my research. Some
of the evidence found on the website included the original Lisbon agreement, and specific
questions regarding the EU's relationship with Croatia. This helped identify the agreements
Croatia had signed on to as part of its conditionality for membership. They also pointed out other
expectations the country had and must continue to meet if it is considered to be in good standing
with the institution. These documents assisted in providing the necessary information needed to
properly analyze the potential effects these requirements had on Croatia. In addition, the website
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also allowed users to gain access to the speeches and articles given and written by the EU
ambassador to Croatia as it strove for membership. This evidence provided a gateway into the
EU's perspective of where Croatia met or failed to meet EU standards and exactly where the
organization would like to see the country change. This meant further understanding the greater
ramifications these changes would have on Croatia. Essentially, the website provided the EU
perspective on the questions I had regarding its expansion into Croatia.
After acquiring the necessary research I needed to understand the EU position regarding
Croatia, it was important for me to gain access to Croatian citizens and their opinions and
thoughts regarding EU membership. In order to do this it was vital to find someone who not only
knew people that were informed on this subject, but could assist me in achieving access to these
individuals as well. In my search for such a person I came into contact with Ante Beljo. A former
member of Sabor (Croatian Parliament), Beljo has and continues to be a major figure within
Croatian politics. After pitching my research assignment to him, he quickly became my point of
contact. Throughout the duration of my research Beljo educated me on multiple figures that held
various roles within Croatian society, but were also heavily opinionated on the subject of the EU.
After gauging who would be relevant and accessible for my research, Beljo assisted me in
arranging interviews with the selected individuals. The help that Beljo provided me during my
research in Croatia proved invaluable.
The interviews proved both informational as well as enlightening in relation to my
research. In total 9 interviews were completed, 8 of which took place in Zagreb while the 9th
interviews took place in the coastal city of Split. The respondents all held a variety of positions
within Croatian society which included professors, parliament members, activists, reporters, and
editors. Each interview took place in an area where the respondent felt was accessible and
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comfortable for this process. The various locations included coffee houses, Croatian parliament,
and office buildings. In addition, each respondent was asked a series of questions relating to
Croatia's bid for EU membership. The type of questions asked ranged from general opinions
regarding the EU, to inquiries into specific issues and or developments that have resulted from
the country's relationship with this organization. The diversity of the respondents led to detailed
and informative answers that assisted me in paving the way for my research. The knowledge
imparted from these interviews have served as a large part of the evidence surrounding my
arguments. Overall, the successful interview process proved vital for achieving m research goals.
The final phase of my research in Croatia was to obtain as much Croatian literature
regarding the accession process as possible. This phase was worked on co-currently during the
interview process. I obtained most of this literature from various individuals who had access or
owned copies of books relevant to my research, while the rest were compiled from various
Croatian bookstores throughout Zagreb and Split. These books and documentations also play an
important role within my own research as well. The majority of this literature covers the Croatian
EU perspective that his both hopeful as well as questioning in regards to the changes that the EU
has influenced Croatia to undertake. It provides an introspective into Croatian life, principles,
etc. all of which are important in my research assessment. In addition, the evidence proved to be
incredibly helpful as much of this documentation could not be found in the United States, thus
providing an opportunity to take a closer look into this Croatian perspective. Basically, the
literature obtained in Croatia has proved to be an incredible addition to my research.
Overall, in order to answer my questions regarding Croatia and EU membership required
me to undertake a detailed research process. The various stages of my work has taken a lengthy
amount of time to complete. Roughly 9 months of research, 2 and a half months spent in Croatia,
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was needed in order for me to collect the necessary evidence in order to properly analyze and
answer my research questions. Various approaches were used to complete this process which
included internet and library research, as well as interviews and literature collection. All of this
served to enhance and provide the fundamental evidence needed to supplement my argument.
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Chapter 1: The Legend of the European Union Identity
Croatia's accession into the European Union on July 1st 2013 is not only the state's
official induction into the supranational institution, but an equinox marking the division between
Croatia's past and future relationship with the EU. The accession day bridges Croatia's turbulent
journey of obstacles and concessions as an EU candidate with its future existence and challenges
as an EU member. To a large extent EU expansion and membership is not only an agreement,
but a fusion between the state and the organization. While this synthesis encompasses
economics, and to a large degree politics, the aspect of identity often remains a forgotten
component among this list. In many ways it can be argued that the concept of identity plays an
important role when discussing the hardships that Croatia has and continues to face in regards to
its alliance with the EU. Yet, in analyzing any relationship it is important to note both sides of
the equation. As a result, one cannot discuss the impact EU membership has on Croatian identity
without discussing how the institution views its own expansion. This is especially poignant in
regards to the EU's approach of the identity issue and how this ultimately defines the way in
which it relates to its members states. Over the duration of the EU's existence it has evolved in a
number of ways, including its decision to leave the familiar sphere of Western Europe and
expand eastward. This choice meant that the EU had to contend with states that had unique
attributes and noticeably different cultures, hence making identity a vital concern for the
organization's future. As time progressed the sustainability of the EU has become dependent on
fostering a solid and independent identity. Yet the reality of multiculturalism has presented not
only the institution's limitations, but its lack of ability to reconcile its failures in this area, which
ultimately impacts new member states like Croatia.
The Quest for Prosperity, Power, and Immortality
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While the EU evolved and expanded it became apparent that identity must be a vital part
of the organization's foundation in order to ensure future sustainability. The successful
beginnings of the EU as an economic partnership naturally inspired reflection on ways in which
this achievement could be enlarged and preserved. As a result, the concept of identity became the
key that could both unite and maintain the institution in the future. This is touched upon by Dean
Carroll who says, "Only by cementing a sense of European solidarity and identity, albeit by
economic means, will Europe avoid a return to the sectarianism of its past and enter a
metaphorical new Pax Romana era of prolonged peace."5 In this statement Carroll points out the
immense benefits a united European identity could provide, even if it relied on economic means
to come into being. From the EU's perspective identity supplied a way in which it both anchored
the organization and allowed ceaseless growth. At the same time, an opportunity to be part of
the EU's successes is incredibly enticing for a state such as Croatia. Part the EU's attraction lies
in the potential security and benefits a shared economy could provide a member state. In
addition, the idea that the institution could create a European Pax Romana of peace and
prosperity remains a large part of the EU's image and allure, which drives states like Croatia
towards EU membership. Another correlating aspect of identity is the concept of a multicultural
union based upon shared values. This is aptly discussed by Lisbeth Aggestam and Christopher
Hill who say, "Prominent among the latter are the ideals of democracy, tolerance and respect for
human rights, which both internally and externally have become key identity markers of the EU
as a would-be carrier of universal values."6 By the EU publicly emphasizing these beliefs they
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are appealing to many aspects of human nature. These supportive and inclusive standards are
captivating as they erase any doubt a state could have about the principles behind EU identity. It
can be argued that this is especially true for states like Croatia, that had battled years of
communist rule, and are presently looking for alliances that could be supportive of its own state.
Essentially, the EU has realized that identity is a necessary component for both stability and
growth, which functions to solidify the institution while drawing in new members.
In addition to identity becoming a necessary cornerstone of the EU, it aids the function of
the organization at a supranational level. While the EU uses identity to attract new members, it is
also used in ways to further solidify the institution. Rachael Craufurd Smith touches upon this
notion by saying, "More boldly it might be argued that a shared sense of identity is also
important in a democracy, in order to foster the sense of trust and mutual responsibility which is
necessary to ensure that voters and politicians transcend their personal interests and act in the
common good."7 In her discussion of EU culture, Craufurd Smith is noting the relationship
between identity and responsibility. In regards to the mindset of the EU this is extremely
beneficial. If a member state acknowledges its EU membership as part of its identity, then
undoubtedly a sense of obligation towards the institution is formed. As a result, the EU would
have a cohesive organization with loyal member countries. On the other hand, the goal of a
shared identity provides more questions than answers in regards to EU member states. While
many of these countries welcome EU membership, the extent in which they desire EU identity
can be disputed. A state, like Croatia, has its own perspective on EU identity, which in turn
affects how responsible the country feels towards the organization. Karsten Xuereb expands on
this view by saying, "Although the Commission does say it aims at combining cultural policy
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with other policies in order to contribute towards achieving fuller social cohesion and a shared
sense of citizenship...it is difficult to see how the present political disposition of the EU’s
member states will help achieve that."8 Xuereb correlates identity with the sense of citizenship,
but questions whether states could transcend their politics and achieve the EU's goal of a unified
identity. If this were attained, the EU would have the ability to function as a state, with its
members acting as citizens. Yet, the question remains of not only the ability of countries to do
this, but would they do it? Basically, while identity offers the institution power and stability it
can only be achieved if the member state accepts an EU identity.
As the organization recognized the value and need for an EU identity, it had to discover
ways in which to implement it amongst its member states. One of the approaches the EU has
used to achieve the creation of a European identity is through the use of state relations. Siret
Hursoy mentions this aspect in the following, "The development of foreign policy activities
gradually fostered the creation of an independent European identity and a more unified political
performance in the international arena. In other words, it became essential to have a European
foreign policy to help to create an independent European identity."9 Hursoy explains that by
having member states follow certain foreign policies, it not only gives the EU a powerful
reputation internationally, but works to unite its participants under one identity. In addition,
foreign policy ensures that candidate countries are aware that these EU markers are a
fundamental part of the organization's membership. Maintaining solidarity as a subconscious
element of foreign policy works in the EU's favor. At the same time, however, to what extent are
8
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states willing to conform to an EU classification? Does a country like Croatia have the desire to
fully accept EU identity and more importantly does it really have a choice? These questions
reveal the possible expense a state must undertake as it begins a relationship with an EU that is
steadfast on solidifying its status through identity. This train of thought is also brought up by
Craufurd Smith who says, "Cultural policy can be understood as an effort by the state to
influence the transmission and development of this public culture. A narrow definition is needed,
however, given that many public policies aim in one way or another to affect public culture."10
While not discussing EU foreign policy, Craufurd Smith does note that there is an effort on part
of the organization to use cultural code to further entrench EU identity within its member and
candidate states. From the perspective of the countries involved with the EU, this can be seen as
an effort on part of the organization to mold the state in accordance with EU values. Overall, the
EU has used its own policies to foster the creation of an independent EU identity. As a result,
this has had an additional impact on the organization's relationship with its member and
candidate states and their respective ideals and beliefs.
As the EU uses policy to promote its own individualism , this goal has expanded to other
areas of the organization as well. The development of a shared identity has formed the core of
many EU decisions and codes that the institution decides upon. Cristian Jura contemplates this
idea as follows, "The Commission work to ensure that the promotion of culture and cultural
diversity is given due consideration when all regulatory and financial decisions or proposals are
made."11 Jura's analysis reveals that the EU's extensive involvement in the area of culture is
another way in which it can further create and maintain an EU identity. The organization retains
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this ability as it can decide what is beneficial or obstructive in regards to EU ideals. Craufurd
Smith expands on this idea when she says," In seeking to 'nation build' in this way the Union
faces, however, a central difficulty: to select symbols or traditions from any one Member State
entails rejecting those from other Member States. "12 From this quote it is clear that Craufurd
Smith associates the EU's investment in cultural policy as a form of nation building. Again, by
making identity a focal point, the organization is re-enforcing its foundation. Despite the profit
this tactic has for the EU, it remains to be seen whether this can be successful for both the
institution and member states. As Craufurd Smith conveniently points out choosing specific
traditions and ignoring others can create tension. If members feel that the EU's policies regarding
identity negatively affect them how are they able to overcome these setbacks? Also how does the
EU deal with these seemingly inevitable challenges? While the EU has made identity creation a
priority, there is doubt of whether the implementations aspect can be successful for both the
institution and its members.
Subdued By the Illusion of Identity
Despite the EU maintaining an ambitious vision regarding identity, the realities of
multiculturalism have generated complications for the organization. One of the larger issues
being the sheer magnitude of differences that can be found throughout Europe. This is indicated
by Aggestam and Hill who say, "Europe is immersed concurrently in deeply contested political
debates about the roles of culture, religion, ethnicity and identity."13 This is a crucial analysis as
it reveals that culture and identity pervade so many subjects that people and even states
themselves consider a vital part of existence. Yet, the problem lies in the fact that many times
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these issues are the source of deeply entrenched debates and tensions. How can an organization,
even one as large and powerful as the EU be able to define an identity that could be inclusive for
all of its members? In addition, how does a state like Croatia proceed if the identity standards
marketed by the EU are in conflict with its own values? This idea is expanded upon by Jura who
explains, "The European political project cannot ignore this plurality of cultures in which each
national culture expresses and imposes itself differently."14 Again, the obstacle presented is how
does the EU ensure that the organization is not only maintained, but its members are satisfied in
regards to identity if each state has its own beliefs regarding the concept. Essentially, it seems
that while the EU has vast goals regarding identity, it must contend with a variety of
controversial subjects that it may have not envisioned undertaking.
Not only does the EU have to commit to solving these identity topics, but it must deal
with the obscurity that comes attached to such a challenge. As the EU attempts to push forward
doubt remains about how to approach these problems. This idea is presented by Aggestam and
Hill in the following, "The multicultural idea of ‘unity in diversity’ rests on a ‘constructive
ambiguity’ to enable it to be acceptable to everyone. There are tensions inherent in the concept,
between the European and the national, and between the individual and the community."15 In this
statement Aggestam and Hill suggest that the EU strategizes to make identity issues vague in
nature so it is seemingly inclusive and universal. Yet, this also leads to difficulties regarding
divisions between the EU, the state, and citizens. Xuereb also suggests similar thoughts on this
tactic when he states, " However, whether cultural communities can be viewed as groups with
their own special rights or as citizens with particular cultural characteristics whose rights and
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duties are part of those of the larger community remains unclear."16 Xuereb takes the uncertainty
approach of the EU further by implying that inconclusiveness still leaves the question concerning
the role of unique cultural groups and EU identity unanswered. What obligations does the EU
have towards these factions and vice versa? It seems that the obscure strategy of the EU to deal
with identity has only muddied the waters for both organization and state.
In many ways the presence of multiculturalism has only exposed the limitations of the
EU in this area as it attempts to obtain a universal European identity. The uncertainty and
constraint regarding multiculturalism and identity can be found within the EU's core. This
concept is illustrated by Jura who remarks, "In fact, there was no strategy to really implement
multiculturalism as a transversal policy in European societies. No relevant document has been
adopted; no specific laws to promote multiculturalism were passed."17 Jura points out that while
the EU has consistently acknowledged and implemented identity and culture within its platform
and decisions, it still has not dealt with the issue of multiculturalism. It seems the EU seemingly
would rather avoid the subject that find a way to adequately find a solution. As a result, states
and cultural groups belonging to the EU are left in an effective limbo regarding the safety of
their beliefs and rights within the organization. This is further exemplified by Craufurd Smith
who says, "Though Community law is in principle able to accommodate Member State policies
in the cultural field, in practice many domestic regulations of this type have been found to be
either disproportionate or discriminatory."18 Craufurd Smith expands on the EU's inability to
contend with these problems by recognizing that even the legislation produced in relation to
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multiculturalism has gaps and contradictions within it. Thus, the whole topic of multiculturalism
is left a tangled mess, which inevitably leads to immense tensions not only between EU states
and the organization but members themselves.
The inability of the EU to contend with multiculturalism is further compounded by the
trickledown effect the organization's uncertainty has had on its own member states. The lack of
direction from the EU has led member states to be more expressive of their own beliefs and
rights. This an idea that is touched upon by Aggestam and Hill who say, "Approaches to
multiculturality still vary greatly between EU member states because they are linked to distinct
national experiences of state-building and concepts of citizenship...Multiculturalism as an
approach is far from universal."19 This reveals that the states themselves have different views on
what constitutes acceptable multiculturalism due to each having unique attributes and
experiences. As a result, it makes the ability for states to agree on the issue so much more
difficult, which ultimately fosters tensions within the organization. Roberto Belloni follows this
train of thought when he explains, "Not only do EU member states hold different views, but
European institutions themselves reflect these disagreements."20 Belloni's assessment reveals that
the mutual benefits advertised by the EU also mean shared problems as well. Since the EU does
not have a firm direction regarding multiculturalism, it allows states to express their differing
and often contending beliefs on the matter, which in turn begins to characterize the institution
itself. Therefore, multiculturalism has proven to be one of the major flaws of the EU, which in
the end may have negative consequences for all member and candidate states involved with the
organization.
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Battles Fought Over Shattered Dreams
The EU's shortcomings in the realm of multiculturalism has resulted in an array of
tensions and challenges that continue to negatively affect the institution and its members. A
significant issue is the EU's lack of direction regarding multiculturalism has led to animosity
within the organization. This notion is covered by Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood who assert, "In
Europe this charge assumes a role in the backlash against multiculturalism and is particularly
evident in debates concerning the accommodation of religious minorities..."21 This statement
indicates that without a clear agreement regarding multiculturalism, member and candidate states
find themselves arguing over their own beliefs and EU's policies. Craufurd Smith argues that
these matters worsened with the development of the Single European Act, which limited
member state power in the area of culture. Craufurd Smith notes that, "With the loss of the
Member State's legislative veto in significant areas, the Commission's willingness to develop
cultural policies tailored to Community rather than domestic needs, would, from the Member
States' point of view, have taken on a more troubling dimension."22 From the standpoint of the
EU, it seems their strategy is to maintain control by limiting member power. At the same time,
however, this naturally prompts concerns about whether this restraint is really in the benefit of
the members? How can a state, like Croatia, make a viable contribution and even protect itself if
it has no power to do so? Jura accounts for these complications in the following, "The French
President Nicolas Sarkozy declared in February 2011 that the multicultural model is a European
'failure'; he thus, adhered to similar opinions previously expressed by Angela Merkel, the
German Chancellor, and by David Cameron, the British Premier, says AFP 'Yes, it is a
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failure.'"23 This statement reveals the severity of the multicultural issue within the EU. The fact
that representatives from the leading EU countries, France, Germany, and Britain have all
declared multiculturalism a failure leaves the organization in chaos. As a result, what fills this
void of uncertainty? Is the issue meant to be ignored or dismissed? How can states remain stable
in an organization immersed in confusion concerning such a sensitive and valuable subject for all
involved? Seemingly the road to a unified EU identity has only meant fragmentation and a loss
of direction and rights for member states.
In addition, the failure of EU identity and multiculturalism has pervaded the
organization's processes. It has led to EU member states questioning whether multiculturalism
can ever be attained within the organization successfully. Jessica Sprague Jones covers this topic
when she remarks, "With that cultural diversity came a complicated history of policy adoption,
as several European states came to question the efficacy of multiculturalism as state policy in the
face of race riots and the failure of some immigrant communities to become economically and
culturally integrated within their host countries."24 It seems that with the EU being unable to
contend with multiculturalism, states have begun to distrust the organizations belief that all
groups could be included and successfully assimilated. This has led to an outward expression of
disagreement amongst citizens and cultural groups in the form of protests, riots, etc. It has also
meant the states have expressed doubt in regards to overall trust in the EU on this matter. Anca
Pusca delves into this topic through her case study of Poland entrance into the EU and France's
insistence that Polish migration within the EU be delayed due to a fear of Polish plumbers taking
jobs away from French nationals. Pusca expresses the significance of this event as follows, "The
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metaphor of the ‘Polish plumber’ thus came to signify a divided Europe, one side of which was
ready to defend itself against an incoming wave of ‘Polish plumbers.'"25 This is a prime example
of the brewing tensions underneath the surface of EU principles of inclusiveness and
multiculturalism. The fact that the French successfully supported a bid to stall Polish migration is
an act of self-interest that goes against the so-called EU standards the organization was founded
upon. More importantly it can be considered a serious case of double standards and divisions that
defines the EU and European state relations. Essentially, the breakdown of EU identity and
multiculturalism has only created further challenges that put the organization's sustainability into
question.
As the EU's fantasies of a European identity have arguably failed, the very principles of
the organization have had to adapt and transform to the realities of a complicated and
multicultural Europe. The tensions that had been growing amongst EU member states regarding
identity has outwardly expressed itself through the expansion process. This is covered by Belloni
who says, "Many EU member states, led by France, are opposed to further enlargement in the
absence of a new treaty. Only Croatia is expected to be admitted, once the objections of
neighboring Slovenia are overcome. For the most part, the issue of enlargement is frustrated by a
lack of enthusiasm among European officials."26 While EU expansion had always been
correlated with prosperity, the issues regarding multiculturalism has physically slowed and
transformed this process. It seems that EU members are beginning to see expansion as a
negative, rather than positive outcome. This is also significant as Belloni uses Croatia as an
example for his argument. From his analysis it is implied that Croatia has only narrowly been
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accepted into the organization. Therefore, this lack of support has a direct impact on Croatia's
place within the EU and its stability as a state. Similarly Xuereb argues,"... for the EU to develop
an agenda which promotes ideas and values about being European that go beyond establishing
strict norms of what distinguishes communities from others, thus separating European and nonEuropean people on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion and other cultural differences."27 This
quote is important as it reveals that the organization may be allowing personal beliefs about
subjects such as culture and race dictate how it relates to an EU member state, candidate, or
particular group within the organization. Pusca expands this concept by again noting the Polish
plumber and saying, "...but the extent to which it managed to address the larger problem of
discrimination and xenophobia, present not only in France, but all throughout the European
Union, Poland included, is unclear."28 Directly attacking the issue of discrimination within the
EU and its member states has called into question whether the EU is actually a wellspring of
problems rather than prosperity. The EU appears to have become a haven based on divisions,
rather than the unified Europe it claims to be.
While the EU continues to promote itself as the epitome of unity and mutual prosperity,
the reality of the EU's image is one riddled with problems due to its failures in the area of
identity. The divisions and debates surrounding the EU's identity have come to define how the
EU operates. This is an aspect touched by Pusca who says, " It was also a question of defending
one’s identity and nation and defeating a potentially wrong turn in how the EU thinks about
itself. Representation, at least in this particular case, remains very much about identity if not also
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about ideology."29 This statement reveals that the EU has become driven by powerful member
states making decisions on their own personal perceptions rather than the original principles the
EU was founded under. This can be a potentially disastrous outcome not only for Croatia, but
many other EU member and candidate states, as multiple beliefs and standards would create
problems rather than solve them. Craufurd Smith supports this point by saying, "Article 151(2)
requires one to focus on a separate, though related, issue, namely who should be regarded as
European."30 Reverting back to the foundations of the EU and its Lisbon Treaty, Craufurd Smith
notes that expansion and relations has come down to whether one is considered European or not.
Yet, what standards or characteristics define European? Who or what decides that definition?
Finally, how are states impacted by such an approach? It seems that EU identity began as an
empowered idea gone wrong, which has inevitably turned the organization into a breeding
ground for fragmentation and discrimination.
Conclusion: What Exactly is Plan B?
While this report centers on the particular challenges regarding Croatia's relationship with
the EU, it is important to fully understand the organization it has now aligned itself with. Croatia
has entered an institution that marketed itself around the ideas of unity, identity, and prosperity.
Yet, while the EU attempted to achieve its goal of an EU identity, the realities of
multiculturalism have proven too complicated for the organization to handle. Strategies
involving an obscure approach to multiculturalism has only shattered alliances and has created
tensions amongst member states. Without the EU providing direction, support, or solutions to
these issues the institution has dwindled down to discrimination and double standards. As a
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result, this leaves many questions regarding the protection of state's rights within this field.
Despite the EU's epic inefficiency in promoting an inclusive identity it still continues to survive.
With multiculturalism being deemed a failure, exactly what new tactic has the organization
resolved to use in order to maintain its sustainability? More importantly how does this strategy
affect member states?
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Chapter 2: Europeanization: The Profits and Prices of A Movement
Not only did the European Union fail to create an independent identity, but the
unsuccessful attempt developed tensions within the organization itself. Although the EU has not
provided a solution for the situation, it continues to sustain and even grow. The institution's
ability to expand into Croatia reveals that the EU has begun to rely on a new approach, while
outwardly maintaining its platform based on the ideas of inclusive identity and multiculturalism.
With so many member states expressing their distaste for the changes that occurred within the
EU and their own countries as a result of this identity goal, it was inevitable that a power
struggle would ensue. As noted previously leading members of the EU, which included France,
Britain, and Germany, had announced their disappointment with the results of the multicultural
approach the organization had taken. Unsatisfied with the situation left to the EU and their
respective states regarding this matter, it seems that these powerful members had resolved that
the best approach would be to change any state or group that did not conform to their ideals and
standards. In effect, these Western European states launched a campaign of Europeanization
within the institution. Suddenly, states that weren't considered "European" had to transform
themselves in order to either remain in the organization's good graces, or to merely be considered
as a candidate for membership. Of course this transformation has a significant impact on Croatia
as it must contend with this project of European homogenization. The larger ramifications of this
strategy on states like Croatia can be seen through the EU's development of this tactic and the
consequences that have already begun to reveal themselves.
Western Protectionism
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It can be argued that the failures of inclusive multiculturalism within the EU, made
Europeanization not only attractive, but profitable. EU members began to move towards this plan
as identity became seen as a necessary evil in the path of the organization's interests. This
thought is explored by Xuereb who says, "The cultural agenda in Europe is of relatively minor
importance yet ideologically highly charged. Culture is a thorny issue particularly when the
division of competencies between the EU and its Member States is considered."31 This remark
indicates that culture is a tension filled subject that comes attached with an enormous amount of
power. As a result, it is in the organization's benefit to attempt to bring this issue under control.
Another influential factor leading Western European members towards Europeanization is that
true multiculturalism means an exchange between all parties involved. Jura touches on this
subject in the following, "It appears that multiculturalism addresses to elites not to individuals
who live their life in the midst of other cultures. But most of all we must not forget that
multiculturalism is a policy that encompasses at least two parties willing to share each other
values."32 This analysis drives to the very heart of the matter of multiculturalism within the EU.
The institution desired an independent identity that worked in the best interests of the
organization, rather than being inclined to exchange beliefs and culture. As a result, once
Western European EU members became unsatisfied with the multitude of cultures being shifted
throughout the expanse of the organization, it became clear that they had to make this area work
in their favor. This concept is suggested by Zlatan Krajina who asserts," Nonetheless, the idea of
‘common European identity’ remained both a necessity and a repeatedly discovered problem."33
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This implies that the EU recognized that the power of identity could not be dismissed. At the
same time, the prospect of Western European states containing the issue became increasingly
appealing. For countries like France, Germany, and Britain this is a welcomed proposal, but what
happens to states, like Croatia, who are not only unwelcome within this club, but are seen as
liabilities that must dealt with? The failure of the EU identity project did not inspire the
organization to continue its search for a solution based on its principles, but allowed the belief of
a Western European controlled culture to come into being.
The failures of EU identity has not only compelled Western European states to assume
control over the organization, but has fostered the development of a Europeanization campaign.
It has become clear that identity within the EU has only encouraged discrimination and divisions.
Tobias Theiler expands upon this notion in the following, "Yet while west Europeans
unconditionally trust in one another’s peaceful mutual dispositions they have not experienced a
corresponding rise in overarching communal identifications (that is, as European or EUEuropean)."34 Theiler makes a key assessment of Western European EU members, by saying that
these countries mistrust any state outside the western sphere. As a result, this strong divide may
have far reaching implications for members and candidates hailing from Central and Eastern
Europe. The mistrust indicates that Western European states do not view their eastern
counterparts as equals. Therefore, it is fair to say that the organization's policies towards Central
and Eastern Europe are inspired and driven by what the Western EU members desire. In
addition, Europeanization is also a way for Western Europe to extract a profit from Central and
Eastern European countries anxious to enter the institution. Carroll delves into this subject matter
when he explains, "The polar opposite to integration is disintegration and no progressive
34
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European leader will countenance regression when there is an opportunity to proceed forwards
by propelling EU norms to new geographical territories."35 This statement reveals that these so
called "EU norms" are a way for Western European members to extend control and reap the
benefits these states have to offer. Furthermore, Carroll's depiction of the EU in this area is very
similar to the way in which one would describe an empire, or a controlled state like the Soviet
Union. Is Croatia and other states within this part of Europe entering an EU founded on mutual
benefits and equality or an organization focused on obtaining members that will merely be
subservient to a larger EU agenda? In truth, the EU campaign of Europeanization is a tactic used
to exploit EU member and candidate states outside of the western sphere.
Unity Without Identity
Once Europeanization began to take hold within the organization, Western EU members
began to focus on the ways in which this strategy could be implemented across Europe.
Establishing Europeanization within the EU's relations with members and candidates became the
first plan of action. Bedrudin Brljavac explains the depth of Europeanization when he remarks, "
"Europeanization process may have two functions. First, it explains the influence of the
European politics and institutions on the domestic politics. Second, Europeanization stresses the
process of change through which domestic actors adapt to European integration."36 It can be
inferred that Europeanization is a transformative process that must be undertaken by the state in
question. Furthermore, Europeanization in this case is defined as a far reaching mechanism that
has the ability to change any aspect of the state whether it be politics or culture. This means that
if a state, like Croatia, has policies or values that are not seen as in accordance with EU
35
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standards, it will have no choice but to change them. Not doing so would put a member's position
within the organization in jeopardy and candidate states would risk their EU membership
negotiations. This idea is considered by Marko Stojic who says, "The influence of the European
Union is today widely accepted by all European states as an integral part of their policy-making
process. The final goal of this process, often called Europeanization, is to prepare countries to
become EU member states and to accept the democratic values and norms shared by all EU
member states."37 Again, this statement supports the idea that Europeanization is not a process
that a state has the ability to dismiss or even be selective about regarding certain subject areas.
Belloni comments on the wider impact of Europeanization goals when he mentions, "In the long
term, inclusion into European institutions can soften exclusive, nationalist identities by adding a
new layer of identification."38 This reveals that Europeanization will not only be a changing
force within the European state who undertakes the process, but the EU's goals will be to create
an allegiance within these states that is far stronger than any national identity a person may value
and adhere to. Essentially, the Europeanization system is a powerful mechanism within the EU
that has the ability to apply extensive changes on a country that works in the organization's
benefit.
While the Europeanization process is a powerful strategy within the EU, it had to be
implemented properly in order to be successful. The tactic had to be undertaken in a way that
maintained the efficacy of the project, but made it seem an unimportant step to the states in
question. This concept is touched upon by Theiler who says, "Yet as was equally argued, if
citizens are to develop commitments to the EU through their existing national identifications,
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overarching institutions and processes must..retain a measure of ‘constructive ambiguity’ to
facilitate their incorporation into the different national identity constellations."39 Before when
attempting to establish a unified EU identity based on multiculturalism, the tactic of obscurity
resulted in a complete failure for the institution. This time, however, the EU used this strategy to
their advantage. By making their Europeanization process ambiguous, states will not see the
campaign as an exploitative measure. At the same time, this will grant the EU an opportunity to
instill its selective ideals and standards within multiple areas of the state. Brljavac also comments
on this approach when he remarks, "In addition, Europeanization can be comprehended from the
angle of ―top-down approach as some form of domestic change that is caused by European
decision-making."40 The significance of this statement is that Europeanization isn't a subject that
every EU member state is allowed to make a contribution to. Without this aspect, the EU is
implementing so-called European standards decided by a small group of Western European
states. This implies that all of Europe must adhere to these EU requirements if they desire to
have a meaningful relationship with the institution. Basically, Europeanization has allowed the
EU to assert their standards and desired changes on countries, who by all account are largely
unaware of the massive implications this mechanism has on their states.
Not only does Europeanization provide the EU extensive control over its members and
candidates, but it works in a way that subtly encourages these states to conform to this process.
Countries continue to aspire to be part of the EU's greatness, which in turn creates an impulsive
drive for the states to join and remain in good standing with the organization. The result of this is
that under these conditions the countries do not confute unwanted changes or at times even
question them. Brljavac points out an example of this when he explains, "Since Europeanization
39
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process is a two-way street both the EU and aspirant country hold a responsibility for the pace of
the process."41 This indicates that pressure is put on states to meet Europeanization demands.
Essentially, the EU informs the country about desired changes and explains that the state must be
held accountable for these adjustments if it is to remain in good standing. Thus, countries rush to
placate the EU without thinking about the future consequences these changes could have on the
state itself. Stojic expands on this topic when he says, "The mechanism of Europeanization – i.e.
the way the EU influences different countries – can be described as combining policies of
conditionality and norm diffusion or social learning."42 This implies that Europeanization
provides the EU an advantage over states as they use it as part of the organization's
conditionality requirements. Since this process is part of those obligations a country, like Croatia,
does not have the chance to undergo EU negotiations on a level playing field, there will always
be this feeling that the country must undertake the EU's required changes. In addition, by using
terms such as "norm diffusion" and "social learning" to characterize Europeanization, Stojic is
reflecting the discriminatory undertone this mechanism has. Brljavac summarizes the impact of
Europeanization on states when he remarks, "In fact, Europeanization process is not only about
adopting and implementing EU policies, rules, norms and values... it is equally important that the
EU has set clear standards, measures and rules which are to be adopted by aspirants on the
membership."43 Brljavac reveals that Europeanization is merely a plan to influence countries to
conform to EU standards, regardless of what the future ramifications may be. In many ways,
Europeanization has become the EU's oppressive tool that forces countries to be submissive in
the area of state transformation.
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Navigating the Seas of Doubt
In regards to the states undertaking or commencing the process of Europeanization, they
are also contributing to the EU's plan of control and uniformity. The EU through this strategy is
seemingly moving the organization towards a point in which it would have absolute control over
European ideals, values, and standards. This idea is expanded on by Carroll who comments,
"Pure homogeneity must not be the goal—rather it should be celebrated heterogeneity through a
partnership of countries adhering to some universal traits and values as well as establishing
unbreakable partnership links that in future must define the supranational body."44 Through his
criticism of EU and identity, Carroll is acknowledging that there is an effort to homogenize
Europe. This means that states who hold their differences as invaluable, may have to abandon
them upon the EU's request and adapt themselves to a life dictated by what the EU views as
normal. This train of thought is continued by Theiler who notes, "While perceptions of Europe
remain heavily ‘nationalized’ national identifications have become partially ‘Europeanized.’"45
This statement means that the EU is achieving its goals by having citizens claim an EU identity
and in turn responsibility that supersedes their own national country. The implications of this is
that future choices of how a state proceeds will be highly influenced by what the EU desires.
Yet, some like Krajina have noted the negative consequences that homogenization may bring.
This can be seen when he remarks that, "A complex unrest has been contextualizing discussions
about what kind of unity the EU imagines, and in what ways it demarcates its borders over a
single geographical entity – the continent of Europe – claiming its name, and infusing it with a
culture of divisions."46 Through this statement Krajina is questioning the concept of

44

Carroll, "How Selective Should the European Union Be When Selecting Its Future Members?"288.
Theiler, "Does the European Union Need to Become a Community?"788.
46
Krajina, "Mapping' the 'Other' in Television News on International Affairs,"143.
45

B i l a n d z i c h | - 59 -

Europeanization and even going as far as to note the divisions and problems that may occur in
Europe as a result of it. Essentially, Europeanization has been successfully implemented , but
potentially at a high cost for member and candidate states of the EU.
Although Europeanization can be considered an effective plan, it still has created tensions
within states aligned with the EU. Many times Europeanization attacks the very core or belief
system of a country. Brljavac explains this notion when he says, "However, very often it happens
that European norms and values are in clash with EU aspirant's values and norms."47 This quote
indicates that states are often forced to give up their individual beliefs and standards. Usually
countries desire EU membership and benefits to the point that they undertake the
transformations, but it is not without resentment. This begs the question of not only whether a
loss of values is worth a place within the organization, but where does this animosity lead? The
larger ramifications of this tension is expanded upon by Carroll who argues, "This indoctrination
is not always viewed positively by the demos in the candidate country but fear of loss of national
identity is accepted and often overwhelmed by positivity about employment and trade
opportunities..."48 Again, this statement seems to point out that in the moment of negotiation
states submit to EU policy. Yet, there remains a doubt of whether these changes come at the cost
of one's own identity and values. The Europeanization process is not only unequal and
discriminatory, but it creates an antagonistic environment within Europe, where states pay a high
price for this alliance.
Conclusion: Finding Yourself on the Wrong Side of the Fence
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With the failures of an inclusive multicultural identity far behind the EU, it found success
in the Europeanization approach. Fed up with the failures of multiculturalism, Western European
EU countries took it upon themselves to use EU power in their favor. Hence Europeanization, a
campaign of exploitation came into being. The process of Europeanization meant that states had
to become part of an EU effort at homogenization. This implies that any belief or value a state
that the EU considered in conflict with its own standards would have to be changed as part of
conditionality requirements. While this has caused tension, the desire of maintaining an alliance
with the EU often supersedes any doubt a state may have. As a result, the EU is able to pervade
its member and candidate states and expand its control. In addition, Europeanization standards
are very much driven by Western European states leading the organization. The larger
implications is that EU standardization policy completely alienates the Central and Eastern
European members that have arguably become part of a discriminatory East-West divide within
the organization. Furthermore, it also puts these states into a submissive role within the
institution where they must consistently conform to EU norms, thus putting a state's individual
identity at risk. In this chaos of tension, double standards, and power struggles the EU has
expanded into Croatia. A country geographically located within Central Europe, Croatia enters
the organization on the disadvantaged side of the east-west divide. In many ways, the
Europeanization process can be held accountable for many of the challenges Croatia has had to
contend with in regards to its relationship with the EU. These are issues that attack the very heart
of the state, beginning with the EU's insistence that Croatia be marked with a label reading
Balkan.
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Chapter 3: Balkanization: The EU's Blacklist
Croatia, like any other European state, found itself allured to the potential benefits the EU
could offer the country. As a result, it underwent years of transitions and negotiations in order to
be inducted into the organization. Unfortunately, for Croatia many of the hopes and dreams it
associated with EU membership, were mere illusions in the end. This is especially true in regards
to the country's identity. For Croatia EU membership symbolized an opportunity for the state to
be recognized as an independent European nation, that had and continues to contribute to the
well being of the continent. Despite these ambitious dreams, Croatia found itself entering an EU
based upon divisions and the insistence that every member that did not meet Western European
standards must be Europeanized. As a result, Croatia became an additional victim and part of a
long list of states that have become entangled in the tensions, and issues the Europeanization
approach created. In the case of Croatia, this meant a long road of concessions that threatened the
very heart of the state and its people. For every benefit the country received, it had to give up
tenfold in the area of its own identity. Croatia hoped that EU membership would mean an
abolition of the negative experiences and associations that had been part of the state's history.
The tragedy of it all is that the EU embodies every malicious aspect of the country's past that
Croatia has been determined to escape from.
One of the elements that pervades Croatia's history and its relationship with the EU is the
concept of Balkanization. For many years the EU has referred to Croatia as a Balkan country.
Not only do Croatians disagree with this label, but the characterization has become synonymous
with numerous stereotypes and negative beliefs regarding the country. The classification of
Balkan is in contention with the ways in which Croatia views its own state and how it foresees its
future within the EU. To make matters worse, the EU has allowed Balkanization to guide its
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relations and policy making towards Croatia. As a result, the EU has effectively put Croatia in a
category where it receives systematic punishment due to its forced attachment to the Balkan
label. The negative effects the term Balkan has on Croatia can be seen in a variety of ways. To
begin with, it is a concept that defines the way in which the EU views Croatia and challenges the
state's perspective of itself. In addition, it is a depiction that has influenced the EU's
Europeanization of the country, and the Croatian determination to preserve its identity.
The Meaning of the Balkan Mark
In order to understand the ramifications the term Balkan has on Croatia, it is important to
explain the various meanings behind the concept. While some attribute the Balkan label as a
purely geographical term, although highly inaccurate, it is a classification that comes loaded with
a variety of beliefs. Maria Todorova explores this idea in her analysis of the depiction and
treatment of countries considered part of the Balkans. She addresses the geographical perspective
of using the term Balkan in the following, "In fact, this is a simultaneous process: at the same
time that 'Balkan' was being accepted and widely used as geographic signifier, it was already
becoming saturated with a social and cultural meaning that expanded its signified far beyond its
immediate and concrete meaning."49 This evidence is significant as it proves that Balkan is much
more than a geographical marker, it is a label that represents many views ranging from the
cultural to the political. In addition, by classifying Croatia as Balkan, it becomes synonymous
with all of the perspectives that are part of the term. The signifiers that are attached to Balkan
also work to create a division within Europe. This is touched upon by Belloni who says, "... the
Balkans has been described as a form of Orientalism, part of a dichotomy between the rational
and enlightened West and the feminine, passional and irrational Orient. For some commentators,
49
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the Western Balkans continues to be constructed as an ‘Other’ towards which European identity
is constantly redefined."50 This analysis of the name Balkan is crucial for a variety of reasons. To
begin with, Belloni affiliates the term with Edward Said's theory of Orientalism. Said's concept
largely deals with how the depiction of the East pervades many subjects whether it be politics or
culture, and how this ultimately influences the way the West relates to the region. By joining
these two ideas together, Belloni is asserting that countries considered part of the Balkans
experience similar situations as the East does within the topic of Orientalism. Furthermore,
Belloni's explanation is that the Balkans will always be considered as Europe's negative other.
While Todorova does not argue that Orientalism and Balkanism are one in the same, she does
note correlations. This can be seen when Todorova remarks, "That the Balkans have been
described as the “other” of Europe does not need special proof. What has been emphasized about
the Balkans is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as
normative by and for the civilized world."51 This statement also supports the idea that Balkan is
an adverse and divisive term. As a result, by regarding Croatia as Balkan, it puts the state in a
negative and non-European category. Essentially, Balkan is more than a geographical term, it is
an alienating and destructive label.
Not only are the Balkans considered separate from all that is European, but they are
perceived as a problem by the EU. The beliefs behind Balkanism also expand to the citizens of
these so-called Balkan countries, as their presence within this region and throughout Europe is
seen as a vital issue. This aspect is explored by Todorova who explains, "'Balkanization' not only
had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units but also had become a
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synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian."52 This means
that countries, like Croatia, that are considered to be part of the Balkans are thought to be
uncivilized. As a result, this naturally opens the doors for unequal and maltreatment within
organizations such as the EU. Krajina directly attacks this point when he comments, "A
subsequent reference to a weak and backward entity (Croatia) before a strong and ordered system
(EU) follows from this quite easily."53 In his work, Krajina covers Croatia's depiction within
media throughout its accession process. He conclusively found that the negative aspects of
Balkanism came to define the characterization of Croatia. The significance of this statement is
that Balkanism is a legitimate concept that has very real ramifications for a country considered to
be Balkan. Furthermore, Krajina's analysis of Croatia reveals that its forced association with the
term Balkan has produced visible consequences for the state. Basically, the infamous perceptions
behind Balkanism has extreme effects on the countries that are classified as such.
The believed challenges attached to the Balkans plays an important role in influencing
the EU. In many ways the EU's goals for the Balkan region are driven by the stereotypes
associated with Balkanism. This is expanded by Branko Caratan who remarks, "...the
Europeanization of the Balkans provides the best protection against the Balkanization of Europe.
Here the term 'Balkanization' does not mean the fragmentation of nation-states, but the
entanglement of South-Eastern European countries in retrograde processes and unsolved
problems."54 Caratan's assertion continues to portray the Balkans as a destructive region. His
suggestion that the Balkans must be Europeanized, suggests that the area is in some way a threat
to the rest of Europe. It is exactly these stereotypes that encourage Western Europe and
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institutions like the EU to discriminate against states deemed to be Balkan. These thoughts are
explored within Belloni's assessment of the EU's role within the Balkans in which he says," This
approach reinforced the feeling among international observers and citizens and leaders in the
Western Balkans that the EU lacks a real strategy to address the region’s problems."55 Again,
Belloni compounds this idea that the Balkans somehow represents insurmountable challenges for
the EU. As a result, countries like Croatia are treated more like criminals rather than equals
within the EU. An example of the issues this perspective creates is revealed by Krajina who
argues, "The news screening of the intense awaiting for the European Council’s decision on
whether to start the negotiations with Turkey and Croatia, sheds light on the sophisticated
cultural refurbishment of new/old fronts of Europe’s margins, and its ‘others’: the Orient and the
Balkans."56 This shows that Croatia has been viewed as Europe's other even at the beginning of
its EU accession process. As a result, this is evidence that the EU is driven by the negative
associations attached to the Balkan name. In many ways, EU policy within the Balkan region is
dictated by the superstitious beliefs that constitute Balkanism.
The influence of Balkanism has continued to create a permanent view of the region, even
within the EU. In regards to the Balkans the EU has depicted itself as an effective knight in
shining armor. It seems the goal is to salvage the Balkan region by saving the states from
themselves. This is covered by Belloni who remarks, "...today the Balkans are better understood
as a transitional concept, something not yet Europe, or not quite European, but on its way to
European integration. The Balkans might be backward, but they have the potential, at least in
nuce, of entering the European mainstream, defined by progress, stability and prosperity."57
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From Belloni's depiction he implies that the only aspect that isn't wrong with the Balkans is its
potential to be molded into proper European states. In addition, Belloni repeatedly characterizes
the region using Balkan stereotypes by claiming that it is both non-European and backward. This
definition only supports the fact that so called Balkan countries entering the EU are being
accepted at a disadvantage. These ideas are expanded by Carroll who says, "It may take 10 or 15
years or more but South Eastern European and Balkan states actually have the potential to
transcend cultural and religious boundaries, the East–West divide and to redefine the principles
of the Western world and the EU."58 Again, the Balkans are discussed in terms of European
potentials and divides. This subversive condescending attitude towards Balkan states is very
much characteristic of the treatment these states receive in regards to their alliances with the EU.
Marijan Bošnjak makes the correlation between Balkanism and EU policy within his book when
comments, "We mainly learn about the creation of the Western Balkans through the media.
There are, however, some concrete plans that are funded by the EU Commission, but the media
does not talk about them."59 This quote is significant as it reveals that Balkanism is very much a
living concept within Europe that continues to adversely affect states that are classified within
this category. In addition, it also indicates that the EU plays an important role in supporting and
marketing this concept within Europe, as well as its relations with so called Balkan countries,
like Croatia. Overall, any state that is considered to be Balkan has and continues to be victimized
by the stereotypes and negative views attached to this label.
The combination of Balkanism and the EU has led to the organization forming very
specific views in regards to Croatia. From the beginning of its accession process, Croatia has
unhappily voiced its concern with the EU's insistence that it be classified as Balkan or in more
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political terms the south-eastern region. This pattern has been noted by Josip Jović who remarks,
"Croatia is increasingly treated as part of a united region, called the Western Balkans or
southeastern Europe..."60 This statement indicates that the EU is resolved to treat Croatia as part
of the Balkan region, despite its desire to be recognized as an independent European state. The
larger ramifcations of the EU's view of Croatia is explored by by John E. Ashbrook who
says,"One of the most controversial aspects of Croatia’s road to candidacy has been the EU’s
decision to consign Croatia to the Western Balkans. The Croatian government resisted this
grouping, but it was only through compliance that they were offered the promise of potential
candidacy."61 This confirms that the EU had been well aware of Croatia's distaste for the Balkan
label. Yet, the organization not only insisted on maintaining the classification, but used EU
membership as leverage against the country. Knowing how much Croatia desired to be inducted
with the EU, the institution made it clear that unless the state accepted the marker there would be
no EU membership. Essentially, this situation is proof of how Balkanism allows Croatia to be
treated unfairly within the EU. Krajina compounds this concept by arguing, "... Croatia’s
prosperity and problem-causing for the ‘Western’ evaluators, which brought the opposing forces
of ‘accession’ and ‘othering’ to a schizophrenic relation of mutual support. Between these forces,
the overriding impression was that of a transitional stage in attaining ‘European-ness’ which the
country appeared in."62 Krajina's analysis indicates that Croatia is considered an outsider in
regards to Europe. It is portrayed as both a challenge and a lucrative prospect for the EU. Since
the state is perceived in such adverse terms, it has no equality within the institution. Therefore,
Balkanism has formed the foundation of the EU's view and treatment of Croatia.
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Croatian Truth Against Balkan Perceptions
In regards to Balkanism and Croatia, the state desperately desires to disassociate itself
from the term. One reason is that the controversial label influences the self perception of states
deemed to be Balkan. Todorova comments on this idea when she says, "It is virtually axiomatic
that, by and large, a negative self-perception hovers over the Balkans next to a strongly
disapproving and disparaging outside perception."63 This statement indicates that so called
Balkan states are very much aware of the negative perceptions that are associated with this
classification. Instinctively, Croatia has continuously voiced that the views and beliefs behind
Balkanism are very much in conflict with how Croats perceive their own state. The importance
of a distinct Croatia identity is covered by Dr ðuro Njavro who asserts, "Croatian national
identity as the essence of a moral community whose solidarity as a group has created a solid
foundation for the modern Croatian state."64 Njavro reveals that Croatia identity is an integral
part of the state itself. As a result, Croatians do not want to accept an identity that is not their
own. Unfortunately, Croatia's self perception and the prevailing Balkanist attitude within the EU
has only created tension. This is expanded upon by Krajina who notes that, "Another Balkanist
continuity is evoked as the story goes on to negotiate Croatian identity between its Balkan origin
and contested ‘European-ness.’" As Krajina documented the portrayal of Croatia's EU accession
process, this analysis brings an important issue to light. His statement proves that the EU
declines to accept the ways in which Croats view their own state. This EU's refusal to recognize
Croatia according to the country's terms indicates that the state is not only discriminated against,
but that it must battle Balkanism itself in order to sustain. Basically, Balkanism has challenged
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Croatia's sense of self as this strange concept as formed the foundation of EU perceptions
regarding Croatia.
One aspect of Croatian identity the EU refutes, is the state's insistence that it has always
been a European country. For Croatians they have always considered themselves part of Europe.
This is acknowledged by Dr. Goran Dodig who investigates why Croatians do not question the
area of identity within the EU accession process. Dodig concludes the following, "At first glance,
one might say that this issue was completely unnecessary because it is the most natural fact that
Croatia is a member of the European family."65 This reveals that European classification is an
integral part of Croatian identity. The issue, however, is that the EU does not view the country as
such. As a result, this encourages tensions among Croatians who are aware that the EU
categorizes the country as non-European. The dispute this creates is illustrated by Zvonimir
Šeparović. When asked whether obtaining a European identity formed part of the state's desire
for EU membership, Šeparović stresses, "We don't need to prove we're European."66 This reveals
that doubting Croatia's European identity is an unfathomable concept for Croatians. In addition,
it brings attention to the disagreements between the EU and the Croatian state on this matter.
From Šeparović's statement it is implied that since Croatia is asked to consistently provide
evidence that it is European, is a form of discrimination against the country. This idea is
compounded by Branimir Lukšić reflecting on Croatian identity argues, "To be Croatian is to be
representative or part of a very old culture to be oriented towards Middle, Western Europe and
part of the Mediterranean society."67 This quote supports the belief that Europe is such an
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integral part of Croatian identity that it cannot be separated from it. Therefore, the EU's refusal to
acknowledge Croatia as European attacks the very heart of Croatian identity.
Not only is Europe part of Croatia's internal and official political identity, but it is a
concept that is continually expressed within Croatian culture. For Croatians, Europe is the state's
past, present, and future. This is aptly expressed by Dr. Vinko Grubišić when in responding to
questions regarding Croatia and Europe states, "Croatia always part of Europe traditionally, and
culturally."68 By using the terms "tradition" and "culture," Grubišić is indicating that European
identity pervades all of Croatian society, and is an aspect that is continuously expressed by the
Croatian people. Dr. Miroslav Tuñman details this concept within his own response,"Croatia was
always part of Europe historically, culturally, politically even during history of time when it was
not independent. Even from Roman times Croatia belongs to the West part, Croatia part of
Austro-Hungarian empire developed concept of Middle/Central Europe. If you ask anybody in
Croatia if he or she belongs to Balkans or Europe the answer will always be Europe."69 This
reveals that Europe isn't something that is only felt by Croatians, but it is a concept that is part of
the state's history. In addition, Tuñman's statement emphasizes the universiality and attachment
Europe has amongst the Croatian people. It shows that Croats do not perceive nor do they want
to have any affiliation with the Balkan name. The desire for Croatia to be recognized as separate
from the Balkan classification is presented by Ivan Miklenić as follows, "By joining the EU,
Croatia is returned to its natural environment - Central Europe, where it formally belonged from
1102 until 1918."70 This shows that Croatians believe that they have always been part of Europe,
and that EU membership is a logical step for the country. In addition, Miklenić's statement
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indicates that Croatians believe EU membership will officially recognize Croatia as a European
country. Despite the EU's affirmation that Croatia is non-European, Croatians consider Europe a
very important part of their culture and heritage.
While Croatians regard Europe as a signficant part of their identity, to be regarded as
Balkan is both offensive and detriemtnal to Croatians. The elimination of Croatia's forced
affiliation with the Balkan term is extremely vital for the Croatian state and its people. This can
be seen when Ashbrook asserts, "Ever since independence a common identity discourse in
Croatia has focused on the country’s place as a Central European—not Balkan—territory. In
discussing accession experiences, Croatian writers find it appropriate to compare Croatia with
other Central and East European countries."71 Ashbooke's comments reveal that the eradication
of the Balkan label is so important for the country that it has become a vocalized campaign
within Croatian politics, and academia. Yet, the EU's consistent desire to categorize Croatia as
Balkan has encouraged Croatians to dispute this action and prove the legitimacy of their self
perception. Responding to the allegations that Croatia is Balkan Bošnjak clearly explains his
view as follows, "Not really we are Middle Europe, almost Mediterranean as well because
Adriatic extension. No we're not, East of the river Drina no not Eastern Europe partly. I've got
objections on all grounds politically, geographically. Look at the term Balkans, set of hills in
Bulgaria entire region given name due to bloody hills in Bulgaria. Geographically should name
region based on dominant features."72 This statement provides compelling information related to
Croatia's stance regarding the Balkans. To begin with, Bošnjak points out that according to
standardized geography, Croatia is no way part of the Balkans. This presents an issue that reverts
back to the stereotypes and beliefs behind Balkanism. This is clearly a discriminatory act
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because if Croatia is not geographically part of the Balkans then why does the EU continue to
define it a such? Also Bošnjak's response supports the fact that Croatians do not agree with
Balkan classification. These concepts are also presented by Ashbrook who says, "The postTudjman governments, the Croatian public, and various experts often expressed distaste at being
'forced' into agreements and classification with the Western Balkans."73 This further indicates
that Croats are very dedicated to their anti-Balkan campaign, and are aware that the EU
membership process has continued to make the Balkan label an issue the country must deal with.
Basically, Croatians believe the Balkan label is nothing more than an improper term that is
affecting Croatia, and they are willing to defend and justify their position against this perception
of the country.
Not only do Croatians openly disagree with the Balkan term, but they view it as a
negative symbol of the past that the EU has happily been promoting. While Croatians are quick
to defend their anti-Balkan stance, there is also a growing awareness that the EU does not agree
with their position. This is expressed by Ashbrook when he remarks, "Croats resented this
geopolitical placement because it countered their self-perceptions and self-promotion as Central
European or Mediterranean. Moreover, as many pointed out, Romania and Bulgaria, arguably
less economically and politically developed than Croatia, were not forced into a general Balkan
agreement before their accessions, even though both are Balkan states."74 This highlights both
the discrimination and determination of the EU's Balkan efforts within Croatia. The unfairness
towards Croatia is illustrated by the EU's refusal to put Romania and Bulgaria within the same
Balkan category. In addition, the EU's treatment of Croatia as a Balkan country, continues the
trend that challenges Croatia's self perception. Bošnjak's addresses these issues in the following,
73
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"Project of 'Balkan' EU driven project. I have proof that this is an EU project financed by them
the logical question, is why forming those countries--minus Slovenia and Albania. A
reconstitution of Yugoslavia just under another name, an attack on Croatian independence."75
Bošnjak brings several important issues to light within his response. Not only does Bošnjak note
the EU's affiliation with the Balkan term, but he argues that the organization has been fully
supporting and marketing this label within Croatia. In addition, he also acknowledges the
discrimination aspect of it as he explains that Slovenia and Albania are surprisingly left out of
the Balkan category, despite either bordering or being geographically close to Croatia. Finally,
Bošnjak identifies a disturbing trend by acknowledging the similarities behind the EU marketed
Croatian Balkans and the former Yugoslavia, which have elicited legitimate concerns regarding
the Croatian state within the EU. Antun Dubravko Jelčić also contributes to these ideas in the
following, "The terms of Western Balkans does not exist in history or geographically. Something
leaders in EU brought to existence, synonym for Yugoslavia. Many ideas before Yugoslavia fell
apart term like Euroslavia that is what is dangerous for us those types of terms."76 Like Bošnjak,
Jelčić acknowledges both the EU's involvement with defining Croatia as Balkan, and the striking
similarities between the EU's Balkan Croatia and Yugoslavia. His analysis alludes to Croatia's
tortured past and the fears associated with the parallels between the EU's Balkanization
campaign and Yugoslavia. As a result, Croatians are recognizing the EU's Balkan plan for
Croatia and are defending themselves against this classification.
The EU's ambition to establish a Balkan Croatia has elicited numerous fears amongst
Croatians. The comparison between the EU's vision of Croatia and Yugoslavia has aroused
suspicions that Croatia may be forced to relive its negative past. This is expanded upon by
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Admiral Davor Domazet Lošo who says, "That is the biggest problem for Croatia because EU
put in Croatia on Western Balkans that is synonymous for Yugo. Western Balkans never existed
geographically, economically, historically, culturally something they don't want to use term
Yugoslavia (Yugo) because knew people would be against so use synonym forcing that term
which is against Croatian interests altogether. People in Croat government won't do anything
about it."77 In his response, Lošo addresses the potential ramifications if the EU's policy within
Croatia is anything like the former Yugoslavia. He argues that while there are elements of
Yugoslavia within the EU's Balkan campaign, the organization intelligently avoids using the
terms Yugoslavia or Yugo. This is done so the EU does not directly express its intentions or
arouse the anger of the Croatian state and its people. Lošo makes an additional and valid point by
commenting that nothing about the EU's Balkan campaign within Croatia is in the interests of the
country. From his analysis it is implied that there are already visible risks for Croatia in regards
to its identity and the dangers of Balkanism. This idea is expanded upon by Grubišić when
responding to question of a potential Euroslavia, "Question of terminology, there is a saying
those who do not regret Soviet Union heartless, those who think it can be restored brainless.
Croats not heartless but think of unity, it's nonsense."78 Grubišić's analogy of Croatia's battle with
the Balkan term is both striking and informative. To begin with he remarks that Euroslavia and
other labels are only a question of semantics. Therefore, he is explaining that no matter how one
addresses the EU's campaign the root problems and dangers for Croatia are still there. In
addition, by using his analogy he is arguing that Croats do not regret the dissolution of
Yugoslavia, but have dreams of a type of unity within the EU that is based on ideals rather than
reality. Basically, the EU's Balkan policy poses direct threats to Croatian interests, but Croats
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still cling to their feeling that should provide benefit of the doubt in regards to how beneficial
and secure EU membership will be for Croatia.
Croatian Ideals of EU Membership and the Tragic Realities of EU Europeanization
Despite the risks of the EU's Balkan policy, Croatians believe they can contend with the
adverse campaign. The overwhelming idea is that official EU membership provides an escape
from this Balkan classification. This is brought forth by Jelčić who says, "EU can have positive
and negative effects. If EU would mean to go away from Balkan concepts in that case would be
positive, if happen opposite than it will be negative for Croatia, with that we need to make
difference between stances of Europe and EU."79 Jelčić's statement provides a number of
implications. The fact that although there are acknowledged risks, Croats are willing to gamble
with their identity, reveals the immense allure the EU continues to have on states like Croatia. In
addition, while the EU's association with Balkanism is felt by Croatians, they still believe EU
membership holds the key to their escape from such a label. As a result, this continues to drive
Croats and the state towards the institution. Yet, Jelčić stresses that if membership results in a
permanency of Balkanism within the country, Croatians will be willing to fight. This idea is
supported by Admiral Lošo who remarks, "Instead of definition of Croatia in EU would rather
talk about what stand Croatia should take in EU. First Croatia should stand and explain to other
member states not to put us in Western Balkans category, Croatia shouldn't agree."80 From
Lošo's response it seems that the prevailing idea is that official EU membership will give Croatia
the power to justify their platform regarding Balkanism and remove the label altogether. While
these are encouraging goals for the Croatian people, these ideals omit the possibility that not only
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may these ambitions be unsuccessful, but that Croatia may find itself in a far more precarious
position. Essentially, while Croatians disapprove of the EU's Balkan position, they believe EU
membership would provide an opportunity for the country to enact change in this area.
The Croatian belief in the ability to create change, has led them to have very idealistic
expectations regarding EU membership. One of the prevailing beliefs is that EU membership
will mean an end to the Balkan classification of Croatia. This is exemplified by Ashbrook who
comments, "For most, inclusion in the EU means that Croatia will finally become an accepted
member of the European community, severing the cognitive link their state and the Balkans that
many Westerners take for granted."81 This shows that Croatians feel that EU membership will
provide the European legitimacy that forms such a large part of their own identity. This concept
is touched upon by Miklenić who emphasizes, "Deliverance from the Balkans in Croatia is an
extremely important step. Given the strong legacy of the totalitarian period and abuse of power
and position for personal and group interests, I expect that the EU will be the framework for the
development of the rule of law, and pluralist democracy."82 This indicates that an escape from
Balkanism is crucial for Croatians to the point that they are willing to take a risk with EU
membership, with the hopes that it will be provide a new beginning for the country. This is
compounded by Admiral Lošo who says, "If Croatia doesn't join EU, Croatia would be staying
Western Balkan, synonymous for former Yugoslavia. Joining EU Croatia will be same as
Slovenia, won't be part of that region anymore. Only because of that am I for EU membership."83
This proves that EU membership seems to be a means to an end for Croatians anxious to escape
the Balkan label. This desire is so infectious that it has become the primary if not only force
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driving Croatians towards EU membership. Therefore, EU membership is far more than an
economic opportunity for Croatians, it is considered to be a pathway of escape from the Balkans.
Although Croatians have high expectations for EU membership, there is a growing
concern that these ambitions may end in catastrophe for the state. Some Croatians have already
begun to note the gap between Croatia's expectations of EU membership and the unfortunate
realities. Branimir Lukšić addresses this subject when he remarks, "Croats want the community
of European nations remain Europeans the Croatian way, as they have been over the centuries of
its history, and like other European nations Europeans on their national way."84 Lukšić points out
that Croatians want EU membership according to their terms, however, this may not be a viable
option for the state. He indicates that Croatia wants to be part of a European community and
organization, but retain everything that is held sacred within the country. Unfortunately, it seems
that the EU does not share Croatia's views, therefore setting up the state for disappointment. This
is commented on by Belloni who argues, "On balance, the current strategy risks raising the
expectations of south-east European citizens about the future benefits of membership, with little
assurance of positive short-term, concrete developments. The difficulty to deliver on promises
explains a growing disillusionment about the EU."85 Belloni focuses on the fact that the
expectations of Croatians have already put them at odds with the EU, as the organization either
cannot or will not deliver the ideals that Croatia had in mind when it decided to become part of
the EU. As a result, this naturally will lead to strenuous relations between the institution and the
Croatian state. Lukšić addresses a significant and related point when he asserts, "Europe is
obviously not the same as the EU. Therefore personally accept EU-skepticism, not
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euroscepticism."86 Lukšić argues that Croatians are naturally a part of Europe and desire to
continue this affiliation. Yet, he notes that the principles of the EU is drastically different than
the Europe Croatia wants to be a part of. Therefore, he claims that Croatians who voice their
dissatisfaction with the EU should be labeled EU-skeptic rather than euroskeptic. Even though
Croatians have ambitious hopes for the EU, there are suspicions that membership may be more
problematic for the state than it is beneficial.
Despite Croatia's perseverance to eradicate Balkanism, the EU has continued with its
plans to Europeanize the state. The EU continues to insist that Croatia needs to be Europeanized,
if it is to be considered a welcomed member within the organization. This is expanded upon by
Belloni who comments, "As long as such a process is structured around the idea of the increasing
involvement of the EU in the Western Balkans with the intent of including this region into
European institutions and socializing it by means of European norms..."87 This proves that the
EU continues its efforts to mold Croatia according to its standards of what is considered
European. Milan Jajčinović notes the EU's emphasis on transforming Croatia when he says,
"Balkanization is a goal that is especially aimed at the Croatian culture."88 Jajčinović's comment
reveals that the EU is not only promoting Balkanization within Croatia, but it has shaped the
EU's policy and relations regarding the country. It is implied that the EU will only relate to
Croatia according to Balkan terms, which is in direct conflict with everything the country stands
for. Krajina notes an example of this in the following, "A sense of the country’s immobility and
inferiority before its individual evaluator comes to mind here, as Croatian politicians are referred
to as a group against the ‘Western’ individual, who is to meet the country’s alleged need of
86
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'policing from without.'"89 As Krajina points out the EU treats Croatia as a primitive state. This
even pervades to the EU's relationship with Croatian politicians, as they are considered to be the
epitome of everything that is not Western. Again, there is this ongoing trend that no matter how
vocal Croats are that they share no characteristics with the perceptions forming Balkanism, the
EU is still intent on treating them as such. In many ways the EU's Europeanization approach
regarding Croatia is to make sure it is retained within the Balkan category.
Not only does the EU's Europeanization plan within Croatia mean the state must continue
to be defined as Balkan, but it must also make numerous changes related to this approach as
well. The Europeanization of Croatia is more about the country's conformity and appeasement of
the EU, than it is a process that benefits the sustainability of the state. Caratan delves into this
topic when he claims, "The Europeanization and transition have been essentially one and the
same process – the former, with its requirements, has significantly helped and facilitated the
latter. It has all boiled down to the adoption of EU requirements and regulations."90 This
statement indicates that since Croatia must undergo this Europeanization process, it is really
taking part in a forced transformation, where it must make significant changes to its own state in
order to satisfy the EU. One of these transitions is the country accepting an unwanted Balkan
identity. Mladen Stančić focuses on the specificity of this issue when he emphasizes, "Western
Balkans - will have to be able to adapt to the standards and criteria of the Euro-Atlantic
structures. Due to the Croatian accession to the structure in the desired time it is absolutely the
last chance for Croatia."91 While Stančić is referring to Croatia's accession process, his analysis
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is key as it shows that the country had no choice but to oblige the EU in any way possible unless
it wanted to lose its chance to obtain EU membership. Furthermore, Stančić's referral to Croatia
as the Western Balkans implies that assuming this Balkan identity forms a major portion of EU
policy within the country. This reveals that while Croats continue to protest the Balkan name, it
continues to be part of EU relations with the country. Essentially, the EU disregard of Croatia's
self-perception and dissatisfaction maintains that the state must remain Balkan and transform in
the ways in which the organization wants.
Defending Croatian Identity
In the midst of the Europeanization of Croatia, the Croatian people have begun to focus
on maintaining the preservation of their identity. With the increasing number of changes that
have taken place within Croatia as a result of the EU, there has been a growing concern that the
Croatian identity and lifestyle will be lost. This is commented on by Ashbrook who remarks,
"Euroskeptical Croats see the EU as not only more stringent but in some cases threatening to
both nation and state.. In their view, EU membership means the erosion of the characteristics that
make Croats Croatian, including religion and national identity."92 This illustrates that there are
worries that the EU required changes will eventually force Croatia to transform or abandon the
fundamental aspects of the state. This idea is also professed by Dodig who claims, "We need to
be deprived of the misconceptions that the economic parameter is the only parameter of a good
and quality of life. Croatian tradition, individual and collective consciousness is based on a much
broader basis of quality of life and therefore with caution: Croatia and the EU can with and
without the EU to achieve quality of life for its citizens."93 Dodig is pointing out that Croatians
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value much more than economic benefits. He cites cultural traditions and the collective
conscience as fundamental characteristics of Croatians that must be preserved. Furthermore, he
implies that Croatians should not think of the EU as the only way for the state to achieve quality
of life and stability. These concepts are expanded by Lukšić who says, "I think that Croatian
accession to the EU would be too fast, such that the political unifying approaches of the superstate, and the entry with the current conditions, will be harmful to the economy, national
identity, and the social and moral life of Croatians."94 This reveals that like Dodig, Lukšić
believes that EU membership poses great risks for Croatians regarding their identity. He is
arguing that the fast changes occurring within Croatia to appease the EU may come with large
consequences for Croatia later on. As a result, Croatians have a legitimate fear that the
Europeanization approach of the EU is also a direct attack on Croatian identity.
The Croatian fears of Europeanization reveals the importance of identity within Croatia,
and the possibility that it could all be lost as a result of EU membership. One belief is that if the
EU negatively impacts identity, there may not be a way to stop it. This theory is put forth by
Stojic who asserts, "The source of their Euro-rejects’ attitude is the fear that the Croatian identity
would be in danger within the European Union and that Croatia will be in the position of a slave.
Though not a priori against the EU, they underline that there are no guarantees that the Croatian
identity will be preserved..."95 This shows that Croatians acknowledge that there is a risk that
losing their identity may be the ultimate price for EU membership, and that Croatian EU
membership will only benefit the organization, rather than the country. Božo Skoko explores
these fears further when he explains, "Identity in the modern world is becoming almost
synonymous with a number of general trends, which are expressed through the policy of violent
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political and cultural unification."96 Skoko notes that the EU's insistence on Europeanizing
Croatia could lead the country into a situation where its identity must be abandoned in order for
the EU to achieve political and cultural unification. Croatians like Mate Kovačević contemplate
the possibility of an EU that is detrimental for the state when he reflects, "In politics, like in the
film, everything possible. But I think it will not happen, unless it is wanted by the Croatian
people. Everything else would be violence like what happened in 1918 and 1945."97 This
statement indicates that the Croatian people reflect on the possibility that the country may be
worse off within the EU identity wise as it was within the former Yugoslavia. Yet, Kovačević
also reveals his faith in the endurance of the Croatian people, that they will not change unless
they desire to do so. He goes so far as to make parallels between the negative possibilities of the
EU and significant points within Croatian history where the people struggled to preserve their
national identity in the face of both the kingdom and communist Yugoslavia. Kovačević implies
that Croatians would not surrender without a fight if these adverse possibilities became reality.
Essentially, the Europeanization of Croatia has encouraged Croats to reflect on their identity and
the possibility that EU membership could mean its demise.
The grim prospects for Croatian identity within the EU, has also influenced Croats to
assess their weaknesses in this area. For Croatians the smallness of the country is a constant
concern. Njavro articulates these concerns in the following, "If this hypothesis is correct, the
survival and development of small countries such as the Croatian must be based on a constant
reflection of their cultural identity in terms of the constant changes surrounding the situation."98
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In this quote, Njavro is expressing that Croatians should be aware of their identity and work to
preserve it. His argument is based on the assertion that the changes that the EU commences
could be detrimental for small countries, like Croatia, that want to retain the unique values and
characteristics of the nation. Miklenić compounds these thoughts when he remarks, "As a small
country, Croatia will have to make more effort to preserve their identity and values. Croatian
public is not aware of the facts on which all Croatian negotiators agreed that Croatia received
membership in the EU."99 In his assessment of the EU, Miklenić acknowledges that preserving
Croatian identity will be difficult within the EU. In addition, he regrets that the Croatian people
have not been made aware of all of the negotiations and changes that have taken place as a result
of EU membership. This implies that if Croatians were more informed about these EU
transitions, there would be an even stronger campaign for identity preservation amongst the
public. Bošnjak acknowledges the importance of Croatian awareness when he explains the
dangers of being a small country within the EU. This can be seen when he comments on the risks
Croatia faces within the EU in the following, "When we were in some kind of state or
community of nations, we were exposed to their domination, political, economic, linguistic,
cultural, and there were attempts to us seize parts of our territory, and our identity. Majority of
people with whom we were in common states for us, unfortunately, led politics of conquest, and
some even genocide. "100 Bošnjak is noting an alarming pattern within Croatian history, that
every time the state had been part of a larger community it resulted in negative and tragic
consequences for the country. As a result, Bošnjak is pointing out that there is a strong chance
history may repeat itself as Croatia has been accepted as an EU member. In addition, he notes the
various important aspects of Croatian identity ranging from the cultural or political that could be
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at risk due to the small nature of Croatia and the power that the EU wields. Basically, the small
size of Croatia has elicited concerns regarding identity preservation within the EU.
As the speculation regarding the status of Croatian identity within the EU continues to
grow, Croats have become increasingly protective of their character. There is this prevailing idea
that Croatians can defend themselves from any changes desired by the EU that they feel is
damaging to the state. Brljavac addresses this issue when he comments, "Put differently, the
promise of European Union membership has not been a sufficient instrument for the Bosnian
politicians to make them respect the European values, norms and rules and work on their
implementation into domestic policies."101 Although Brljavac is specifically discussing Bosnia,
many of the assertions he puts forth can be related to Croatia. To begin with, Brljavac notes the
discord between EU policy and the domestic country, which is something that Croatians clearly
experience as well. He takes his analysis further by indicating that Bosnians do not feel that they
need to implement EU policies they feel are negative within their state. Croatians hold the same
view in regards to the protection of their identity from policies that the EU has put forth. This
can be seen when Admiral Lošo reflects on the EU's influence on Croatian identity when he
remarks, "No, every Croat who is conscious of his identity there is nothing that should change
his life. Standard of living is important but it is not so important to change way of living they are
what they will live for. The so called EU standard are nothing else than the way of how to
destroy identity and we have to stand against that."102 Lošo explains that the EU should not have
any effect on Croatian identity, and that if the institution poses any risk Croats will stand against
it. Through his statement, Lošo is illustrating the unity and loyalty Croatians have towards their
identity. In many ways there is almost a sense that Croatians feel they are untouchable. This is
101
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exhibited by Jelčić as he emphasizes the EU's impact on Croatian identity as follows, "They
really won't have any influence there."103 This reveals that the Croatians have an unshakable faith
in regards to the strength of their identity. Yet, this belief almost becomes a detriment for Croats
as it could prevent them from recognizing or taking action against EU changes within this area.
Overall, as concerns regarding the preservation of Croatian identity become more frequent,
Croats become more resolved to protect their character.
Conclusion: The EU's Balkan Croatia & the Future
For Croatia EU membership has meant that the state must wage a war against
Balkanization. The term Balkan is not merely an inaccurate geographical term, but a
classification that is based upon a variety of negative stereotypes and perceptions. Unfortunately,
this superstitious label has been forced upon Croatia by the EU. Despite Croatians consistently
vocalizing that their identity shares no similarities or characteristics with the term, the EU
continues to insist on letting this categorization guide its policies in regards to Croatia. As a
result, this has led Croatians to assess the risks EU membership poses towards the stability of
their identity, which has resulted in Croatians becoming increasingly protective of their
character. As there are visible tensions between the EU and Croatia regarding the Balkan term, it
arouses questions and doubts about the ways in which this issue will affect Croatia in the future,
specifically characteristics it may lose as a result of EU membership.
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Chapter 4: Christianity: Croatia's Salvation and the EU's Obstacle
In regards to identity within the EU, Croatia has already begun to meet a number of
challenges. Battling the stereotypes associated with Balkanism and contending with the fears of a
potential end to Croatia's unique identity, have all been obstacles the state has had to endure
throughout its relationship with the EU. This has led Croatians to evaluate their lifestyle and
beliefs and reaffirm the values that they do not want to see compromised. One of these standards
is maintaining religion within the country. For Croatians religion plays an important and active
role within society. Since Roman Catholicism represents the majority of the country it retains a
special place within Croatian culture, traditions, and life. At the same time there is a question of
whether the EU truly respects the Croatian dedication to their religion? If not then how do
Croats contend with EU membership that comes at the expense of their belief system. The
tensions that arise from these differences can be seen through the EU's stance and
characterization of religion, the importance of Roman Catholicism within Croatia, and the
conflict that ensues when both sides come into contact.
The EU's Embrace of Secularism
In regards to the EU, the institution has embraced secularism as one of its principles.
From the perspective of the organization religion is an obstacle that prevents the EU from
attaining its goals. This theory is addressed by Aggestam and Hill who argue, "European
secularism has come to incarnate these universal aspirations: the dignity and autonomy of the
individual, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They are considered to be universally
applicable because they stand free of cultural, historical and political circumstance... Yet the
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emphasis on tolerance also implies a view of Others in need of change."104The analysis presented
by Aggestam and Hill provide significant information regarding this subject. To begin with, they
are indicating that the EU believes that avoiding religion will allow the organization to easily
expand its ideas and principles. At the same time, however, the authors point out that the EU's
desire to segregate religion not only alienates religious groups, but attempts to force change upon
them. This approach raises suspicion about how religious countries, like Croatia, will be treated
within the EU in regards to their belief system. Carroll explores this problem when he comments,
"Religious and cultural differences should not be used as an excuse to veto any state’s candidacy
unless they contravene the union’s norms of human rights and democracy."105 From this
statement, Carroll is implying that the EU has used its power as leverage against states that
exhibit religious and cultural beliefs that do not compliment the EU's secular standards. Carroll
cites EU membership as one the organization's methods of compelling changes, such as devotion
to religion, within its member and candidate countries. As a result, rather than complimenting
the religious and cultural beliefs of states, the EU positions itself as an adversary intent on
minimizing the role of religion.
The EU's secular approach defines the institution, and influences the religious identities
of member and candidate states. In order to achieve secularism the EU has made these principles
part of the organization's foundation. This can be seen when Aggestam and Hill note, "While
there is a diversity of views over the precise interpretation of this tenet, a clear expression of its
strength was the rejection of any reference to God, religion or a Christian heritage in the Berlin
Declaration celebrating the EU at 50."106 Essentially, the EU has made it clear that religion does
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not hold a place within the institution's beliefs and policies. At the same time, the EU's rejection
of religion can be seen as a move against states that consider religion as not only important, but
influential within their state. This concept is touched upon by Lošo who asserts, "... 'New Age', is
designed to spiritually impoverish Europe and Europeans, to take away their identity, that is to
make them what they are. Mysticism 'New Age' puts the spotlight on a man's subjective
emotional experience of their own happiness and the pursuit of satisfying their own needs and
egotistic impulses."107 Lošo illustrates that the New Age of secularism promotes a negative
aspect of individualism that focuses on profits and a self serving attitude rather than supporting
the well being of the community at large. In addition, Lošo notes that these changes have the
potential to destroy identity. This statement reveals that the EU's desire to promote secularism
may be at the cost of the religious identities of states. Therefore, the EU's belief in secularism has
large ramifications for religious countries that have aligned themselves with the organization.
The Catholic Foundation of Croatia
For Croatians Roman Catholicism holds a sacred place within their culture. From one
aspect, the importance of Catholicism can be seen through the sheer magnitude of Croatian
believers. Lukšić touches upon this when he says, "Of course 92% of Croats have declared that
they belong to the Catholic Church."108 Lukšić's comment reveals that Catholicism is a natural
and important part of the majority of the Croatian population. In addition, the shared religion is
an aspect of Croatian identity that unites the people as one. This is expanded upon by Ashbrook
who remarks, "Traditional Croats are highly critical of the secularism of the EU project. They
argue that to be a true Croat, one must be Catholic, and thus trends toward increased
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secularization directly threaten Croatian identity."109 This statement illustrates the importance of
Catholicism within Croatian identity, as to be a true Croatian one must be Catholic. In addition,
it accurately portrays the legitimate fear Croats have that the secularism of the EU will pose a
danger to their Catholic identity. Lošo compounds these ideas when he explains, "Croats one of
the oldest nations in Europe, but they have to be clear of importance of their own identity. I
would treat in one way identity moral and Christianity, frontier of Christianity. It is in one way
defined through Croatian Catholic identity, language, and special alphabet."110 Lošo's response
indicates Catholicism is a part of Croatian culture that is rooted in its history and its traditions.
Furthermore, he is reaffirming that Christianity cannot be separated from the Croatian identity.
Essentially, Catholicism plays a crucial role within Croatian culture as it defines its cultural
identity.
Not only does Catholicism comprise a large part of Croatian culture, but it is also an
influential factor on Croatian society. In many ways, Catholicism is viewed as a trusted guide for
the Croatian people. Stojic explores this relationship as follows, "The Croatian Catholic Church
is very influential institution in Croatia and its stance towards European integration is important
and can decisively influence Croatian public opinion taking into consideration that in Croatia
(compared with the EU-25 countries) there is an above-average number of practicing
believers."111 Stojic's analysis shows that the strength of the Catholic belief system within
Croatia has the power to sway the people regarding a number policies ranging from the cultural
to the political. In addition, Stojic also comments about the fact that Croatia in comparison to
other EU members have the highest amount of believers and that the Croatian Catholic Church

109

Ashbrook, "Croatia, Euroskepticism," 33.
Admiral Davor Domazet Lošo, author interviewed, July 6, 2013.
111
Stojic, "Between Europhobia and Europhilia,"331.
110

B i l a n d z i c h | - 90 -

has a respected voice within the area of Croatian EU integration. This implies that there may
already be brewing tensions between the EU and Croatia, as Catholicism is highly influential
within the country, while the EU is a proponent of secularism. The importance of Catholicism
within Croatia is also touched upon by Stančić who affirms, "Part of it stems from the traditional
position of the Church in society, where it is often considered a guardian of national
interests..."112 This explains that not only is Catholicism important from a traditional aspect, but
from a political one as well. Since Croatians view Catholicism as the state's protector it means
that Croats have the utmost respect for the opinion the Church has to offer, further indicating the
discord between the country and the EU. Lukšić summarizes the influential factor of Catholicism
in relation to the EU when he argues, "What, therefore, should be the future of Croatians in
Europe? If Christianity created Europe as a spiritual and cultural term, and if it is the basis of its
moral and political order, Europe cannot survive the death of Christianity. Being a witness of
religious and moral foundations, despite all their national weaknesses, is the role of Croatians in
Europe, if Croatia does not want to betray his identity."113 Lukšić emphasizes that for Croatians
to potentially give up Catholicism would mean sacrificing the Croat identity, which has formed
the foundation of the Croatian state. He also stresses that Croatians have a duty to help Europe
preserve Christianity and the moral values associated with it, thus making Croatia a religious
supporter in the face of EU secularism. Essentially, Catholicism is not just a cultural component
of the state, but an active player within Croatian society.
When Two Worlds Collide: The Conflict Between Secularism and Christianity
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The Croatian faith in Catholicism has also affected how the EU's secular policies are
perceived within the country. Since Croatia and the EU hold differing views regarding religion,
this has led to divisive tensions between the organization and the country. This is addressed by
Njavro who argues, "The consensus in Croatian society will have to be struck between the
traditional religious and secular ideological values."114 Njavro is expressing that Croatians must
find a way to retain their Catholic beliefs as the EU attempts to promote its secular agenda. By
analyzing this situation in terms of opposing views, Njavro is illustrating that the EU and Croatia
are as compatible as oil and water regarding the subject of religion. The Croatian dissatisfaction
with EU policy is mentioned by Šeparović who says, "Judeo-Christian culture civilization is our
civilization, Bible is what is connecting us. Unfortunately, EU did not accept Christianity as a
cultural element and as basis of what is European."115 This reveals that Croatians not only
believe that Christianity is the core of their own identity but Europe as well. Therefore, by the
EU not accepting Christianity as a tenet of their institution it is seen as a disappointment for
Croatians that hold their belief system as sacred. This idea is expanded upon by Lošo who
remarks, "The EU won't respect Croatian history and identity because it won't recognize its own.
Only civilization that threw God from their constitution. Christianity is fundamental to Euro
history and identity."116 Lošo's comments provide additional support in that Croatians view
Christianity as a vital component of European identity. In addition, his statement implies that
Croatians are not pleased that the EU has rejected religion, as this decision is in contention with
Croatia's religious views. As a result, this creates an environment where Croatia and the EU find

114

Njavro, "Hrvatski Identitet i Globalizacija Hrvatski nacionalni i kulturni identitet u procesu globalizacije," 39.
Author Translated.
115
Zvonimir Šeparović, author interview, June 24, 2013.
116
Admiral Davor Domazet Lošo, author interviewed, July 6, 2013.

B i l a n d z i c h | - 92 -

themselves on opposing sides rather than partners. Basically, the EU's policy of secularism has
created divisions between the organization and the Croatian state.
Not only are Croatians disappointed with the EU's secular policies, but they view it as a
threat to their religious identity as well. As the EU continues to promote secularism, Croatians
have grown increasingly wary about how this campaign will influence their own religious
identity. Ashbrook details these thoughts in the following, "In line with this train of thought,
Croatian conservatives decry the inherent hypocrisy of Western Europe’s liberal ideology.
Therefore, Brussels promotes atheism and progressivism, cloaking both notions in the
legitimating mantle of European identity, thereby denying the legitimacy of competing forms of
identity."117 This statement is significant as it notes that Croatians believe that the so called unity
EU secularism provides, only works by rejecting other religious identities. As a result, this
validates the fears that Croatian Catholicism could be in jeopardy if EU secular policies were
allowed to take hold within the country. Lošo also addresses these concerns when he says, "An
attack of those Northern Europe states that have no Christian values on Christian part of Europe,
they can accept that or not but that is what it is."118 Lošo comments that the EU's secular policies
are nothing more than tools that are used against Christian countries. In addition, by categorizing
these policies as an attack, Lošo indicates that Croatians already feel that their Catholic identity
has been harmed by the EU. Lukšić explains the severity of this claim when he argues, "Today
Croatia is leading a covert war against the three values forming the organic pillars: religious
communities, families, and the nation state...with the offensive promotion of homosexuality and
lesbianism, and the full liberalization of abortion."119 In his response, Lukšić is asserting that the
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EU policies of secularism are aggressive tactics that are intent on damaging the Catholic values
that Croatians hold sacred. The implications of this is that instead of benefits, EU membership
has the potential of inflicting an immense amount of harm on Croatia. This means that Croatians
will have to fight to preserve their faith in an organization that seemingly promised security.
Overall, the secularism of the EU threatens the very heart of Croatian Catholic beliefs, which
means Croats will have to struggle to defend them.
Conclusion: An Identity In Danger
In the midst of forcefully undergoing the Europeanization process, Croatians have found
themselves at odds with the secularism embraced by the EU. While the EU promotes secularism
as an all encompassing approach, it risks alienating and even harming religious countries like
Croatia. As a result, Croatians have not only vocalized their disappointment with the EU's lack of
necessity for religion, but have striven to protect their own religious identity from being eroded
away by EU policies regarding this matter. While Croatians feel that the EU has put the state in a
precarious position, the people continue to hold on to their beliefs. Unfortunately, this situation
leaves more questions than answers upon reflecting on the future of Catholicism within Croatia.
Will the Croatian people continue to endure and hold on to their Catholic values, or will they
succumb to the secularization of the EU? In addition, where will the tensions between the
country and the EU lead as the topic of religion grows increasingly controversial? Will the EU
also adversely impact other aspects of Croatian identity as well? It seems that Croatia has found
itself swimming in dangerous waters in terms of its alliance with the EU.
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Chapter 5: Language: Croatia's Form of Expression & The EU's Unnecessary Formality
As Croatia's relationship with the EU increases, so has the organization's attempts to
influence Croatian identity. Not only does Croatia have to contend with the EU's lack of respect
and support for the nation's Catholic religion, but the Croatian language as well. For Croatians
language is considered to be one of the fundamental principles of Croatian identity and the state.
It is not only a form of communication, but an expressive act that is representative of Croatia's
history and its people. Despite the importance Croatians place in regards to the preservation of
their unique language, the EU does not share the same views. As far as the organization is
concerned, it is just another aspect of Croatian identity that needs to be changed in order for the
country to meet EU standards. While the EU recognizes Croatian as an official language, it is not
interested in preserving or properly respecting this component of Croatian identity. Evidence of
this can be found through the treatment of languages within the EU, how the Croatian language
is perceived, and the larger ramifications the organization's policies regarding the Croatian
language have on the state and its people.
The Divide Between High Expectations and Sobered Realities
The potential risks for the Croatian language can be seen through the expectations and
realities of the treatment of languages within the EU. From a state's perspective the idea is that
the EU would support a country's unique language. This is expressed by Kovačević who says,
"Of course, the EU is not an ideal community... These two forces, which are still recognizable in
the EU favor the Republic of Croatia to compete economically on a large market, and
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individually preserve its statehood, culture, language and tradition."120 This reveals that while
Kovačević realizes the EU has limitations, he still has faith that the organization will work to
uphold Croatian identity, including language. This perspective continues the Croatian trend of
viewing the EU far too optimistically. The realities of language preservation within the EU is
addressed by Dr. Slaven Letica who remarks, "National identities in other European countries
were created in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries through violent crimes that
suppressed dialects and imposed a literary or standard language..."121 In this statement Letica is
noting parallels between how national identities were formed throughout European history, with
the EU's present quest to establish a unified identity as well. He explains that none of the forged
identities within history were done so without violence, and illustrates this by using the
standardization of language as an example. As a result, this raises suspicions of whether the EU's
recognition of official languages is merely a superficial motion that masks its intent to obtain one
standardized EU language. This idea is explored by Bošnjak who argues, "One of the biggest
fallacies of the European Union constantly expanding, is that all of the languages are
considered the official languages of the Member States and, as such, are quite equal within the
European Union. This is not only not true but it is a lie."122 Bošnjak goes on to explain that there
are a number of languages that are categorized within the EU, for example there are some
languages that are in use, but not formally recognized on paper. Bošnjak's point is that this is
evidence that the EU's self promotion as an organization that treats all languages as equals is
simply an empty and idealistic notion that is not representative of the reality of the situation.
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Therefore, this means that Croatia and other states may find that their languages may be put at
risk. Essentially, the EU's language principles are professed, but are never practiced.
The gap between the EU's language platform and its actions has prompted concerns
regarding language sustainability within the organization. The EU's treatment of languages has
continued to fuel fears regarding language preservation. Bošnjak points out the EU's
discriminatory acts when he says, "There are three official languages of the European
Commission, and the EU government which are English, French and German. These are the
three arbitrators and the favored languages within the EU. There is not even Italian, Spanish, or
Polish among them."123 Through this example Bošnjak is illustrating that the EU does not
practice what it preaches. While the EU officially recognizes a number of languages, it does not
incorporate them within the organization. Essentially, the primary EU languages are those of the
leading controllers within the institution which are the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
Therefore, there is clearly a favoritism regarding language that benefits Western European EU
countries at the expense of other members. Since the EU does not utilize these other languages,
states are forced to become more reliant on using English, French, and German, rather than their
own native languages. As a result, this indicates states have a valid concern that their languages
may become extinct. This is a theory which is explored by Letica when he comments, "When it
comes to fear of Croats that there may be a loss of national and cultural identity in the European
Union, it is by no means without merit, but it is not an exception to the rule when it comes to
small European nations. Croatian people are meager, and the Croatian language and culture
without much influence in Europe and the global scale."124 In his statement, Letica is explaining
that small countries, like Croatia, often end up having no power within large unions like the EU.
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This can be especially detrimental to the identity aspect of language, as it can become abandoned
and lost when powerful actors or institutions, like the EU, desire a standardized language.
Basically, the treatment of languages within the EU is another area in which the organization has
reduced itself to discrimination and double standards.
Croatian Language Values Against the EU's Need for Standardization
While the EU has visible issues regarding the equality of languages within the institution,
there is also disconnect between how Croatians and the EU perceive the Croatian language. For
Croatians the language is more than a mere method of communication, it symbolizes Croatia's
history, culture, and identity. This concept is put forth by Josip Pavičić who remarks, "For
speakers of the Croatian language, language is a means and a goal which can be used
defensively."125 In this statement, Pavčić is showcasing the significance of the Croatian
language. He is expressing that not only is the language part of Croatian culture, but it can be
used to defend Croatian identity as well. Grubišić also highlights the importance of language
when he says, "I left Croatia at 22, now I'm 70, spent most of life in Switzerland than Canada.
Always felt Croatian, connected to culture by teaching language and culture. To be Croatian is
to belong to culture and tradition and to like Croatia as a country."126 In his personal statement
Grubišić is noting that despite living the majority of his life within different countries, he
retained his connection to Croatia, due to his cultural participation and the use of the Croatian
language. This reveals that the language is also a unifying aspect for Croatians because by
sharing a form of communication, Croats are able to maintain a bond no matter where they live
in the world. In addition, his feelings illustrate the revered place the native language has within
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Croatian society. Yet the value of the Croatian language is not shared by the EU as Bošnjak
points out, "Not only in the UK and France but also in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands the
mentioning of Croatian linguistic particularities are often portrayed as primitive, nationalist
blasphemy."127 This is evidence that some of the leading EU countries do not have any respect
for the unique value of the Croatian language. The fact that these countries insinuate that the
Croatian form of communication is primitive or a negative form of nationalism is pure
discrimination against the Croatian state and its people. As a result, since the languages are
depicted in such a light, it begs the question of whether the language will survive within the EU?
Essentially, Croatians value their language as an expressive act of their identity, while the EU
perceives the language to be nothing more than an inferior form of communication.
The fear of the status of the Croatian language within the EU is an ongoing issue. There
is concerns that the EU does not view the Croatian language as equal within the organization,
and retains a desire to minimize its role within Croatian society. This is touched upon by Letica
who comments, "In addition, it is now quite clear that within the European Union will be
promoted European identity that will reflect the tradition of great European nations. This fact
does not have to worry about the English, Italian, German, French, Spanish and Polish, but must
worry about small European nations, particularly those in the European periphery."128 In his
analysis, Letica is noting that the powerful and influential countries forming leadership will not
worry about their respective language preservation. His argument is that these countries either
control or have a large influence within the institution, which will guarantee that preference will
be given to their languages. As for small periphery countries, like Croatia, the fear is that the
native language will be seen as unnecessary and become obsolete. Letica's views provide
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additional support to the theory that the EU does not respect nor have a use for the Croatian
language. The realities of this fear are explored by Bošnjak who asserts, "When the Director of
the European Language Service publicly questions the distinctiveness of the Croatian language,
and Croatia has not yet acceded to the European Union, it is a clear sign of what the leading
bodies within the European Union are thinking."129 Through his comments Bošnjak provides
concrete examples where the Croatian language has not been respected within the EU. In this
case, he is citing the fact that the director of the EU questioned whether the Croatian people
could claim that their language was a distinct language. By the director openly expressing his
doubt regarding the language, it can be seen as an act against Croatian identity and culture.
Bošnjak also makes a good point by acknowledging that the questioning of the Croatian
language by the EU during the accession process possibly foreshadows the treatment it will
receive within the organization. Overall, the EU shows disregard for the Croatian language,
which puts its future preservation into question.
Serbo-Croatian or B.C.S. Code for an Attack on Croatian Identity
The EU's treatment of the Croatian language has led Croatians to reflect on the larger
ramifications the organization may have on the native language. One of the concerns is that
Croatia will lose its language's uniqueness through its affiliation with the EU. Bošnjak delves
into this topic when he says, "In the event that the Croatian language through reasoning is seen
as 'politically sensitive' and is formally 'assigned' the status of official language, there is a
danger that we later, in practice, however, will be imposed on a kind of hybrid of SerboCroatian."130 Building on the EU's doubt of the distinctiveness of Croatian, this reveals that the
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institution may eventually declare that Croatian and Serbian are the same language. If the EU
declares Serbian and Croatian one in the same, this would be detrimental for Croatian identity.
Croats have always viewed their language as unique and independent, and if the EU were to
remove this, it would be a direct attack on the Croatian belief system. In addition, the EU's
argument that the similarities justify joint recognition of the language, is in effect just another
double standard within the institution. If these language choices are based on similarities then
why isn't Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish classified as P.I.S or Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish
as N.S.D? Both sets of the previously mentioned languages share commonalities, but are not
considered or discussed as the same language. This is evidence that the EU favors Western
European countries at the expense of Central and Eastern European members. Miklenić
postulates these concerns when he ponders, "From the 1st of July 2013, Croatian language is
one of the official languages of the EU, so it remains Croatian citizen's responsibility to preserve
and develop."131 Essentially, Miklenić is arguing that even though Croatian is recognized as an
official language by the EU, Croats must be prepared to defend it. Tuñman concurs this idea
when asserts, "We have to protect national culture identity, threats are different today than 20 to
40 years ago. Economic or political problems we can solve, one way or another. Key values
determine Croatian society if under attack or in danger we have to take care of to avoid not only
for Croatia but other member states of EU vested differences."132 Tuñman is claiming that
political and economic issues can be handled, but cultural problems require Croats to be aware
and ready to defend them. In addition, he expands on this idea of attentiveness when he explains
that the issues facing culture are different today than they were a few decades ago. As a result,
the experience the Croatian language will undergo within the EU will be new, which may result
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in the state experiencing distinct problems regarding this aspect of identity. Therefore, the
Croatian language has increasingly found itself the victim of the EU's double standards.
Not only does the EU's treatment of the Croatian language adversely affects the cultural
aspect of Croatia, but the political one as well. The EU's intent to classify Croatian as SerboCroatian, or B.C.S(Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian) has larger political consequences for Croatian
identity. Bošnjak explores this claim when he argues, "If Serbs, Croats and 'Bosnians' all speak
variants of the same language, what does that say about them and their claims that they are
members of different Nations, if the language is the same, but do not share ideological and
political reasons, are not then these nations actually the same, only they, like language, is also
divided because of some ideological and political, rather than a scientific reason?"133 In his
analysis, Bošnjak is exploring a very sensitive and sacred topic for Croatia, which is their
independence. Croatians have struggled to regain their national sovereignty for years, and for the
EU to insinuate that Croatians are the same as other republics that had been part of the former
Yugoslavia, attacks the very heart of Croatian identity. Therefore, if Croatian were to be
recognized as Serbo-Croatian or B.C.S. within the EU it would not only be a move against
Croatian culture, but their fight for independence, and their belief that they deserve the
recognition and rights a sovereign country should receive. Bošnjak continues this exploration of
discrimination and double standards when he remarks, "Unlike in Western Europe, some Eastern
European countries, such as Ukraine and Poland, quite properly treated the Croatian language as
a separate language. Even Russia's diplomatic school in Moscow, its diplomats teach Croatian
and Serbian separately."134 Bošnjak is illustrating that other countries recognize and respect
Croatian as a separate and distinct language, yet the EU continues to insist otherwise. This also
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shows the division between the East and the West within the EU. It seems that Western EU
countries are not willing to put in the effort to learn and acknowledge the cultures and values of
its fellow Central and Eastern European members. Overall, the EU's ambition to classify
Croatian as the same as other languages is an act of discrimination that puts Croatia's political
identity at risk.
Conclusion: Dissolving Identity
For Croatians the native language is much more than a form of communication. It is a
part of identity that is found within the state's history, traditions, and culture. While Croatian is
recognized as an official language within the EU, it does not receive this status without
consequences. The EU has begun a legacy based upon Western European favoritism that has
come at the cost of other nations, primarily Central and Eastern European, identities. As a result,
Croatia is not excluded from this list, especially in the area of language. As the institution
visibly shows its disregard for languages deemed unnecessary or even problematic, Croatians
have found themselves fighting a battle to preserve their native language. The EU has an
ambition to categorize Croatian as the same as other languages, which is not only an example of
various forms of discrimination, but has negative political ramifications on Croatia as well. It
seems that the more Croatia becomes enveloped within the EU, it has increasingly found itself
holding the short end of the stick. In addition, there is an indication that the EU is attempting to
slowly dissolve Croatian identity. This begs the question of whether Croatia could survive the
perpetual attacks placed against Croatian beliefs and values?
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Chapter 6: Identity and War
Within Croatia the establishment and preservation of independence remains one of the
most sacred values of Croatian identity. It is a component, which has formed a significant part of
Croatian history, because it is a history of the struggle for freedom. The past of Croatia is one
filled with interchanging oppressors, leaving the Croats to perpetually fight for independence.
While an opportunity to obtain Croatia's freedom would present itself, unfortunately it would
mean a trial by fire for the Croatian people. Upon the death of Tito, Serbian leadership within
Yugoslavia, began an attempt to expand their power at the cost of the other republics. Unhappy
and fearful regarding Serbia's ambitions, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. The Serb
dominated Yugoslav government not only denounced the acts of Croatia and Slovenia, but
resorted to aggressive violence in an attempt to retain the republics. In the midst of waging their
war for freedom, the Croatians found themselves virtually abandoned by everyone, including the
EU. Although seemingly doomed to fail, the Croatian endurance prevailed; and like a phoenix
rising from the ashes, the Croatians were able to win the war and finally secure their freedom.
Yet, Croatia did not emerge unscathed from its dalliance with its adversary. The battle wound
scars are symbolic reminders that have become a permanent and influential part of Croatian
identity. As a result, this aspect of Croatian identity not only impacts the way Croatians view
themselves, but others. In regards to the EU this subject remains a source of tension between the
state and organization. This is illustrated through the position of the EU during the war, Croatia's
perception and identity regarding the experience, and the consequences the state has had to
endure at the hands of the EU as a result of its fight for freedom.
Finding Silence In Croatia's Darkest Hour
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A significant source of tension regarding Croatian identity and the EU, is the position the
organization took during the Croatian war for independence. The issues between the EU and
Croatia started at the very beginning of the war, when the institution avoided intervention within
the conflict. This is explored by Belloni who says, "European institutions lacked the political
unity to address the crisis. Jacques de Poos, Foreign Minister of tiny Luxembourg and Council of
Ministers President at the outset of the crisis in June 1991, optimistically announced Europe’s
readiness to tackle the Yugoslav problem. Europe, however, lacked the necessary unity and
resolve to follow through on this."135 This reveals that there was no sincere ambition on the EU's
part to intervene or attempt to provide solutions for the conflict. As a result, Croatia was forcibly
isolated by the EU's refusal to react, thus indicating that the fight for Croatian freedom would
have to be fought by the Croats alone. The EU's aloofness during Croatia's time of need has
greatly impacted Croatian identity. This is covered by Šeparović, who acted as foreign minister
during the war," My goals twofold, to stop the war against my country asking foreign countries
and international organizations to help my country in defense of Serbian JNA forces and goal
was please recognize my country, international recognition was needed and it was historically
justified... EU hesitated, lasted long, but they have been among the first to recognize my country
on January 15, 1992."136 Through his statement Šeparović is noting that Croatians not only had
to wage a physical war to preserve their nation, but a diplomatic one as well. The fact that the
EU attempted to avoid the conflict, meant that Croatians had to fight for recognition and support.
Therefore, the EU's silence continues to be a reminder for Croatians that the preservation of their
identity had to be won without the assistance of the organization. Consequently, the EU's refusal
to act influenced how Croatians view their relationship with the EU. This is illustrated by
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Kovačević who remarks, "Every birth is difficult. Some countries, such as the usual, guarded
international order, and each new country has its emergence disturbance. Some countries have
had a considerable share in the creation of Yugoslavia, so they defended until the last moment,
and some again...watched the collapse of their own ability and the reluctance regarding Croatian
independence to protect their own principles."137 Kovačević explains that Croatia's struggle for
self determination has become a permanent part of Croatian identity. Furthermore, the war is also
a reminder that many states and institutions, like the EU, refused to acknowledge Croatia's right
to freedom because it was of no benefit to them. This means that Croatia's relationship with the
EU will always be defined by the organization's silence during the war for independence.
Not only did the EU fail to recognize Croatia's right to self-determination, but in the early
days of the war, the organization insisted on the preservation of Yugoslavia. The fact that the EU
ambitiously attempted to secure Yugoslavia is in direct contention with Croatia's validated need
to be recognized as an independent country. This is illustrated through the EU foreign policy
documents edited by Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith which state, "In the view of the
Twelve, a united and democratic Yugoslavia stands the best chance to integrate itself in the new
Europe."138 This demonstrates that the EU had no interest in supporting an independent Croatia,
when war erupted within Yugoslavia. Lošo explores the damages incured by this action when he
says, "Secondly, Croatia, and not the international community saved and defended Bosnia and
Herzegovina."139 This points out that Croatians overwhelmingly acknowledge they were
abandoned by the EU, and many others that were part of the international community during
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their time of need. Naturally, this has led Croatians to be suspicious of the organization that
essentially left them for dead. The proof of the EU's intentions can be seen when Christopher
Booker and Richard North note, "As Poos himself put it, 'the idea of a national selfdetermination is dangerous as a basis for international order...It would release an explosive
development.' He poured scorn on the idea of tiny Slovenia imagining it could survive on its own
as a nation, even through its population was six times larger than that of Luxembourg."140 Both
Booker and North point out that the EU only viewed the concept of self-determination within
Yugoslavia as a problem that had to be dealt with. In addition, the authors also examine the
double standards of the EU's justification for its stance regarding the war, by acknowledging that
Slovenia is significantly larger that Luxembourg. Although this analysis uses Slovenia as an
example, it can also be applied to the Croatian case as well. By viewing self-determination as a
challenge, the EU effectively launched an assault against Croatian identity. Basically, the EU had
no intentions of supporting an independent Croatia, which continues to define Croatian identity
and its relationship with the organization.
As if the EU's lack of recognition and abandonment of Croatia weren't enough, it
continued to damage the state and its people, both during and after the war. The organization
began this trend when it showed an utter disregard for the history of the republics constituting
Yugoslavia. This is outlined by Booker and North who assert, "They demanded that Slovenia
should revoke its declaration of independence as a condition of a ceasefire. So ill-informed were
the troika ministers, they were not even aware that the Federation had already reconciled itself to
Slovenia's secession."141Again although this example depicts Slovenia's journey to
independence, it is very much reflective of the situation Croatia that found itself in during the
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war. The EU's intentions to keep Yugoslavia together completely overrode the need to
understand the situation, and the republics that wanted their freedom. As a result, everything that
the EU wanted went against the desires and identity of the Croatian people. To make matters
worse, the fact that the EU did not take any initiative to understand Croatia reveals that the
organization had already classified the nation as inferior. Even after the war had ceased, and
Croatia had won its independence the EU continued to commence strikes against Croatian
identity. This is touched upon by Lošo who emphasizes, "...EU policy towards the region
'Western Balkans', therefore, to Croatia, for which the European deterministic compiled
sequence of standards and procedures to all these countries lead to the same level of guilt, to
make them 'all bundled', after 2010, it was brought in an associate position, but not a full
member of the European Union."142 Instead of attempting to rectify its failure to act by
understanding Croatia, the EU decided to label everyone who had partaken in the war as equally
guilty. This is a staggering concept for Croatians to reflect on, let alone accept. This is due to the
fact that it had been the Serbian controlled leadership of Yugoslavia that had commenced the
violence that engulfed Slovenia, Croatia, and later Bosnia and Herzegovina. For Croatians to be
classified as a guilty party is to condemn Croatian identity and their right to independence.
Lukšić further expands on the EU's goals regarding the equal guilt policy when he comments, "
Some of them, who are at the highest political position in the country, are trying to implement a
new Titoization, renewed cult of Tito, and to criminalize the Homeland War and its veterans, in
order to become leaders of the new Yugoslavia, perhaps called the Western Balkans."143 Lukšić
is arguing that the EU's insistence that Croatia accept equal guilt for the war has been so
pervasive and influential, that it has encouraged Croatian politicians to accept this categorization
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as a form of appeasement. Lukšić reaffirms that this goes against every principle of Croatian
values and identity. This may consequently lead to Croatia becoming part of an EU sanctioned
region entitled the Western Balkans, a group Croatians want to escape from. It seems that the EU
has played a continuous and damaging role for Croatia throughout its war for independence,
which continues to effect the Croatian people.
The EU's Lack of Empathy for the Croatian Experience
Decades after the war, Croatia still finds itself at odds with the EU regarding its
independence. Croats attribute these tensions to the fact that the EU has never attempted to
understand the Croatian experience it had endured during its fight for self-determination. This is
a way of thinking that began during the war, which Booker and North explore in the following,
"The Council was simply unable to grasp why the peoples of Slovenia and Croatia would now do
anything to break away from the tyranny of Belgrade which had held them in its grip since
1945."144 This analysis explains that the EU is not interested in the experiences of small nations,
but rather the cost benefit ratio of what independence may do for the organization as a whole. As
a result, this has left Croatia to question whether the EU is actually invested in the well being of
the Croatian state or its people? Ashbrook expands upon this idea when he remarks, "Many
Croats regard Western criticism and the rejection of their reasons for not cooperating with former
enemies and less developed regional neighbors as evidence of EU arrogance and
prejudice."145This illustrates that the EU does not take the Croatian perspective or their identity
seriously. Croatia suffered tremendously during the war, leaving the people and the state
extremely conscious about their safety. By not extending understanding or support, the EU has
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symbolically declared the perceived inferiority of the Croatian state. Therefore, Croatians find
themselves having to defend their truth and experiences of war from an EU that could care less
about the subject.
The EU's lack of empathy can also be viewed as an attack on the core identity values of
Croatians. A specific area that has created challenges in Croatia's relationship with the EU is the
International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY). The EU insisted that Croatia cooperate
with the tribunal, which meant turning over Croatian citizens suspected of war crimes. While
Croatia consented, it later found that many of those accused, were innocent men who had
defended Croatia during the war. Although many of these individuals, including Generals Ante
Gotovina and Mladen Markać were later proven innocent and exonerated from the accused
crimes, Croatia's defense of the men during their trial did not sit well with the EU. Therefore, it
became a struggle between the EU's desires and Croatian identity. This area is investiaged by
Stojic who says, "The ICTY is a symbol of difficulties these countries are faced with on their
road towards the European Union, and the main argument used by Euro-sceptics to show that
their fears of the European Union are justified. They interpret indictments, which are individual,
as a collective guilt that have to be rejected as a threat to national identity and pride."146 This
continues the idea that Croatians believe that they fought a defensive war, but that the EU insists
that the country retains a guilty title. The EU's insistence on Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY,
and the equally guilty categorization, implies that the Croatian experience isn't justified nor is the
freedom and self-determination that the nation achieved. To force Croatia to accept these
requirements, is essentially asking Croatians to deny their own identity. These thoughts are
depicted when Grubišić says, "People forget, Gotovina and Markać were considered guilty while
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innocent all during these years of EU agreements, painful for Croatia."147 Grubišić is
highlighting that even after surviving the horrendous experience of war, the EU continues to
torment the country. He explains that the idea that two innocent Croats had to be considered
criminals for crimes they did not commit, just so Croatia could continue the EU accession
process is an atrocity. This shows that Croats are aware that the EU has consistently inflicted
damage on this aspect of Croatian identity.
The EU's position regarding Croatia and the war has also turned into a form of
punishment for the country. One way in which Croatia has found itself enduring the EU's ire is
through its defense of its own identity in relation to the war. This subject is covered by Petra
Roter and Ana Bojinovic who argue, "Loud voices are still to be heard in Croatia, including
those by intellectuals and the informed public, arguing that Croatia should not surrender and let
go of individuals who had helped to defend the country during the war...but that in comparison
with other Central and East European states, the EU has set stricter criteria for Croatia."148 This
illustrates Croatia's commitment to its own identity and values, including its belief that their war
for independence was justified. At the same time, however, it seems to indicate that the EU is
intent on Croatia paying for its dedication through stricter criteria the state has to fulfill. In this
case the EU's dislike for Croatia's stance, led to the organization ultimately using its power to
punish the nation. These thoughts are expanded by Lošo who asserts, "... using 'soft power' (the
media), the Croatian Army showed as criminals, and its generals, officers, NCOs and soldiers
informed on as primitive, criminals, thugs, uneducated people and to the victorious army and its
members as 'human dregs' were removed due to alleged harassment of civilized Croatian
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citizens."149 Lošo is explaining that instead of an attempt at understanding, Croatia suffered a
character assassination through its portrayal within the media. The EU not only did not help
Croatia to confute these reports, but arguably joined in on this depiction of the nation. Despite
the fact that war was fought two decades ago, Croats must continue to defend their self
determination, which is a punishment in and of itself. Essentially, the EU does not favor
Croatia's stance regarding its own independence and attempts to punish the nation for it.
This EU's ill treatment of the Croatian state as a result of its past is also seen through the
organization's attempt to regionalize the country. The EU's push to categorize Croatia as part of
the Western Balkans, is also a plan that stems from the institution's position during the war for
Croatian independence. This is touched upon by Bošnjak when analyzing the relationship
between the freedom of Croatia and the EU when he says, "No they pay lip service to our
culture, but no they don't, if they respected Croatian history wouldn't want us to accept blame for
a purely defensive war, not the values the EU is built on it is a political project... EU does not see
Croatia separate from Serbs and Bosnians which is why pushing Balkans history, culture,
language, not respected as separate."150 This reveals that despite Croatia achieving independence
and formal recognition, the EU still does not believe it deserves it. The organization is purely
interested in putting Croatian in a position, in which it can capitalize from the state. Therefore,
Croatian identity does not fit within the EU's equation, but establishing the Western Balkan
region within the EU does. Stančić continues this idea when he says, "When, however, it became
increasingly clear that the international community supports the reconstruction of Yugoslavia,
they hoped for greater Croatian autonomy within a democratic Yugoslavia."151 In his statement,
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Stančić is noting the EU's goals to recreate Yugoslavia, is directly counter to the desires of the
Croatian people. If the EU were to achieve such a feat, it would erase everything that Croatia had
fought for. Therefore, the EU's desire to regionalize Croatia, can also be seen as an attack on the
principles of independence found within Croatian identity.
The Continued Cost of Freedom
The division between the EU and Croatia regarding Croatian freedom has developed
consequences for the state. An issue that has arisen is that the EU qualifies Croatian cooperation
with the ICTY and the acceptance of equal guilt as the only access for Croatia to be recognized
as European. This theory is expanded upon by Geoffrey Pridham who claims, "This was
regarded in EU circles as a symbolic as to the willingness of prospective candidate countries to
move on in time and embrace a European future, and in particular as being relevant to respect for
the rule of law. In doing so, the EU relied regularly on the activity and advice of the ICTY over
its conditionality..."152 This analysis indicates that although the ICTY is a separate body it has
largely influenced the EU's conditionality requirements on Croatia. In addition, it shows that the
EU has forced Croatia to decide between EU inclusion and their own identity. This concept is
discussed by Dejan Jović who remarks, "Only extract from Croatian Yugoslav federation was
motivated - at least in nominal terms - the idea of a 'return to Europe'...Croatian sovereign were
not interested in joining the EU in the framework of Yugoslavia because they assumed - usually
with good reason - that such entry into the EU decreased or completely destroyed the chances of
creating an independent Croatian state."153 Jović is asserting that acceptance within the EU as a
European country continues to be a driving force for Croatians, despite the fact that Croats want
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to avoid any affiliation with the Western Balkans or Yugoslavia. In addition, it shows that the
EU has used the Croatian war of independence as a leverage tool against the state. As a result,
this method forcibly pushes Croatia into categories and classifications it does not agree with.
Essentially, the EU has manipulated Croatia's fight for freedom to its own advantage, that comes
at the cost of the Croatian state and its people.
The Croatian war of independence has also been used by the EU as an intimidation
approach against the state. For Croatians they unwillingly found themselves having to choose
between defending the values they hold sacred and the EU's requirements. This is presented by
Ashbrook who remarks, "After the Yugoslav wars of dissolution, an authoritarian government
throughout the 1990s, international isolation and embargoes, and intense pressure from the EU to
cooperate in the arrest and extradition of alleged Croatian war criminals, the more stringent
criteria for inclusion are a bitter pill, given the inclusivist rhetoric emanating from
Brussels."154This statement implies that Croatia finds itself dealing with an EU, that is quite
different than the persona it markets itself as. The EU professes the idea that it is an organization
that welcomes everyone equally, yet the reality is, as far as Croatia is concerned that couldn't be
any further from the truth. The strict requirements placed on Croatia in regards to the aftermath
of the war does not take into account the state's experiences, values, or beliefs. As a result, the
EU has made Croatia's past a continual challenge for the country. This is reaffirmed by Miroslav
Tuñman who asserts, "In the past decade Croatian public often indicates a message that is
repeated in different forms due to the policies of President Tuñman Croatia was in isolation, if it
did not meet the requirements of the Hague prosecution, Croatia will be in isolation, or, if you do
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not meet the standards of the international community, it threatens you with insulation."155
Tuñman is explaining that Croatians found themselves between a rock and a hard place. Croats
are dedicated to their values and identity, but found that the EU and others within the
international community insist that Croatia conform. If the state does not, than it faces isolation,
which is a punishment that is far more difficult to overcome. Therefore, it seems the EU is
punishing the Croatian state because it won its freedom.
Conclusion: The Rejection of Independence and the Croatian People
Despite suffering a history under the control of various oppressors, Croatians maintained
their faith and perseverance that Croatia would eventually regain its independence.
Unfortunately, it would take a defensive war against Serbian led aggression to achieve this feat.
During the violence of war, Croatians found themselves fighting the battles alone. It was a
virtual abandonment by many, including the EU. Years later the endurance of the Croatian
people during this tragic time had come to form a part of both Croatian identity and its
relationship with the EU. While Croatians want to savor their freedom and move forward as a
recognized equal, the EU thinks otherwise. The EU's abandonment of Croatia has transitioned
into the organization, essentially punishing the state for attaining its freedom. It refuses to invest
time into understanding the experiences and position of the Croatian people, and it has forced the
state into a classification of an equally guilty title, despite the fact that Serbian leadership
commenced the war. Even Croatia's justification of its actions have become part of the EU's
target, as the institution has isolated and virtually punished the state for its views. All of these
actions reveal that the EU has in no way supported a free and independent Croatia, something
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which is so integral to the Croatian identity. This means that Croatia has entered an institution
that does not retain an ounce of respect for the nation and the experiences that have forged its
identity.
For Croatians the EU represented the ideal dream. The Croatian desire to enter the EU
was more than economic, it was a chance to escape the past. After years of being victimized by
the brutality of various rulers whether it had been the Austro-Hungarian empire, Tito, or Serb
aggression, EU accession became an opportunity for Croatia to be recognized as an equal and
independent state. It began under the concept that Croatia would become part of an EU that had
formed its foundation on the basis of inclusiveness, acceptance, and equality, no matter what part
of Europe the state had originated from. Unfortunately, Croatia failed to see that by this time the
EU's ideal principles hid the discrimination and double standards that lurked beneath the pretty
illusion of equality and camaraderie. Since the beginning of its negotiations with the EU,
Croatians have found their identity attacked by the organization from all sides. The EU began by
blacklisting Croatia as a backward and Balkan country, despite the fact that core values of
Croatian identity, history, and culture have no affiliation with the negative stereotypes that stand
behind this title. If that weren't enough the EU began an assault on Croatian Christianity and its
native language in an effort to mold the state according to the Western European based standards
that have driven the organization for over a decade. Finally, the EU has even come to question
and even punish Croatians for their independence. Therefore, the EU wants Croatia, but not the
Croatian people. As an EU member, Croatia will have a future of battles as it must constantly
decide between the preservation of Croatian identity and the appeasement of the EU.
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Chapter 7: The Fissures of Sovereignty Within the EU
When the EU began to expand from its economic foundation, to political aspirations, it
claimed that the change would not only solidify the organization, but provide security and
prosperity to its members. Arguably, this led to the EU becoming an example of Antonio
Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony. Within the idea of cultural hegemony, is the belief that
society agrees to a form of consented coercion in regards to the ruling class. Similarly within the
EU, states would agree to consign part of their sovereignty in return for the believed support the
organization could provide. At the same time, states still felt that many of the Westphalian
principles of sovereignty would remain intact. Some of these principles being the right to self
determination, equality, and sole control over domestic affairs. These beliefs were reinforced by
the EU marketing itself as an organization based on equality and mutual gains. Unfortunately,
just like the institution's failures regarding identity, sovereignty is another area where the EU has
been unable to meet its own standards. Behind the pretty facade of equality, is an organization
that is very much guided by double standards and discrimination. The fissures within this area
have led to tensions and issues that have become increasingly visible to member states and its
citizens. One of most revealing double standards is the EU's stance regarding the ethnic Roma
minority that resides throughout Europe. The EU has increasingly ordered member states, such
as Romania, to provide more laws and benefits in favor of the Roma.156 Yet, other EU member
countries, like France, have been allowed to alienate and even deport the Roma from their
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states.157 As a result, this incident shows that the EU is more than willing to dictate a member's
domestic affairs, and foster inequality and double standards within the organization. Therefore,
state sovereignty finds itself in a threatened position within the EU.
As for Croatia, part of its motivation to join the EU was the believed support the
organization could give the country. Furthermore, it saw EU membership as a symbolic gesture
that would recognize Croatia's sovereignty and its contributions to Europe. Yet, Croatia's valued
independence has consistently found itself at odds with the EU. The institution only views
Croatia's sovereignty as significant when it affects the EU. As a result, this creates tensions
between the country and the organization. Croatia wants to be accepted within the EU, but retain
the Westphalian principles of sovereignty. On the other hand, the EU would like Croatia to either
surrender its political rights or have them conform to the institution's desires. This has led to
Croatia struggling to preserve it political rights in the face of a highly powerful EU. The impact
of the sovereignty issues within the EU can be seen through the organization's approach and
limitations to this area, as well as its direct relationship with Croatia concerning its own
sovereignty.
The Flawed Sovereignty Exchange
The problematic environment regarding sovereignty within the EU can be observed
through the theoretical framework that has built the organization's policy on this topic. The EU
has based its ability to function politically around the concept of consigning state autonomy to
the institution. This is an idea presented by Haddii M. Mamudu and Donley T. Studlar who
argue, "Thus, shared sovereignty, which deals with how states willingly cede part of their
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sovereignty to intergovernmental organizations or supranational bodies to deal with issues that
cannot be handled single-handedly, provides an important theoretical frame for understanding
how the EU gained authority in this policy area within a system of multilevel
governance."158This reveals that states agree to give up a portion of its own sovereignty in return
for protection and assistance. At the same time, however, Mamudu and Studlar note that this
action stems from the belief that sovereignty is shared. This means the states still desire to retain
a large amount of its sovereignty, and in no way is its secession of autonomy a blank check to the
EU. The issue that arises is when the EU clearly does not respect this agreement. Mamudu and
Studlar expand on this idea when they remark, "Under this arrangement, state actors have the
authority to enter into agreements that would compromise their Westphalian sovereignty, with
the goal of improving domestic sovereignty...they cede their autonomy by pooling their
resources into a multilateral organization or their commitments into an international treaty,
which then become vehicles for international collective action."159This illustrates that the
concept of shared sovereignty is supposed to benefit EU members long term within their own
respective states. Yet, it begs of the question of how does an EU member contend with collective
actions and agreements that hinders the state's national interests? Essentially, the EU began with
ideal principles regarding sovereignty and its member states, however these plans leave ample
room for discrimination and abuse.
While ideal in thought, the practice of shared sovereignty within the EU has led to some
uncertainties that have adversely affected member states. A concern is the amount of power the
EU receives through this approach to member political relations. This is touched upon by Booker
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and North who assert, "... setting up an entirely new form of government: one which was 'supranational,' beyond the control of national governments, politicians, or electorates. Nation states,
governments and parliaments could be left in place: but only so that they could gradually become
subordinated to new supranational government which was above them all."160This analysis
illustrates the potential negative consequences this approach to sovereignty can have for states
within the EU. If the state loses its ability to retain control over EU policies it does not agree
with, than it has effectively surrendered its sovereignty to an organization that may or may not be
working in its best interests. This approach is also addressed by Evelyn Eliis who says, "Of
course, if the Member States possessed general powers to contradict EU law by means of their
own national legislation, then all Member States would not be placed in the same position. The
notion of reciprocity is central to the Union, and reciprocity would not exist without the doctrine
of supremacy of EU law." From the point of Eliss the state's lack of rights helps achieve equality
within the EU. Yet, the reality is that this statement illustrates that are no checks and balances to
control the EU and its decisions. As a result, states can find the EU supporting actions that are
directly in contention with the national interests of a state. As Eliss points out, states within the
EU have no ability to contradict EU law, which makes it a precarious situation for a country to
find itself in. Belloni also explores this situation when he comments that, "The EU resembles a
neo-medieval empire characterized by overlapping authorities and divided sovereignty, multiple
identities, fuzzy borders and various forms of external power projection."161This statement is
evidence that the EU has used state secession of sovereignty as an opportunity to function as an
empire. In addition, it supports the idea that there is no concrete division separating the EU's
power and the state's right to sovereignty. Consequently, a state can find itself working for the
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EU's benefit, rather than its own. In many ways, the ambiguity of the EU's approach to
sovereignty as given the organization an advantage, but at the expense of its members.
The EU's stance regarding sovereignty has created problems for member states. A
concern is that through the EU, states have lost the ability to fully function in relation to their
own domestic politics. This idea is presented by Alyson J.K. Bailes who asserts, "Moreover, the
pattern of surrendering sovereignty together with centralized control has always been patchy,
leading to the supranational treatment of some areas of governance, the prevalence of
Westphalian-type intergovernmental bargaining in others, and every possible degree of mixed
and blurred competences in between."162This illustrates that because there is no concrete
agreement between the EU and states in relation to their autonomy, members must be focused on
EU desires. As a result, this takes away the state ability to run its domestic politics the way it
sees fit. This concept is expanded upon by Mamudu and Studlar who stress, "States become
bound by adherence to international norms developed as a result of this collective action or
cooperation. In this respect, the state does not have the sole authority over policy but is
disaggregated..."163Mamudu and Studlar's statement reveals that once countries enter this
agreement of shared sovereignty, the EU becomes an additional controller of member states.
This leaves little room for states to vocalize their opinions regarding the collective decision of
the organization, which could potentially be detrimental for the state in question if the EU
supports an action or policy it doesn't agree with. Basically, the excessive amount of control the
EU has could create issues that threaten the sovereignty of its member states.
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Croatia's Apprehensive Agreement
As for Croatia, while EU membership was an ambition, it still left the country concerned
for its sovereignty. Despite Croatians acknowledging that it would have to surrender some
sovereignty, there were still questions about how this would impact the state. Šeparović
highlights these fears when he says, "Some are frightened, we are again in another common
state... We as European are accepting of European rules, not happy to lose our sovereignty, but
world has tendency to unify."164 Šeparović presents the idea that Croatians understand that some
sovereignty has to be given up, yet it does so with reservations. Again, this aspect of EU
membership almost seems like a form of gambling, where the Croatian state does not know
whether this action will bring benefits or problems for the country. This feeling is also concurred
by Tuñman who asserts, "I do not idealize the EU, does not mean it will be rosy. A realistic
approach to expect all difficulties, but I can live with that." Again, Tuñman expresses the belief
that there could be issues awaiting Croatia within the EU by giving up its sovereignty, but that it
is a chance the state should take. The problem with this approach is that it does not account for
the worst case scenario, where Croatia may not be able to live and sustain through the potential
challenges awaiting the country in the EU. Jelčić highlights an important concern about the EU
and Croatian sovereignty when he remarks, "The doubt would be because Croatia had very bad
experience living through multinational formations and especially for reason Croats small nation
because of that can be problem. Second reason Croatia just started to be independent nation is
that smart to lose some sovereignty after nation standing firm on their loss."165 Jelčić brings up
an important point by noting the parallels between the EU and the past organizations that Croatia
had aligned itself with. The unfortunate trend is that for Croatia, all of the past insitutions that it
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was a part of had oppressed the country. In addition, since Croatia has been recognized as an
indpendent country for such a short time, is it wise for it to give away a valuable part of Croatian
political rights and identity so quickly? This shows that while Croatians may want EU
membership, there is a sense of hesitation that is based on legitimate concerns about the
organization. Essentially, Croatians have agreed to give up their sovereingty, but they do so
uneasily.
The apprehension of Croatians regarding the preservation of their sovereignty, has led to
a reflection about their status within the EU. There is a concern that EU membership could mean
benefits or the end of state autonomy. Lošo addresses this subject when remarks, "EU is not
defined yet, in the future we are not sure one conglomerate of states united or kind of state
controlling all of those because it is not defined I have questions about it...Normal that you join
any federation or a kind of togetherness lose sovereignty, abolition of national identity not good.
It would be wrong that the time of national states is over."166Lošo brings up a valid concern for
Croatians, as there is an ambiguity about the EU's intentions regarding sovereignty. He also
reaffirms the fact that Croatians would consider it a gross violation of the principles of
independence if the EU assumes the role of a dictator and effectively abolishes the existence of
nation states. Lukšić expands on this topic when he says, "The role of Croatia within the EU
provided that the EU does not disintegrate in the very near future would be to defend the rights
of small nations..."167 Lukšić is showing that there is a valid concern that small nations may find
their independence is at risk within the EU. Furthermore, Croatia will possibly have to defend
itself, if it is to preserve the principles of sovereignty that it values. Ashbrook comments on this
aspect when he asserts, "... Croats have a number of concerns, some very legitimate, about
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joining the EU. Questions about transparency, equality among members, the uniform application
of rules to candidates and members, lingering prejudices against the states and peoples of Central
and Eastern Europe—all these are valid concerns for a candidate country."168Ashbrook notes that
the concerns Croatians have are not without merit. They could potentially find that their state is
unequally treated within the EU. Therefore, Croatia has found that giving up its sovereignty also
creates an environment where the state may be negatively impacted by this action.
Croatians also fear that surrendering part of its independence will seal its fate as a servant
to the EU, rather than state interests. There is a belief that the EU may decide to dictate its
desires to Croatia, and the country will not be able to contest actions that go against the
principles and values of the state. Bošnjak touches upon this topic when he stresses, "Primarily I
feel the EU is a loss of Croatian independence. I wish the EU well, but without Croatia. No
animosity to EU as such, once Croatia becomes a member I will feel hostility towards EU, view
it as a colonial power."169Bošnjak is stating that Croatia may end up merely being a colonial
outpost for the EU, and the state will no longer be independent and able to control its domestic
affairs. It will have to worry about fulfilling EU desires and needs, rather than what is beneficial
for the country. Jelčić reaffirms Bošnjak's point when he says, "Croatia's sovereignty, that would
be what EU will impose on us."170In his analysis, Jelčić is arguing that Croatian decisions will be
decided by the EU, thus the state would lose its decision making capabilities. Basically,
Croatians view the possibility that the EU may become a dictatorship, which costs the Croatian
state its autonomy.
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There is also the belief that by consigning part of it sovereignty to the EU, Croatia will
become a victim of double standards and discrimination. Croatians perceive that a loss of
independence would allow other to take advantage and capitalize off the country. This idea is
presented by Caratan who emphasizes, "This fact, as well as the estimation that some of the new
members have fared worse than Croatia, not only in terms of their economic indicators, causes a
sense among the citizens that the country has waited unjustifiably long to be admitted to the EU.
Such sentiment has reinforced Euroscepticism, given support to the nationalist arguments about
the EU posing a threat to sovereignty..."171This shows that Croatia retains the view that the EU
does not respect the nation's sovereignty. Consequently, the state could find itself receiving
adverse treatment within the organization. Bošnjak also addresses this perspective when he
remarks, "Publicly stated goal of the European campaign to convince the Croatian people to give
up their independent and sovereign state...the EU is directly intervening in the internal affairs of
another state-which is unacceptable in classic international relations."172Bošnjak is exposing the
fact that the EU's goal for Croatia to surrender its sovereignty works against every principle
regarding independence within the practice of international relations. Therefore, by performing
this action, Croatia would effectively be entering an organization that does not retain the same
respect for its political rights and values. As a result, Croatians may find that the EU is not
interested in the preservation of Croatia's independence.
Croatians also sense that the state could be put in a dangerous position, by giving its
political power to the EU. There is a feeling that Croatia could be facing more challenges, rather
than benefits by signing over its sovereignty. Kovačević highlights this perspective when he
says, "... increasingly intensive relativizing role of nation states, there is a real danger that the
171
172

Caratan, "The European Union, South-Eastern Europe and the Europeanization of Croatia,"176.
Bošnjak, EU-Ne Hvala,, 66. Author Translated.

B i l a n d z i c h | - 125 -

federal authorities, EU, will turn into a powerful, centralist institution, which erodes collective
national and individual rights."173 Kovačević is arguing that the power of nations states may
deteiorate within the EU, and as a result this will affect not only member countries, but their
citizens. This seems to be a legitimate fear that Croatians are preparing for in regards to their
own membership within the organization. Bošnjak expands on this validation when he
comments, "Croatian sovereignty in the EU, none 1% of population less than 1% of political
power. What sovereignty? Lose 100% of sovereignty by going to EU especially with the changes
by April 2017...Croatian votes meaningless."174The statement Bošnjak provides explains that the
reality is that despite what is professed officially, Croatia will not be able to impact any of the
EU's chose decisions and policies. Without this capability, Croatains are forced to live under EU
jursidiction, rather than being an equal contributor to the organization. Lošo mentions the lack of
sovereignty as well when he states, "When it is question of sovereignty need to define which one
territory, cultural, economic, information distribution, etc. All those sovereignties in smaller or
bigger sense will be in danger. That will again depend on direction EU will go as either
conglomerate of states or a controller."175Lošo is emphasizing that if the EU becomes a dictated
empire, all aspects of sovereignty will be put at risk. As a result, this will be especially dangerous
for Croatia as it will open up the country to a host of issues. Basically, Croatia's lack of control
within the EU, puts the country's political sustainability in a negative position.
Conclusion: The Possible Reappearance of the Multinational Curse
Overall, Croatia has found itself at odds with the EU regarding the issue of sovereignty.
The EU would like every state, including Croatia, to surrender part of its political rights in return
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for security and prosperity. Yet, the reality is that the EU's approach to this matter has left the
organization without checks and balances. As a result, member states could find they have no
ability to counter EU policies it does not agree with, which may have a negative impact on the
state. The Croatian state, which is dedicated to the Westphalian ideals of sovereignty, understand
the EU's reqirement regarding the consignment of political power. At the same time, while
Croatians have decided to follow through with their side of the agreement, they do so with
reservations. This is due to the fact that there are numerous and valid concerns that Croatia's
political preservation could be at risk. If the Croatian fears become a reality, than the tragedy
would be that Croatia has found itsef part of an oppressive organization again, thus continuing
the curse of the state's tragic history as a victim of persecution.
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Chapter 8: The Political Price of War
While the Croatian war of independence holds a special place within Croatian identity, it
is also politically important for the state as well. Through the tragedy of war, Croatians were able
to prove to the international community that their right to self-determination was justified. As a
result, Croatians were able to be recognized as a sovereign nation state, eligible for all of the
benefits and responsibilities that come attached to the title. Although this provided an
opportunity for Croatians to be acknowledged for their contributions to Europe, the nation state
continues to fight for acceptance as a sovereign nation. This is due to the fact that while Croatia
is officially recognized as an independent country, there are still states and institutions that refuse
to treat it as such. One of these entities is the EU, who continues to challenge Croatia's
sovereignty, which has led to problems for the state and its people. By having to consistently
defend its rights as a country, Croatia is unable to achieve stability and its full potential within its
domestic affairs and relations within the international community. The EU's negative influence
within this area can be seen through the intrusive conditionality requirements placed on Croatia,
and the relations between the Croatian state and the Western European EU members regarding
the Croatian war of independence.
Diminishing Croatia's Sovereignty
The conditionality requirements that the EU has placed on Croatia has hindered its ability
to function as a sovereign state. The EU's treatment of Croatia in this way began at the beginning
of the war, when it attempted to use its power to sway the Croatian people. This is addressed by
Booker and North who assert, "As news of the fighting in Slovenia reached the Council meeting,
it was greeted as an almost heaven-sent opportunity. Here was a crisis at the heart of Europe
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which would give the Community an opportunity to intervene as the continent's 'superpower,'
demonstrating the 'common foreign policy' in action."176While this depicts the EU's stance at the
beginning of the war, it also illustrates how the organization related to the countries vying for
independence. This shows that the EU's goal was to use the Slovenian and Croatian nations as
examples, where the organization could demonstrate its power. Therefore, the EU's desired
outcome would be that Slovenia and Croatia would conduct itself according to its will, which
was early on the retention of Yugoslavia. The key component of this analysis is the EU's intent
to suppress the will of nation states and control the ability to access the right of selfdetermination. Furthermore, as was mentioned previously, the EU refused to acknowledge
Croatia as an independent state during the war, despite the fact that it met all of the criteria for
recognition. This reveals that even before the war had been won by the Croatians, the EU had
begun to intrusively insert itself within the politics of Croatia, which prevented the state from
attaining its sovereignty at that time. Lošo expands on this theory by noting the EU's transition
from preventing self-determination to using the ICTY as leverage against the country when he
says, "When you closely examine the specific 'Western' targets by the European Union to
Croatia, contained in the formulation of the 'functioning of the rule of law', the apparent high
degree of conformity between the political process in Croatia and the occurrence in the
Hague."177 Lošo's analysis reveals that even when Croatia became recognized as an independent
country, the EU began to attempt to politically influence Croatia by using the ICTY as a tool. As
a functioning body within the United Nations, the ICTY has not affiliation with the EU. Yet the
organization continues to use it to its advantage in regards to its relations with Croatia. While it
can be argued that as an institution, the EU has a right to take into account all of the experiences
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and situations regarding a member or candidate state, its insistence that Croatia surrender to all
ICTY principles removes the state's ability to make its own decisions. As a result, Croatia is
forced to hand over its decision making to the EU in order to be considered viable by the
institution. Essentially, from the beginning of the war the EU has actively attempted to minimize
Croatia's sovereignty.
In addition, the EU has used its conditionality requirements to extort the country of its
sovereignty. By combining Croatia's relationship with the ICTY, along with its desire to be an
accepted member of the EU, the organization has taken an aggressive role within the formulation
of Croatian international politics. This is a concept that is explored by Belloni who remarks,
"The issue of conditionality, is the most powerful tool available to the EU... conditionality
towards the region involves the requirement of ‘full cooperation’ with the ICTY. In practice, this
request meant that the Tribunal and its chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte became the main gatekeepers in the process of European integration."178 This effectively shows that Croatia's
sovereign principle, that no entity may justifiably infringe upon another state's domestic politics
has been broken. As a result, Croatia could not have the freedom to negotiate with the ICTY
according to its own terms, because it had to focus on appeasing the EU. While it is respected
that every supranational institution requires members to consign some of its sovereignty, the
EU's involvement with Croatia's ICTY situation has completely stripped the state of its
sovereignty rights. Thus, Croatia has been reduced to being the EU's puppet, instead of a state
that could justifiably defend its position and make choices that are in the benefit of its citizens.
This is touched upon by Hursoy who explains, "As it is mentioned above, the cooperation with
the ICTY is a precondition for any progresses in the negotiations of the SAA. Despite the EU
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accession negotiations started swiftly with Croatia in October 2005, there are significant
ambiguities about judicial and economic reforms..."179Not only does Hursoy reaffirm the EU's
use of the ICTY as a leverage tool, but he acknowledges the vagueness of the institution's desired
reforms. This implies that the EU's influence has meant that there is no longer a clear separation
between the institution and the sovereignty of the state. As a result, Croatia finds itself entering
an EU that attacks the very core values behind political independence.
Furthermore, the EU's requirements, regarding Croatia's war for independence,
discriminate against Croatia's ability to function as an autonomous state. One of the concerns is
that the EU has asked Croatia to surrender an enormous amount of sovereignty in relation to the
war. This idea is presented by Pridham who explains, "In short, the domestic environment for
EU-committed leaders in the Balkans is decidedly more difficult than was the case with their
predecessors in the 2004 enlargement process... It has at times been highlighted by the new
conditionality issue of handing over alleged war criminals who, like Ante Gotovina in Croatia
and Ratko Mladić in Serbia, have enjoyed a measurable degree of support as national heroes in
patriotic circles in these countries."180 Pridham's analysis reveals that Croatia must undergo more
reforms and conditionality requirements than any other state that had previously conducted EU
accession negotiations. This indicates that the EU's relationship with Croatia is based on how
much political power the organization can influence the state to give up. Stojic also explores this
concept when he comments, "Among these extra demands, the full co-operation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is the most important. As a result,
resistance to the EU, and a feeling of injustice, is stronger in both countries because of the
perceived double standards in EU policy – in Croatia especially, this has strengthened Euro179
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sceptic attitudes."181 This illustrates that the EU's involvement within Croatian politics is a
discriminatory action, that results in Croatia losing a good deal of its political power. Since other
EU candidates and members are not required to conform to the same standards, Croatia has
entered the EU in an unequal position. Basically, the EU's ICTY conditionality requirements
reflect an organization that is looking to assert its dominance, at the expense of Croatia's political
power.
The EU's political influence regarding the ICTY, had resulted in Croatia struggling to
preserve is sovereignty. Croatia's dedication to its political independence has created tensions
between the state and organization. This is touched upon by Roter and Bojinovic who comment,
" The stumbling block, and the reason for the Commission’s unhappiness about Croatia’s
compliance with the membership requirements, has been centered on the issue of Croatia’s cooperation, or rather the lack of it, with The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)."182Again, this demonstrates that the EU has insisted that its own
views regarding Croatia's situation with the ICTY be accepted by the state. Yet, Croatia has
attempted to exert its right to disagree with certain accusations and conclusions the tribunal has
presented. By the organization expressing that EU accession negotiations would be halted by
Croatia's disagreement with the ICTY, reveals that the state has been robbed of its ability to
formulate and stand by its own opinions and beliefs. Bošnjak expands on these thoughts when he
argues, "...Croatian accession to the EU is the largest national and strategic priority, which
unfortunately must submit to sundry other national interests, such as the extradition of Croatian
generals to the Hague, bargaining of Croatian state-owned enterprises, and even the withdrawal
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from the economic zone, all of which is not discussed."183 Through Bošnjak's statement, it is
clearly shown that the EU's desired reforms work directly against the national political interests
of the state. This means that the accession process has costed Croatia the political rights that are
important to the Croatian people. Therefore, Croatia cannot adequately fulfill its own political
priniciples if it is counter to the EU's desires.
These developments regarding the EU and its intrusion within Croatian national politics,
has ilicited concern about the future political sustainability of the state. A major concern is the
lack of equality that the Croatian state has had to endure, due to the EU's forced role within
Croatian politics. This is addressed by Bošnjak who remarks, "They made us do things no one
else has had to do. We had to surrender our generals, long list of things, politically embrace
Serbs forgive them for aggression, pressured to drop genocide case against them in ICJ, and
spend big reparation money on Serbs."184 Bošnjak's analysis reveals threatening implications for
the preservation of a politically autonomous Croatia. The fact that the EU has used its power to
to not only force Croatia to accept ICTY assertions it did not agree with, but to encourage them
to drop its claim against Serbia is a vicious attack against Croatian sovereignty. As a recognized
and independent country, Croatia is entitled to voice any concerns and opinions it may have.
Furthermore, it should have the ability to freely use the United Nations judiciary system without
the fear of punishment. Yet, the EU has violated these principles by essentially blackmailing
Croatia to give up its political sovereignty in this area. This idea is expanded upon by Lošo who
says, "... using the Hague war crimes trials to prove that all the polities were equally to blame,
other than those provided for, again it is no coincidence that the terms of the Croatian accession
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to the European Union overlap with deadlines of the Hague Tribunal."185Lošo is arguing that the
EU has made it clear that Croats need to decide whether its political beliefs were worth its
accession to the EU. This indicates that instead of becoming an equal within a supranational
organization, Croatia has allowed itself to be dictated by the EU. Jelčić reaffirms this theory
when he remarks, "All depends on interests of states towards the EU and the EU's interests
towards the states, sometimes those two things are different."186 Jelčić is arguing that sometimes
the desires of the state and the EU are different, which is exactly true in the case of Croatia. The
Croatians look for political equality within the organization, while the EU is intent on removing
its sovereignty. Essentially, the ICTY conditionality requirements stemming from the EU have
only worked to compromise Croatian political sustainability.
Contending With Ulterior Motives
Not only is Croatia's sovereignty threatened by EU conditionality, but by the specific
intentions of the leading Western European EU members within the organization. The EU's
refusal to recognize Croatia during the war was directly influenced by Western European
members such as France and Great Britain. As a result, this has adversely affected Croatia's
sovereignty. This subject is explored by Lošo who stresses, "Entire area, inefficiency of the
international community, primarily the European duo of Great Britain and France, allowed the
Serbian politicians to conduct continuous' creeping occupation in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina..."187This is evidence that Great Britain and France did not support the
establishment of an independent and sovereign Croatia. In addition, Lošo indicates that the two
countries were aware of Serbia's aggressive tactics, but chose not to act, resulting in Croatia
185

Lošo, Klonovi Nastupaju, 449. Author Translated.
Antun Dubravko Jelčić, author interviewed, July 3, 2013.
187
Lošo, Klonovi Nastupaju, 449. Author Translated.
186

B i l a n d z i c h | - 134 -

having to endure a violent war alone. The Croatian political problems associated with the choices
of Great Britain and France are expressed by Dr. ðuro Njavro and Dr. Zoran Stiperski who
emphasize,"...in British newspapers and books it is often stated that the war started because of
the premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia from Germany and the Vatican. In this way
the fault transferred to Germans, while hiding that Serbia had begun aggressive wars in the
former Yugoslavia."188This statement reveals that Western EU member states, like Great Britain,
continue to negatively acknowledge Croatia's achievement of independence. To label Croatia as
a prematurely recognized country, is to effectively denounce its sovereignty. Šeparović
highlights the impact of these EU member state positions by stressing, "On the other side
enemies, our enemies those who had been supporting Serbia, Milosevic, and former Yugoslavia
those have been countries that had a socialist party in government and or were Orthodox religion
countries, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, France supporters of Serbia."189
Šeparović explains that the Croatian war of independence was more than a defensive fight
opposing Serbian aggression, but a battle against states that refused to recognize Croatia's right
to autonomy. As a result, this begs the question of where does Croatia stand within an EU, where
many of its members denied and continue to negatively acknowledge Croatia's sovereignty?
Therefore, there has been an active resistance from multiple EU member countries against
Croatian sovereignty from the beginning.
As Croatia had to fight for its recognition, its experience with EU members opposed to
Croatian sovereignty, has made the issue of trust a vital concern for the Croatian state. The
motivations behind the choice not to recognize Croatia's sovereignty during the war, has
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remained a challenge for Croatia to overcome in regards to its political sustainability. This
problem is addressed by Lukšić who says, "Some EU members, especially Great Britain, were
very hostile towards Croatia's entrance to the EU because Great Britain was and is a traditional
ally of the Serbian dynasty of Serbia."190This statement reveals the sincere complexity that is
found within the EU. The organization is comprised of members that each have their own values,
thoughts, and motives that form the foundation of their states. Problems arise when these motives
come into conflict with or at the expense of another member. In this case, the victim is Croatia.
Since Great Britain has an immense amount of loyalty to Serbia, it means that Britain will be
more willing to support actions that are in the benefit of the Serbian state. The British desire to
support Serbia may be to such an extent that it will come at the expense of another, such as
Croatia's right to sovereignty. In addition, this means that Croatia can never be sure that the
requirements it must undergo or the treatment it receives within the EU isn't influenced by the
ulterior motives of the other member states. This is further expressed by Stančić who comments,
"Of course, in doing so it will not be forgotten who caused the bloody chaos, but if it is a
common European future, the trauma of the past will be treated in accordance with the standards
of European criteria."191 Stančić is explaining that Croatians will move forward as a recognized
European country, but will never forget those that had commenced and contributed to the war
that had adversely affected Croatia. This is important from a political standpoint as Croatians
will be concerned about the trust it can or cannot put in other member states regarding the
respect and preservation of Croatian autonomy. Stojic emphasizes these beliefs when he asserts,
"As a consequence of the wars, an overall distrust among the Balkans nations, and a suspicious
of the intention of others, the anti-Yugoslav legacy feeds anti-EU sentiments, taking into
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consideration that the EU insists on regional co-operation."192The traumatic experience of war
and the failure of many states and organizations within the international community to recognize
Croatia's right to self-determination in its time of need as forever defined the country. The past
proves that Croatia will always have to be aware and wary of the intentions of other states,
particularly the Western European countries that are leading EU policy, as its decisions may
negatively impact the sovereignty of the Croatian state. Therefore, the motivations of other EU
members has made it clear that the political independence of Croatia must constantly be
protected.
The issues Croatia has faced in regards to its sovereignty has caused reflection about the
state's future sustainability within the EU. One fear is the EU's insistence that Croatia accept
relations it is uncomfortable with, may ultimately cost the state its political values and
independence. This is an idea presented by Lošo when he expresses that, "... the Foreign Office
to Zagreb, everything breaks down, and recommendations to show the Croatian determination
and seriousness of the strong partnership not only with Britain but also to other EU Member
States' and the conclusion that behind this are political losers, but they are, of course not
appointed, and for their own interests willing the fate of the whole country."193 Lošo is showing
that the determination to have Croatia foster these relationships, merely because the EU desires
it, may cost the country its valuable political principles in the near future. As a result, this push
on part of the EU removes Croatia's right to conduct its international relations the way it desires
to do so. Lošo expands upon these ideas when he says, "President Josipović agreed also that
Croatia will support Great Britain's political views on EU which is in many sense against other
members, that way Croatia would be against members who were on Croatia's side. Even worse
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support of Great Britain's view of uniting countries of ex-Yugoslavia."194 Lošo is illustrating that
leading Western EU members are only using Croatian sovereignty to their advantage. In
addition, these actions that it desires Croatia to perform are in direct contention with the
international relations and domestic values that have benefitted the Croatian people.
Consequently, Croatia finds itself in a situation where its political independence has been put in a
precarious position.
Conclusion: Sovereignty on Paper
Overall, the Croatian war of independence has led the nation to finally being accepted as
a sovereign state within the international community. Despite its official recognition on paper,
some states and institutions still do not treat Croatia as an independent country. This is
particularly true in regards to Croatia's relationship with the EU. The organization has
consistently used the ICTY as part of its conditionality requirements for Croatia, which has
essentially stripped the state of its rights regarding this situation. In addition, Croatia has also
found its sovereignty to be questioned and threatened by other EU members that have visibly
indicated their lack of support for an independent Croatia or their loyalties to other states that
would like to capitalize on Croatia. Unfortunately, these issues regarding Croatia's sovereignty
leave the country in a very unequal position within the EU. The situation means that Croatia can
continue to expect that its rights will be questioned and threatened. It also incites reflection about
other areas in which Croatia may find itself manipulated for the EU's benefit.
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Chapter 9: Geopolitical Strain and Conflicts of Interest
For many states, the concept of sovereignty indicates that a country is given the right to
control its own defined territory, while conducting domestic and international affairs according
to its own principles. These values not only define the stability and sustainability of a state, but
its relations with other countries and organizations. In the case of Croatia, its recognized
sovereignty has helped the state prosper and form meaningful relations with other countries. Yet,
this positive progress has been diminished and hindered by Croatia's affiliation with the EU.
From the beginning of its accession process, Croatia has found itself dealing with an increasing
amount of geopolitical issues, primarily regarding its relations with states that border the
country. This stems from the fact that Croatia's accession process has given other EU members
and candidates an opportunity to capitalize off the country at the expense of the Croatian state.
Consequently, this has created and exasperated tensions between Croatia, other countries, and
the EU. The issues that the EU has initiated can be seen through Croatia's strained relations with
Slovenia and Italy.
The Slovenian Extortion Plot
As Croatia began accession negotiations, it found its previously benign relationship with
Slovenia had transformed into a source of tension. By the time Croatia had begun mediations
with the EU, Slovenia was already an official member within the organization. Due to the
positive nature of Croatian Slovenian relations, it was thought that Slovenia would fully support
Croatia in its accession process. Unfortunately, the reality was that Slovenia viewed this situation
as an opportunity for the country to use its position within the EU as a leverage device against
Croatia. By doing this Slovenia would be able to attain its desired goals at the expense of Croatia
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and the Croatian people. As a result, this triggered a variety of incidents in which Croatia found
that in order to placate the EU, it would have to appease Slovenia, even when its desires
unjustifiably infringed on Croatia's political rights and sovereignty.
One of the most vivid examples of this regards Piran Bay. Located in the northern part of
the Adriatic Sea, Slovenia proposed that it had rights to the bay, despite it historically and
legitimately belonging to Croatia. Naturally, Croatians contended Slovenia's claim, only to find
that the Slovenians had decided to use their EU membership as a sanction tool against the
Croatian state. This issue is addressed by Jović who says, "Relations with Slovenia, which at one
time plagued the Croatian path towards the European Union, are relieved when Jadranka Kosor
took over the position of Prime Minister (July 1, 2009), followed by a bilateral agreement on
international arbitration in connection with a boundary in the Bay of Piran."195This statement
reveals that when Croatia refused to consider Slovenia's demands, it threatened to veto Croatia's
accession to the EU. Allowing the Slovenians to extort the country, Prime Minister Jadranka
Kosor agreed to an arbitrage, instead of using the international court of justice to present
Croatia's rightful claim. Therefore, Kosor had provided an opportunity for Slovenia to obtain this
part of Croatian territory. Lukšić expresses Croatian disappointment on this matter when he
asserts, "Slovenia got the impression that by exerting adequate pressure on Croatia, the Croatian
government would agree to a blackmail."196 Lukšić is showing that instead of receiving benefits
and support, Croatia has found itself victimized by an EU member. Furthermore, he clearly
indicates that the right to veto within the EU, has been used by opportunistic states attempting to
take advantage of others. Tuñman reaffirms this idea when he remarks on Piran Bay in the
following, "At that time that was a pre-condition to continue to finish conditions to join EU
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because of that only one thing that can be done...Slovenians are Slovenian oriented having in
mind only their interests, they are following and taking care for only their, not mutual
interests."197 Tuñman is revealing that this situation is in direct conetnion with the values that the
EU has professed regarding equality and sovereignty. By the organization allowing Slovenia to
use its membership as an extortive tool, results in Croatia losing parts of its territory and political
rights. Essentially, EU membership has fostered political tensions between Croatia and Slovenia,
as the Slovenes has used its place within the organization as leverage against the Croatian state.
The unfairness of this situation can be seen through Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor's
choice to handle the issue through arbitrage, rather than the international judiciary court. One of
the concerns is that by refusing to use the international court to settle the matter, it removes
Croatia's chance to prove that the bay solely belongs to the state. This is confirmed by Lukšić
who explains, "I'm a member, at that time, of national arbitration for maritime law in Monte
Carlo Monaco. What Kosor did was against the existing law, the only authority to interpret legal
regulations is the court and not an arbitration...Kosor by this act inflicted great damage to Croatia
and ignored international law."198Lukšić is illustrating that by not using the court system, Kosor
has put Croatia's sovereignty at risk. The agreement to undergo arbitrage is merely an act to
appease the Slovenians. Consequently, Croatia is left without the proper legal authority that
could asses and rule on the situation. Bošnjak comments on Kosor's choice in the following, "She
accepted a kangaroo arbitration. Slovenia did not want to go to court, kept insisting on arbitration
instead of insisting on ICJ, Kosor simply accepted some wild ad hoc arbitration, result of this run
the risk of losing territory. We wouldn't lose if we went to court only reason she did that because
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Slovenia vetoed Croatia into EU, irony double betrayal."199Bošnjak is pointing out the irony that
the EU is supposed to provide benefits and support for its members, and Croatia has found itself
struggling to preserve many aspects of its sovereignty due to the accession process. Furthermore,
Kosor's actions reveal that these choices were made to please another country and organization,
rather than the national interests of the Croatian state and its people. Jelčić summarizes Croatian
feelings on this matter when he says, "Everything that would not be in favor of international law
wouldn't be accepting for Croatia."200Through his statement, Jelčić is arguing that Croatians do
not believe the state should be undertaking actions, which unfairly compromise the nation's
sovereignty. Yet, the EU seems to be pushing Croatia in the direction of lost political rights.
Basically, nothing about the Piran Bay arbitration is in the benefit of the Croatian state and its
people, and its origins can be traced to the EU's lack of support or respect for Croatia's
sovereignty.
The Croatian Slovenian struggle for Piran Bay is also an example of EU discrimination
and double standards. Croatians view the geopolitcal strain with Slovenia regarding the bay, as
one guided by the personal motivations and loyalties of other EU member states. This is touched
upon by Lošo who emphasizes, "Over Slovenia, the major players, in this case the United
Kingdom and Italy, against Croatian perform on two fronts political and territorial. On one side
and on the other threats to Croatian sovereignty, that is, its existence in the northern part of the
first door of Eurasia."201Lošo argues that certain EU members such as those mentioned above do
not have Croatia's best interests at heart. In fact, they are more than willing to diminish Croatia's
autonomy whether it be politically or territorially. In addition, if Croatia is not able to withstand
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these discriminating assaults, its sovereignty could be put at risk. Višnja Starešina expands on
this subject when she says, "The same day, the European official Olii Rehn, Commissioner for
the expansion, he returned from a visit to Zagreb and Ljubljana with a proposal that gives
Slovenia extra time to block Croatian accession negotiations with the EU. Olii Rehn has
accepted the idea of a new Slovenian mediation mission."202Starešina is illustrating the fact that
the EU has double standards regarding Piran Bay. The organization had been more than willing
to support Slovenia's veto of Croatian accession, even though it was a conflict of interest.
Therefore, Croatia's dispute with Slovenia only opens the country to further victimization by the
double standards and discrimination that occurs within the EU.
The Piran Bay conflict also poses large ramfications for Croatia. There is a belief that this
incident could cost Croatia much of its territory and sovereignty. This idea is explored by Lošo
who explains, "Here is no question of what would be better, arbitrage is bad for Croatia
definitely, that is the blackmailing of Croatia. To give something that definitely belonged to you
for nothing, I am an Admiral and know importance of the sea... In this case if that happened
with the arbitrage so that Slovenia has a way to open sea that means Croatia does no longer have
border between Italy and Croatia."203 Lošo is arguing that Piran Bay represents a geopolitical
strategic point, and to lose that would put Croatian political rights in danger. He explains that if
Slovenia were to gain the bay, Croatia would no longer have a fixed border between the country
and Italy. As a result, Croatia would no longer have a defined border for protection, and fishing
rights within the Adriatic could be exploited by Slovenians and Italians. Grubišić expands on this
concept when he emphasizes, "Croatia shouldn't give freely. Good fences make good neighbors,
think good fences should be established. Throughout history Croatia and Slovenia never had
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problems, but problems arose when Slovenia thought Croatia was in trouble and thought it could
get something for nothing."204Grubišić is acknowledging that to lose Piran Bay would be a
travesty for Croatian sovereignty, and that the only way to prevent this is to preserve defined
borders. More importantly, Grubišić notes that Croatia and Slovenia had a positive relationship
until the EU got involved. This shows that as an organization the EU has actually created
tensions, rather than solve them. Šeparović provides insight to this situation when he says,
"Jadranka Kosor and recently Vesna Pusić, have been permissive in giving up what Slovenians
wanted... So I wouldn't be so permissive as they have been with problems on Slovenia, which
has to be blamed on neighboring blackmailer country."205This analysis reveals that the
willingness of Croatian leaders to appease Slovenia, does nothing beneficial for Croatian
autonomy and sustainability. It also reaffirms the dissatisfaction with the realities of the EU
accession process, as Croatia has been forced to make decisions it most likely would not have
done if the EU hadn't been involved. As a result, Croatia's affiliation with the EU has led to
geopolitical strain with Slovenia, that threatens to compromise the state's sovereignty.
Ultimately, the EU's role within the Piran Bay situation has damaged Croatian Slovenian
relations. The dispute between the two countries has eroded the positive nature that had once
formed the foundation of the relationship between Croatia and Slovenia. This concept is
addressed by Lošo who says, "Slovenia won't give up from their blackmailing of Croatia and
Slovenia does not have any other foreign policies except to blackmail Croatia only neighbor they
can get something from... There is no guilt of Slovenia that they do that, but it is Croatia
government that allowed that. I don't think Croatian Slovenian relations will be better."206Lošo is
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arguing that Slovenia's use of its EU membership as leverage against Croatia, has caused
significant damage to the state's values regarding sovereignty. Furthermore, he asserts that it
does not seem likely that the Croatian Slovenian relationship will be a positive one in the future.
As a result, this is evidence that the EU in its support of Slovenia has created numerous issues
between the two countries. Tuñman concurs this idea when he reflects on Croatian Slovenian
relations in the following, "It's a question of confidence in the certain future relations that is a
heritage. Probably both sides a lack of openness."207This illustrates that a distrust has formed
between the two countries. Consequently, the relationship has become based on doubt and
uncertainty, which will have an adverse influence on any negotiations the countries may have to
undergo in the future. Essentially, instead of fostering relations, the EU has negatively influenced
Croatia's diplomatic ties with Slovenia.
EU Supported Italian Ambitions
While the EU arguably created tensions between Slovenia and Croatia, it has negatively
exasperated Croatian Italian relations. As Croatians began EU negotiations, it quickly found
itself embroiled in disputes, primarily regarding the Adriatic Sea, with Italy. One of the conflicts
arose as Croatia attempted to instill an ecological law, that would help preserve the health of the
sea. Italians quickly countered Croatia's claim, by arguing that this law would adversely affect
their fishing industry. Roter and Bojinovic explore this issue when they say, "The proclamation
of the zone was to come into force a year later. With the ecological part addressing the danger of
the pollution...it was the proclamation of the fishing zone that particularly upset Italy, for such a
zone would significantly reduce the possibilities for Italian fishermen to fish in the
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Adriatic."208While the proclamation dealt with Croatia's part of Adriatic territory, Italy like
Slovenia, was quick to use its own EU membership against Croatia regarding this policy. The
EU pressured Croatia to rethink its position or to modify its claim, so that it would be
satisfactory to the Italians. These actions are not only a form of extortion, but they violate
Croatia's autonomous rights to make decisions regarding its territory. Thus, it has also aroused
tensions between Croats and Italians. This is touched upon by Lukšić who asserts, "Traditional
Italian imperialism always wanted to annex and integrate the Croatian coast into Italy. We have
good relations with the present Italian government, but we know that one of our traditional
enemies are those in Italy which think that the Croatian coast should be redeemed, integrated into
Italy..."209Lukšić is pointing out that while Croatian Italian relations had been positive in recent
years, there has been a history of Italian conquest on the Croatian coast. As a result, it seems that
EU membership has allowed certain Italian factions interested in capitalizing off of Croatian
territory, a chance to renew its historical aims. Bošnjak expands on this idea when he stresses,
"Given the systemic Italian conquering Croatian policy towards countries over many centuries,
such statements are adjacent political elite concern for Croatia as a sovereign state...within a
common European government internal limits, requiring even greater caution, because in the
same state much more numerous Italians have again the possibility to colonize Croatian land."210
Bošnjak is noting that the fishing dispute could symbolize a possible re-emergence of Italy's bid
to extend its territory and power to the Croatian controlled Adriatic coast. Furthermore, he cites
this conflict as an example of Croatia losing its political rights through its affiliation with the EU
and its members anxious to take advantage of the Croatian state and its people. Consequently,
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the EU has become a manipulative tool for states like Italy to gain benefits and advantages at the
expense of Croatian sovereignty.
The conflicts regarding the Adriatic Sea have significant implications on Croatian
sovereignty. A concern is that Croatian Italian disputes endanger the autonomous rights of
Croatia. This concept is expanded upon by Lošo who explains, "Italy has defined their position
on the Adriatic a long time ago, and all their options of what they want on Adriatic they get
already. Their aim is to make it Italian lake, Croats were talking about Adriatic as sea. Different
rules apply to sea and lake, so that in that way Italy makes pretention on the eastern coast of
Adriatic Sea... Croatia interests is to protect their part of the sea and to be sea oriented
country."211Lošo is revealing that the Italians claims could eventually ignite a campaign that the
EU recognize the Adriatic as a lake, rather than a sea. If that belief would come into fruitation,
Croatians would lose a large amount of territory and sovereignty. Šeparović emphasizes the
struggle and implications of this matter when he remarks, "Italy blackmailing Croatia is another
case. At that time Italy high position in EU they themselves decided to have Italian border in the
middle of Adriatic. When Croatia was trying to accept its own right on the sea, Italians were
strongly against it."212In his analysis, Šeparović is highlighting another example of conflict of
interests and double standards occurring within the EU. Since Italians already retained official
EU membership, it was able to use its status to influence the outcome of policies that only the
Italian state could benefit from. As in the case of Slovenia, the EU as an institution stood behind
the Italian country. Furthermore, when Croatians attempted to lay claim to their justifiable rights,
it was met with tensions coming from Italy and the EU itself. Miklenić summarizes Croatian
feelings regarding this situation when he says, "Croats have a love for the sea and nobody will
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ever be able to take that away. Competition in the exploitation of the sea will not be to the liking
of our fishermen..."213 Miklenić is arguing that the Adriatic Sea is ingrained within Croatian
history, culture, and territory. Therefore, any policy or move from the EU to diminish this would
not be in the interests of the Croatian people, particularly the fisherman who live off this
industry. As a result, the Croatian Italian dispute regarding the Adriatic is a vivid example of
another assault on Croatia's sovereignty.
The Croatian Italian conflict has led Croatians to reflect further on their autonomy,
particularly regarding domestic affairs and territory, within the EU. Croatians maintain a fear
that the EU is consistently asking the state to surrender more of its rights, especially concerning
the Italian Croatian dispute. This issue is explored by Tuñman who comments, "One of those
things Croatia was forced to accept from EU. EU is a cooperation with economic interests,
forced Croatia to widen its borders on the sea... Italy with support of EU, Croatia not allowed to
enter negotiations for EU to certain extent not fair. That means Croatia has a difficult request to
join, fulfill."214 Tuñman's statement indicates that through Croatia's affliation with the EU the
state has been pressured to fulfill an increasing amount of demands, some which clearly infringe
on Croatia's political rights. In addition, Tuñman notes the double standards that have occurred
in this situation, such as the EU's favortism regarding other members. It illustrates the unequal
position, Croatia has been put in within the EU. Jelčić touches upon these concerns when he
says, "Adriatic Sea will always stay as Croatian sea, even in former Yugoslavia it was Croatian,
but couldn't call it that. Those from the East called it our sea. If EU wants to change that than we
will have same experience as former Yugoslavia."215Jelčić is arguing that Croatian Adriatic
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territory is a historical and recognized fact. Therefore, if the EU attempts to change this, Croatia
would find itself yet again part of an oppressive institution. Essentially, the Croatian Italian
situation has only alerted Croatians to the possibility that their autonomy may be at risk within
the EU.
Conclusion: An Exploited Croatia
Overall, the EU's involvement within Croatian domestic and international affairs has only
created and exasperated tension in regards to Croatia's diplomatic ties. This has been vividly
exemplified through Croatia's disputes with Slovenia and Italy. Both these latter countries have
used their respective positions within the EU to capitalize off of Croatia's accession process. As a
result, Croatia has found itself a repeated victim of double standards, discrimination, and even
conflicts of interest. Unfortunately, the challenges regarding Piran Bay and Italian fishing rights
are one of many disputes Croatia has been facing. Croatia's involvement with the EU has opened
it up to even more obstacles regarding political rights from other countries, like Serbia who have
also laid claims to Croatian territory. As the EU has allowed Croatia to be exploited by other
members, it leaves the question of whether Croatia is a legitimate equal within the EU? It seems
that the institution has consistently encouraged Croatians to give up their sovereignty, instead of
supporting it. Therefore, Croatia's losses greatly outweight its gains.
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Chapter 10: The Trials and Tribulations of Croatian Conditionality
While sovereignty remains a sacred value for the Croatian people, the state agreed to
undergo changes in order to be accepted by the EU. Unfortunately, what seemed like small
adjustments transformed into a long list of requirements from the organization. As Croatia began
the negotiation process, the state began to find itself agreeing to policies and modifications that
went against Croatian political rights and national interests. One of the most discouraging
requirements from the EU was the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), that Croatia had
to undergo so that it could become an official EU member. It became a complicated task for
Croatia as the EU consistently began to add layers and layers of demands for the state to fulfill.
Furthermore, not only was the sheer amount a challenge for Croatians, but the double standards
and discrimination that seemed to pervade every aspect of the requirements. The SAP'S threat to
Croatian sovereignty can be seen through both the conditionality process, as well as the goals of
the EU's demands.
Endless Conditions Against National Interests
For Croatia the conditionality process had a large impact on the country's sovereignty.
One of the disappointments for Croatians was the magnitude of never ending changes the state
was forced to make. This issue is highlighted by Caratan who says, "These conditions have often
been general and unspecified – they have been interpreted by the EU. They have proven to be
moving targets. One difficulty also lies in the fact that, over time, the EU has added new policy
areas: home affairs, justice, the Schengen area, a common foreign and security policy, and a
common currency."216Caratan is expressing the fact that despite Croatia attempting to conform to
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the EU's standards, it consistently found the demands vague and difficult to attain. In addition,
Cartan notes that as Croatia began fulfilling the requirements, the institution began to add other
areas and specifications to this process. As a result, Croatia found itself constrained by the EU's
desires, which meant the country had to be focused on the EU, rather than national interests.
Ashbrook expands on this issue when he remarks, "Croatia must adopt more laws and
regulations than countries of the Fifth Enlargement. And unlike current member states, as a
candidate it is held to higher standards for compliance... noncompliance or non-implementation,
however, is dangerous for acceding countries and is to be avoided at all costs."217In his analysis,
Ashbrook reveals multiple negative aspects of Croatia's conditionality process. To begin with, he
highlights the double standards as Croatia must undergo more requirements and under stricter
criteria than other countries. Furthermore, he argues that a candidate country, like Croatia,
virtually has no choice but to comply to EU standards if it is to continue negotiations with the
organization. This means that the stabilization process has left Croatia in an unequal position
within the EU. In addition, it loses a good deal of its sovereignty as it is intimidated not to
contend EU requirements it does not agree with, for fear that the institution would retaliate
against the country. Basically, the EU demands have forced Croatia to undergo a complicated
and long list of requirements that restrained sovereignty, and reflected the double standards
within the organization.
The conditionality requirements also proved to be against Croatia's national interests.
One of the concerns was that the EU's desires meant that Croatia had to modify aspects of the
state that were considered important by the Croatian people. This is touched upon by Belloni
who comments, "EU soft power tends to be exercised through the gravitational force it projects
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towards its neighboring states, in particular through its promise of association, and potentially
accession, to European institutions... As a ‘process,’ the SAP is designed to give interim rewards
to those local politicians willing to embrace necessary but politically sensitive reforms."218This
reveals that the EU uses its stabilization demands to exert power over a state. Furthermore, as in
the case of Croatia, the desired reforms often deal with sensitive issues for the country.
Therefore, the Croatian state finds itself making compromises that are not in the best interests of
the people. This is reaffirmed by Jelčić who stresses, "In those negotiations before Croatia joined
EU so many factors Croatia had to fill out that was against their interests."219Jelčić is
summarizing the fact that none of the modifications Croatia agreed to was in the best interests of
the state. Therefore, this indicates that Croatia is losing more political rights than gaining
benefits from its affiliation with the EU. Essentially, the conditionality requirements placed on
Croatia has only helped to deteriorate Croatian sovereignty.
The Regionalization Nightmare
Another danger for Croatia regarding the conditionality process has been the EU's goal to
eventually have Croatia be accepted as part of the Western Balkan region within the
organization. Regionalization is a big concern for Croatians, as the state and people want to be
recognized as separate and independent from other candidate and member countries. Bošnjak
addresses the EU's plans when he says, "In fact, the leading architects of the European Union's
long-term creation of a new state is not seen as a union state but as a Union of Regions."220
Bošnjak is explaining that with the expansion of the EU, members and candidates will eventually
be recognized as part of regions, rather than independent countries. Therefore, this is a transition
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that is very much in contention with the desires of the Croatian state and its people. Bošnjak's
idea is reinforced by Belloni who argues, "In fact, the answer to the problem of borders is not to
redraw them, but to make them increasingly irrelevant by recognizing allegiances to overlapping
polities and thus de-politicizing the significance of (hard) borders. By supporting functional
rather than geographical assertion of authority..."221Belloni is claiming that the EU will move
towards eliminating traditional borders, with the goal of achieving structured regionalization.
Again, the EU's plan works directly against Croatia, which desires to retain defined and separate
borders. Ashbrook expands on the Croatian sentiment when he remarks, "Many Croats feared
that closer relations with their neighbors would lead to the reemergence of a regional identity
[that would] hold back [the country’s] ambitions for [rapid] European integration. In its annual
reports the European Commission severely criticized Croatia for its reluctance to accept this
condition."222This supports the idea that Croatians do not want to be recognized as a part of a
regional entity. In addition, Ashbrook reveals that the EU has pressured Croatians to abandon
their concerns and fully embrace the EU's plans, despite it being counter to Croatian national
interests. Basically, the EU's conditionality requirements for Croatia has forced a regionalization,
that goes against the state's interests.
The EU's goal to regionalize Croatia has far reaching implications for the state. An
important concern for Croatians is that the EU could become a new form of Yugoslavia for
Croatia. This is touched upon by Jajčinović who says, "By contrast, the first Croatian Yugoslav
Yugoslavia was seen as a unitary community in which Croatian identity disappeared. Similarly
today, Croatian stateless and mental Yugoslavs look to the European Union. For them the EU is
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actually Euroslavia, a replacement for the failed Yugoslavia."223Jajčinović is noting the
disturbing parallels between the former Yugoslavia and the EU. He argues that for Croatia to
progress in this direction, the state would find itself in the same adverse predicament it had
within Yugoslavia. Ashbrook expands on this concept when he explains, "According to most
Croats, this lumping policy, beyond cultural misperceptions, presents two problems. First, it
forced Croatia into a group of states with at least one perceived aggressor (Serbia and later
Montenegro)."224If the EU would continue to insist that Croatia be regionalized, the state could
find itself forcibly integrated with the other former republics of Yugoslavia, thus recreating the
exact same environment Croatians had worked hard to escape from. In addition, this action
would greatly impair Croatian sovereignty as it would force the country to undergo a fusion it
does not believe is in the national interests of the country. Stojic reaffirms this idea when he
emphasizes, "The main characteristics of anti-EU stances in Croatia is the fear of the restoration
of new Yugoslavia, this time within the EU, where Croatia would be in the same position as it
was before it got the independence in the early 1990s."225This shows that for Croatians
regionalization would be the realization of long held fears. Essentially, the EU conditionality
have pushed Croatia in a direction of regionalization that it has no desire to undergo.
Conclusion: An End to Croatian Sovereignty
Overall, Croatian conditionality requirements have marked the country's accession
negotiations with a series of unwanted concessions. These modifications visually exemplify the
double standards within the EU. In addition, the EU desired aims for Croatia have proven to be
counter to the state's national interests and future goals within Europe and the EU. It seems that
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every time Croatia appeases the EU, the institution continues to add outrageous requirements for
the country to achieve. Since conditionality has marked Croatia's largely unfair accession
process, it begs the question if this will define its status as an official EU member?
For Croatians, the EU meant fulfilling a dream of recognition and respect as an
independent country, that has and continues to contribute to the well-being of Europe.
Unfortunately, like the EU's dalliance with identity, sovereignty within the EU is merely a set of
empty promises. Therefore, Croatia has come to find that the institution has no interest in the
preservation of its sovereignty. In fact, like a parasite, the EU has steadily eaten away at Croatian
political rights and autonomy. As Croatia's political power has diminished, it leaves the question
of how this will affect the country's sustainability within the future? Controlled by an institution
that does not support Croatian independence, the justified experience of war, and that has created
geopolitical strain for the Croats, it reveals that Croatians have already lost more than they have
gained by it entrance into the EU. This foreshadows an EU Croatia without the ability to control
even its most basic political values and needs, as it will be bound by its servitude to the
organization.
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Conclusion: Croatia's Future & The Pattern of Discrimination Within the EU
The Findings
In the wake of visualized issues and tensions plaguing the EU, this research was
conducted in order to answer the question of what forms EU opposition within Croatia? Upon
completion of this investigation, it has been concluded that the EU is not beneficial for the
Croatian state or its people. While there are arguably some economic gains the country will
achieve through its affiliation with the organization, they do not outweigh the price paid through
Croatian identity and sovereignty. In the analysis of Croatia's relationship with the EU, it has
been found that the organization has marketed around itself around idealistic ideas, rather than
truthful realities. To begin with, the EU has unsuccessfully attempted to create an EU identity
based around multiculturalism. Instead of searching for alternative solutions, the institution
resorted to Europeanization. This tactic has been created with the goal of Europeanizing member
and candidate states according to what the EU considers as European. The issue that has arisen
regarding this approach is that the EU is a Western European led organization. As a result, this
has reduced the EU to a supranational partnership based on an East West divide, double
standards, and discrimination. Unfortunately, this tactic means Central and Eastern European
candidate and member states suffer at the hands of their Western European counterparts. The
discrimination and double standards have influenced and dictated EU policy, which have
resulted in Central and Eastern European states receiving the brunt of these goals. Whether it be
the French xenophobia of Polish plumbers that influenced EU policy to postpone Polish
migration or the double standards of the EU Roma policy between Romania and France, it
reveals that the organization is very much West against East.
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As for Croatia it has found its identity considered an unwelcome guest by the EU.
Croatians were driven to enter the organization by more than potential economic gains, it was a
chance to be recognized as an independent nation, without the attachment to Yugoslavia.
Tragically, the EU continues to identify Croatia, as a Balkan country. To be considered Balkan is
more than an inaccurate geographical term for Croatians, but an attachment to negative
stereotypes and beliefs regarding the country and its people. While the EU has professed equality
and acceptance of different cultures, the reality couldn't be further from the truth, especially in
regards to Croatia. The EU has used the perceptions forming the Balkan term to define its policy
on the Croatian state. As a result, Croatians not only have forcibly been classified as Balkan, but
has had to whether a storm of assaults against the founding aspects of Croatian identity,
Christianity, language, and the war of independence. Therefore, the EU desires Croatia the
country, but not the Croatian people.
In a similar fashion, the EU has also been unsuccessful in the area of sovereignty. The
institution argued that by members agreeing to surrender some political rights, the EU would be
able to provide better assistance and security for the states. In practice, however, it has created an
environment that supports the abuse of power. As states have given up their rights, they have no
chance to contend EU policies that it does not agree with, due to the fact that there are no checks
and balances regarding the organization's leadership. Consequently, the Westphalian principles
of sovereignty including state domestic control, self determination, and equality have been
marginalized and dictated by EU desires. This leaves the question of whether a surrendering of
sovereignty is in the best interest of the states or the organization?
Croatia, like many other states, has faced issues regarding it sovereignty within the EU.
The Croatian people have found that despite being officially recognized as an independent
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country, many members within the EU, as well the organization itself refuse to treat it as such. In
addition, it has found its national interests compromised by the EU's endless conditionality
requirements, which promote double standards, and unwanted regionalization. Furthermore, the
Croatian state's autonomy and political rights have been victimized by an EU that allows
conflicts of interest and discrimination to influence Croatia's geopolitics. This has been clearly
demonstrated by the strained diplomatic ties Croatia has with Slovenia, Italy, and other countries
that have used their membership against the Croatian state and its people. If Croatia continues
down this path it will lose everything and gain nothing by its affiliation with the EU.
Limitations
While this research was meant to cover issues regarding Croatia's accession process,
there are limitations to this investigation. All of the themes, problems, and policies mentioned
within this piece, could be expanded. The previously mentioned aspects cover a wide range of
information that would add further depth to this research if capitalized on. In addition, Croatia's
relationship with the EU is always changing, with new issues emerging constantly, especially
since the state's induction as an official member within the organization. Arguably more time
spent in Croatia would uncover an increasing amount of print evidence, respondents, and
perspective regarding the country's stability and sustainability within the EU and the future.
In addition, it has been noted that Croatia's struggles with the EU, represents a larger
pattern of discrimination against Central and Eastern states occurring within the organization If
given a significant amount of time and access to evidence, this research could be expanded to
better account for these problems occurring within the EU. By doing this it would establish and
visually exemplify a major flaw within the institution, that comes at the expense of Central and
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Eastern European member and candidate states. As a result, the research could assist in providing
solutions for countries that have been adversely affected by this issue.
Recommendations
This investigation was conducted in order to benefit Croatia and the Croatian people.
Croatians have fought hard for independence and recognition. Yet, as this research shows, the
state's relationship with the EU threatens the very heart of Croatian identity and sovereignty. The
issues covered within this piece painstakingly reveal that Croatia is on the way to repeating
history. It is aligning itself with an institution that does not respect Croatian values and
independence. To acknowledge this is a chance for Croatia to avoid a tragic outcome, by
demanding the equality and respect the state and people deserve. It is time for Croatians to
believe in themselves, the country, and the fact that it does not have to risk oppression in order to
sustain. In many ways, these recommendations could apply to any Central and Eastern European
EU candidate or member that has found its principles assaulted and compromised by the
organization. Croatia and these other states should begin to openly assert their beliefs and
intentions to preserve them. Otherwise Croatia, and other states, may end up like lions in a
circus, obeying the crack of the EU ringmaster's whip.
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Appendix
English and Croatian Interview Questions
1. How do you feel about the European Union?
Ko je je Vaše mišljenje o Europskoj Uniji?
2. Why do you think there is support for Croatia to join the European Union?
Ko ji su Vaši razlozi za podršku ulazku Hrvatski u Europsku Uniji? ili
Koji su Vaši razlozi protiv ulazka Hrvatske u Europsku Uniju?
3. Do you have any concerns about Croatia becoming an EU member?
Imate li neke zadrške kada je u pitanju ulazak Hrvatske u EU?
4. Do you agree with the sentiment that Croatia is an Eastern European country?
Imate li neke zadrške po pitanju svrstavanju Hrvatske u područje Zapadne Balkan od
strane EU?
5. What would you say are the most important aspects of Croatian culture and or identity?
Što bi bila Vama definicija Hrvatske u EU?
6. How do you feel Croatia's identity will be impacted by its integration into the EU?
Kakva če uticaja imate članstvo Hrvatske u EU na hrvatski identitet?
7. What do you think of the EU's conditionality requirements that were placed on Croatia?
Što je Vaše mišljenje o preduvjetima ko je je Hrvatska morala ispunjavati u predstupnim
pregovorima? Jesu li oni bili fer?
8. Did you feel personally affected by any of the changes that have taken place as a result of the
European Union?
Hoče li ulazak u EU napraviti odreñene promjerne u Vašem osobnom životu ?
9. In 2009 Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor agreed to arbitrage regarding Piran Bay and Slovenia,
in favor for EU accession. How do you feel about that?
U 2009 god. predsnica Vlade RH je potpisala ugovor o arbitraži sa Slovenijom umjesto
meñunarodnog suda u Haagu vezano uz Piranski zaljev-koja bi forma po Vašem mišljenju
bila bolja?
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10. How do you perceive Slovenian-Croatian relations?
Mislite li da če se odnosi sa Slovenijom poslije ulazka Hrvatske u EU poboljšati ili
pogoršati?
11. Recently the EU has halted Croatia's right to distribute prosek, until the name has been
changed. What do you think of that development?
EU nije dozvolila Hrvatskoj distribuciju prošeka bez promjene imena-mislite li da če biti
još mnogo sličenih slučajeva?
12. What role do you see Croatia's sovereignty playing within the EU?
Koliko če se od hrvatskog suverenita održati u EU?
13. Do you think the EU understands and or respects Croatian history or culture?
Hoče li EU razumjete i poštivati hrvatsku povjest i kulturu?
14. How do you view the EU in regards to Croatian independence? Have your feelings changed?
Mnoge države članice EU u prošlosti nisu davale podršku hrvatskoj neovisnosti, mislite
li da če se to promijeniti kada Hrvatska postane članicom EU?
15. How do you think EU has affected Croatia's stability (Immigrant issues & increased rights
for minorities)?
Koliko če članstvo Hrvatske u EU utjecati na stabilnost Hrvatske vezano uz pitanje
immigracija, emigracija, i prava manjina?
16. Have you followed any of the EU opposition movements in other countries such as Poland?
Koje je Vaše misljenje o opoziciji prema EU danas u mnogim zemljama članicama EU:
Grčka, Cipar, Španjolska, Portugal, Italija... koliko če biti sličnost Hrvatske u EU sa
navedenim zemljama?
17. How do you feel about Italy? Adriatic Sea?
Koje Vaše misljenje o Jadransku moru kao europskom moru a ne više mare nostrum
Croatorum?
18. Since other countries from former Yugoslavia are joining the EU does it mean that Croatia
will be in worse situation than it was in Yugoslavia?
Neče li buduči ulazak zemalja bivše Yugoslavia u EU odvesti ponono Hrvatsku u neku
novu Balkansku zajednicu?
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